Life of William, Earl of Shelburne/Volume 2/Chapter 6

by Edmond George Petty-Fitzmaurice

 

CHAPTER VI

 

THE SECOND NEGOTIATION IN PARIS

 

1782-1783

 

On the 5th of October, after a certain delay caused by the illness of Franklin, Jay handed Oswald the plan of a treaty. It contained the clauses relating to Independence, Boundaries, and the Fishery question, already proposed by Franklin to Oswald, and consequently included the American claim to dry fish on the shores of Newfoundland. Oswald considering it at least doubtful whether in the interests of peace it would not be better to yield the latter point, accepted the clause as it stood, nor did he make any attempt at asserting the claims of the English Crown over the ungranted domains, deeming that no real distinction could be drawn between them and the other sovereign rights, which were necessarily to be ceded. The American Commissioners absolutely refused to yield on the subject of the debts contracted prior to 1775, or to admit the claims of the Loyalists.^[1] The territory between the Mississippi and the Alleghanies, the subject of the numerous boundary controversies described in the earlier portions of this work, was already in American hands, as most of the forts which commanded important positions had been taken by the Colonial troops, and Great Britain, Oswald considered, had now no choice but to relinquish her claims.^[2]

The clause relating to the limits of Canada and Nova Scotia on the one hand, and the United States on the other, gave rise to much discussion. From the earliest period of American history the boundaries of the various Northern Colonies had been in dispute. While France still held Canada, England attempted to deny that any part of the territory south of the St. Lawrence belonged to that province; but after the Peace of 1763 this theory was abandoned, and the Commissions of the English Governors defined the Western boundary of Nova Scotia to be the St. Croix, and a line drawn due north from the source of that river to the southern boundary of the province of Canada. Everything west of the St. Croix and the above line and south of the boundary of Canada, was left to the State of Massachusetts, which then included Maine. The point where the line drawn due north from the St. Croix touched the Canadian frontier, came to be known as the North West angle of Nova Scotia, being the angle formed by the above line and an imaginary line drawn along the Highlands dividing the rivers flowing into the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the sea and into the North West coast of the Baie des Chaleurs. This latter line by the Proclamation of 1763 had been declared to be the southern boundary of Canada.^[3] No accurate survey however had been made of the country, and the exact position of the North West angle had consequently never been accurately determined; but it was generally considered to be near the head of the branch of the St. John, now known as the Madawaska, but then incorrectly considered the main stream. Most of the maps published since 1763 placed the North West angle at or near that point. The general course of the St. John and the Madawaska is continuous from North to South, and Jay now proposed to adopt those rivers as the eastern boundary; to settle the North West angle of Nova Scotia to be in the Highlands at the head of that river near Lake Medousa; and then, following the terms of the Proclamation of 1763, to draw the southern boundary of Canada from the North West angle along the Highlands to the north-westernmost head of the Connecticut River; thence along the middle of that river to Lat. 45, thence along that line to the North West bank of the river St. Lawrence, thence to the southern end of Lake Nipissing, and so straight to the source of the river Mississippi. Beyond that river, everything was a terra incognita, technically claimed by Spain, but in the actual possession of the Indian and the buffalo, where as yet the footprint of the European colonist had hardly been planted, and the claims of rival invaders were not sufficiently conflicting to need accurate definition.^[4]

These boundaries were accepted by Oswald, but Franklin subsequently suggested that as the eastern boundary of Massachusetts was a matter of doubt, it should be settled by a Commission appointed ad hoc. Oswald hoping that a further discussion might lead to a settlement more favourable to England than that put forward by Jay, at once accepted the suggestion, and a clause was accordingly interlined to that effect.^[5]

To the clauses relating to the above questions, another for reciprocal freedom of commerce was added at the instance of Jay, who, so Oswald said, pleaded in favour of the future commerce of England as if he had been of her Council. He also strongly urged that West Florida should not be yielded by England to Spain.^[6]

The clause ran as follows:—

 

"That the navigation of the River Mississippi from its source to the ocean shall ever remain free and open, and that both there and in all rivers, harbours, lakes, ports and places, belonging to His Britannic Majesty, or to the United States, in any part of the world, the merchants and merchant ships of the one and the other shall be received, treated, and protected like the merchants and merchant ships of the Sovereign of the country. That is to say, the British merchants and merchant ships on the one hand shall enjoy in the United States, and in all places belonging to them, the same protection and commercial privileges, and be liable only to the same charges and duties as their own merchants and merchant ships, and on the other hand the merchants and merchant ships of the United States shall enjoy in all places belonging to His Britannic Majesty the same protection and commercial privileges, and be liable only to the same charges and duties as British merchants and merchant ships, saving always to the Chartered Trading Companies of Great Britain such exclusive use and trade, and the respective Ports and Establishments, as neither the other subjects of Great Britain nor any the most favoured nation participate in."^[7]

 

Such was the draft treaty sent over by Oswald; in its terms very favourable to the Americans, but as he explained to Townshend avowedly drawn with that object, in order to lay the foundation of future good will, and to leave as few causes of future difference as possible, between the two nations. For the same reason Oswald said nothing on the subject of a future alliance with the States, as he had observed the extreme susceptibility of both Jay and Franklin on anything being mentioned which might seem even in the remotest degree derogatory to the complete independence of their country. He considered that the time to allude to such questions was after, not before, the signature of the treaty, which he urged ought to follow at once, knowing, as he told Shelburne and Townshend, how much it must influence the foreign treaties to the advantage of England, and also how much it had been the wish of the Ministers of France and Spain that the two treaties should only advance simultaneously.^[8]

On the 6th of October, Vergennes handed to Fitzherbert two memorials, containing the demands of France and Spain. In the West Indies, Dominica and St. Lucia were both demanded by France, and in Europe the clauses relating to the fortress of Dunkirk contained in previous treaties were to be rescinded. These propositions were expected; as was also the cession of the river Senegal and the island of Goree. In India however France demanded not only the restoration of the French factories in Bengal and Orissa, with the right of fortifying Chandernagore and the surrender of Pondicherry, Karikal, and the Comptoir of Surat, but also the whole of the Northern Circars and Masulipatam; and in America the concession of an exclusive right of fishery off Newfoundland from Cape St. John to the Point à la Lune,^[9] and one or more islands in full possession, to be fortified and serve as a guarantee to their fishermen. The demands of Spain were still more extreme. They included the cession of Minorca, of the English possessions and rights in Honduras, Campeachy and the Mosquito shore, of all Florida, of the Bahamas, of the Isle of Providence, and lastly of Gibraltar; for which however Oran and Mazalquivir were offered as some compensation. Fitzherbert frankly told D'Aranda that under the instructions he had received from Shelburne there was not the slightest chance of England accepting these terms.^[10]

The Spanish demand for Gibraltar was encouraged by the knowledge that the idea of ceding it had not in times past been unknown to the statesmen of England, and had been even favourably regarded by Stanhope and by Chatham.^[11] Hardly however had Spain renewed it, before the intelligence arrived of the complete and final failure of the attack on the fortress by the combined armies and fleets of the allies. How to relieve it had been one of the most anxious considerations of the Cabinet. At one of their meetings in September, the Chancellor came into the room where they were all assembled, and in his blunt manner asked where was the man who could point out the means to save Gibraltar?

 

"Lord Keppel," so the Duke of Grafton relates, "replied to the Chancellor, that he certainly had a plan prepared for our consideration and approval, which he would proceed to open to the Cabinet. But he expressed his concern, that he was obliged to state to them another service as pressing, and equally necessary as the relief required for Gibraltar; viz. to get the Baltic fleet safe into our ports. The convoy of this fleet having been informed of the force of the Dutch in the Texel, had put into a port of Norway, I think Bergen, for safety.

Lord Keppel plainly told us that the King's yards were so destitute of naval stores, that our dependence for the means of continuing another campaign rested on the safe arrival of these ships, which were laden with all that was wanted for our navy. His lordship added that neither service could be neglected or deferred; and that he hoped to be able to point out the means by which both objects might be effected. The Duke of Richmond, said Lord Keppel, acquaints me, that two transports laden with ordnance stores cannot be ready to sail with the fleet in less time than a fortnight. The wind, says he, is now at west, which will keep Lord Howe's fleet at Spithead from going down Channel, as well as the Dutch from coming out of harbour. My plan is this, says his Lordship, and it waits your concurrence, for everything else is prepared. Under the sanction of your authority I would before I went to bed, send Lord Howe orders to detach Vice-Admiral Milbanke with fourteen ships of the line: the Dutch from the best and surest information cannot muster more than eleven of the line fit for sea. I have too good an opinion of the wisdom of my old friends as to suppose they would be so rash as to risk their fleet out against one superior to theirs, both in numbers and size of the ships. To Admiral Milbanke, Lord Keppel said, that further orders should go, to direct him on the instant of the wind turning to the east, to sail back to rejoin Lord Howe, who on descrying the return of this part of the fleet would get under way and join at sea, in order to proceed on their voyage. Your Lordships in the mean time, said Lord Keppel, need be under no apprehensions of the Dutch coming out of port hastily on the disappearance of our ships: for they will naturally conclude that they are blown by the easterly wind into the Downs: and they are too cautious to put to sea, until they have by some scouts ascertained this point. To effectuate this will necessarily cause a delay of forty-eight hours at least: during which time every ship of the Baltic fleet may get with security into some of our ports. For I propose, says he, to send the most positive orders to the officers commanding the convoy at Bergen, without a moment's delay, as soon as the wind is at east, to run with his convoy over to any British port he can easiest reach. With these orders he will be instructed that by an adherence to them his fleet is secure, and that he would run much risk by a deviation from them.

We were all so well pleased with the relief which Lord Keppel had given to our minds, that after a few questions to indulge the curiosity of us landsmen, we assured him that we concurred most cordially with every part of his scheme. He then acquainted us that Mr. Stephens with two Lords of the Admiralty were waiting to sign the instructions, which should go into no other hands, in order for greater secrecy. We undertook to answer to his Majesty the absolute necessity there was for his service, that the whole plan should be put into motion instantly.

The wisest of human schemes are under superior control, and the present well-digested plan must have been deferred, at least had the wind come about too soon: but all was propitious, and gave just time to the officer commanding at Bergen to receive his orders and to execute them instantly with success. Admiral Milbanke with equal promptitude followed his instructions, and fell in with Lord Howe on the back of the Isle of Wight. The passage of the fleet with so large a convoy was much impeded by contrary winds. On their entrance into the Streights they saw the whole combined fleet drawn up near upon the Spanish coast. The Latona commanded by Capt. Hugh Conway (since known by the name of Lord Hugh Seymour) led in, and some way ahead, with letters to the Governor, who on seeing the Latona making for the harbour, sent to him to get back to apprize Lord Howe of his danger, but Capt. Conway answered that his admiral was well apprized of the strength and position of the enemy, and that he trusted notwithstanding, he should be able to effect the object of his mission, by succouring and supplying the citadel. Accordingly Lord Howe passed the French and Spanish fleets, and covered the store ships and victuallers while they were unlading, receiving little or no interruption in performing this service. This effected, Lord Howe, sailed through the Streights, and in the Mediterranean drew up in line, prepared if the enemy had chosen to attack him. But this was not their design, as appeared soon after; for the two fleets had a kind of running fight when the English fleet had repassed the Streights.

The enemy was so numerous that nothing could justify Lord Howe, who had answered his great object, to bring on unnecessarily an unequal contest: and his orders to detach 12 or 14 ships of the line, to reinforce Admiral Paget in the West Indies would have been frustrated, had the fleet much suffered in such a contest: wherefore the gallant Admiral having once more drawn up to offer them battle, aimed at nothing further at that time: but dispatched Vice Admiral King with the freshest of his ships to the West Indies.

Not long after the decision of the Cabinet, we received the pleasing accounts of the signal successes of the garrison itself in a well conducted and effectual sortie, as also of the distinguished manner in which the formidable attack of the enemy's floating batteries was repulsed with an entire destruction of those famous vessels.^[12]

The succour of the place being completely effected by the fleet under Lord Howe, cut off all hopes which the enemy could form; and the siege was raised to the great mortification of the Duc de Crillon, and the army he commanded."^[13]

 

The relief of Gibraltar removed the momentary depression which the foundering at Spithead in August of the Royal George and the loss of Admiral Kempenfelt and 600 men had caused; and it determined the Cabinet to withstand the demands of France and Spain, to refuse to surrender Gibraltar, and to withdraw from the offer of St. Lucia and Dominica.^[14] Realizing also that the feud between the European belligerents and the United States was already tolerably deep, and that the latter would not in any case continue the war for purely Spanish objects, they resolved to attempt to gain a modification of the American demands in favour of the English creditors and of the Loyalists: points to which Shelburne attached a greater importance than some of his colleagues. Oswald had yielded on them in conformity with the express directions of the Cabinet; they therefore thought it but just to take part of the responsibility of making new demands off his shoulders, and accordingly sent an additional negotiator to his assistance.^[15] This was Henry Strachey, once the Secretary of Clive and of Lord Howe's Commission. After serving as Secretary of the Treasury under Lord Rockingham, he had become Under-Secretary in Townshend's Department, where he was known as a man of great discretion, accuracy, and learning. He left with instructions to urge the claims of England, under the Proclamation of 1763, to the lands between the Mississippi and the western boundary of the States, and to bring forward the French boundary of Canada, which was more extensive at some points than that of the Proclamation of 1763. He was to urge these claims, and the right of the King to the ungranted domain, not indeed for their own sake, but in order to gain some compensation for the refugees, either by a direct cession of territory in their favour, or by engaging the half or some proportion of what the back lands might produce when sold, or a sum secured on those lands; or by the grant of a favourable boundary of Nova Scotia, extending, if possible, so as to include the province of Maine; or, if that could not be obtained, the province of Sagadahock, or, at the very least, Penobscot. "It is understood," so his instructions concluded, "that if nothing of this can be obtained after the fairest and most strenuous trials, it may be left to the Commissioners to settle, and the American propositions be accepted, leaving out the right of drying fish on the island of Newfoundland, and confining them to what hitherto they have used, a drift fishery; and expunging all the last article except what regards the Mississippi, Administration having no power as to the Act of Navigation.

"It must appear authentically, that every instance has been used, in favour both of the refugees and of the debts prior and subsequent to 1775, and more favourable terms must be obtained, if possible, in the way of absolute and positive engagement; if not, in the way of recognition.

"The refugees are of great importance; but, if the province of Maine be left to Nova Scotia, and the Americans can be brought to join us in regard to West Florida, there are resources which may satisfy them; but the debts require the most serious attention,—that honest debts may be honestly paid in honest money,—no Congress money."^[16]

"I trust and hope," Shelburne wrote to Oswald, announcing the departure of Strachey, "you are well founded in your judgment of the American Commissioners now at Paris. I am disposed to expect everything from Dr. Franklin's comprehensive understanding and character; and as I know nothing to the contrary, I am open to every good impression you give us of Mr. Jay. But as you desire to be assisted by my advice, I should act with great insincerity, if I did not convey to you that I find it difficult if not impossible to enter into the policy of all that you recommend upon the subject both of the fishery and the boundaries, and of the principle which you seem to have adopted of going before the Commissioners in every point of favour and confidence. The maxim is not only new in all negotiations, but I consider it as no way adapted to our present circumstances, but as diametrically opposite to our interests in the present moment.

"Supposing the Colonies to return to the state they were in in 1763, I consider it as of the utmost importance to keep the fishery as distinct as possible, to avoid the numberless disputes which occurred perpetually before the present war. But the separation on the point of taking place makes it indispensable for the welfare of both countries to prevent future contention.

"In regard to the refugees, I speak of the mass of them, avoiding to enter into particular odious cases which must always occur in such great concussions. Can there in nature be anything more reasonable than to insist on the justice due to them? Nor can a single argument be offered against it except what you urge, of the particular situation of the Commissioners acting under thirteen provinces with different interests, and in fact no common centre. To remedy this, the matter of the boundaries and back lands naturally presents itself. Independently of all the nonsense of charters, I mean when they talk of extending as far as the sun sets, the soil is, and has always been acknowledged to be the King's. For the good of America, whatever the Government may be, new provinces must be erected on those back lands and down the Mississippi; and supposing them to be sold, what can be so reasonable as that part of the province, where the King's property alone is in question, should be applied to furnish subsistence to those, whom for the sake of peace he can never consistently with his honour entirely abandon. The debts due to our merchants previous to 1775 cannot be lightly passed over. They regard some of our most considerable merchants, who are full of apprehensions, and are making daily applications to Government. Honest debts must be honestly paid and in honest money, and to prove them honest, some security is expected in lieu of the right of appeal which existed when they were contracted. These are considerations dictated by honour and justice, which can never be sufficiently dwelt and insisted on.

"But I beg to recommend the question of policy to your most serious reflection. If we are to look to regain the affections of America, to reunion in any shape, or even to commerce and friendship, is it not of the last degree of consequence to retain every means possible to gratify America at a future I hope not very distant day, when the negotiation will not be carried on at a foreign capital, not under the eye, if not the control of inveterate enemies, nor under the reputed impulse of absolute necessity.

"This is to me such an obvious line of policy, that I cannot believe it possible for it to escape your attention, and indeed am very clearly of opinion that your whole endeavour should be pointed to it. And if there is the disposition you mention in the Commissioners towards Great Britain, and it is stated to them with address, I should think they might be brought to enter into it, as they must feel it perfectly consistent with the language hitherto held to them. It is at the same time certainly of importance to preserve their confidence and good will, where it can be done without sacrifices which mere speculation can never warrant.

"I have nothing else to add, except the particular satisfaction which it gives me to find that what has passed hitherto in the American or French negotiation has given rise to no speculation in the funds. I need not tell you the numbers which are upon the watch, and of how much importance it is to the reputation of every person concerned to avoid the possibility of it, which can only be done by the most determined reserve on every particular where communication can by any labour or pains be avoided."^[17]

He at the same time wrote to Mr. Fitzherbert:—

"I have an extremely good opinion of M. de Rayneval, and wish him to understand that the manner in which he conducted himself here gave satisfaction. Several expressions which dropped from him have confirmed me in an opinion that the French Court desire peace. It is certainly their interest, as the events of war and the duration of alliances are uncertain, though now in their favour. The war on their part could have no reasonable object except an extension of commerce. According to what is proposed they will have obtained and secured it to the east and west without limitation. The independence of the Thirteen Provinces ensures the one, and it is my determination to grant the other, upon the same footing as to our own subjects. Nothing remains in our favour except the territory, a doubtful good and certainly not worth having, if the seeds of a rival power are suffered to be sown anywhere from Bengal to Madras, much less a foreign standard planted either in Bengal or at Masulipatam. They have as much the right to expect it within Great Britain, and it would be much safer, because we could better guard against it. Considering the length we go in other quarters of the world, particularly in Newfoundland, and the balance, if you try it on paper, in their favour, I cannot conceive there will be any real hesitation on their part, and it is our determination that it shall be either war or peace before we meet the Parliament; for I need not tell you that we shall have then to meet so many opinions and passions supported by party and different mercantile interests, that no negotiation can advance with credit to those employed. It may be of importance that the French Ministry be made to understand this clearly, and it may be the means of bringing both them and the Spaniards to an ultimatum, which will leave nothing to us but to say yes or no. This would be very desirable in many points of view, and appears to me the only certain way of preventing infinite discontent."^[18]

Shelburne also wrote to Rayneval reminding him of their private conversations, after which he said it was impossible to enter into the discussion of new propositions less advantageous to Great Britain than those then put forward. "Pour moi," he went on to say, "ni le succès à Gibraltar, ni les nouvelles les plus agréables de nos Flottes, ni les difficultés intérieures, que j'ai à combattre ici, n'auront l'effet de porter aucun changement (autant qu'il dépend de moi) dans les sentimens que je vous ai temoignés pour terminer la guerre par un accommodement honorable et modéré."^[19]

The views of the English Cabinet were placed before Vergennes and D'Aranda by Fitzherbert. He soon found the effect of the victory at Gibraltar, and that except in regard to Dominica there would be no difficulty of any magnitude with France, who withdrew from her demand of the Circars and Masulipatam, and of an exclusive right of fishery off Newfoundland, on condition that England should agree "ministériellement" to secure an uninterrupted enjoyment of their occupation to the French fishermen, by means of instructions given to the Colonial Governors.^[20] Vergennes also at first seemed disinclined to support the extreme demands of Spain, who now evidently despaired of obtaining Gibraltar except by negotiation, and for a fair equivalent. He said that the conduct of that country "was like that of a petty shopkeeper, who thinks that the only way to get a fair price for his goods is to begin by asking ten times more than they are worth"; and he added in the same strain of derision, that "he thought the best method we could follow in order to shame them out of so paltry a manner of proceeding was to act the more dignified part of the respectable wholesale merchant, and deliver in, at a single word, the terms which we were resolved at all events to adhere to."^[21]

On the Court of Madrid however standing firm, Vergennes abruptly assumed a different attitude, and seemed to Fitzherbert to carry the matter even further than D'Aranda; saying that peace with Spain could not be made without the cession of Gibraltar. D'Aranda being pressed on the point by Fitzherbert, said he would give anything in exchange for it except one of the limbs of Spain. Being asked what he understood by that expression, he said that it included Porto Rico, which George III., who was in no manner opposed to the cession of the fortress, had set his heart on obtaining in exchange.^[22] So little aware however were his descendants of the sentiments of their predecessor on the throne, that on the formation of Lord Grey's Cabinet in 1830, William IV. insisted on a declaration from Lord Lansdowne, that he had no intention of renewing the proposition which he attributed to Lord Shelburne of ceding Gibraltar, a proposition to which, so William IV. declared, no patriotic king could possibly accede.

Simultaneously with this change of front on the part of Vergennes, the Dutch plenipotentiaries Berkenroode and Brantsen, who had at length arrived in Paris with full powers, informed Fitzherbert, in what the latter considered a very dictatorial manner, that they would insist on the recognition by England of the principles laid down by Fox in his despatch of April to M. Simolin, in regard to the Armed Neutrality being recognized by England as a preliminary to any treaty of peace with the Dutch Republic.^[23] They also demanded the restitution of all the English conquests, and compensation for all the captured Dutch merchant vessels. These demands Fitzherbert refused, explaining that he considered that the despatch of Fox had become null and void, from the moment that the overture for peace which it likewise contained had been rejected by Holland, as it had been.^[24]

The respective negotiators being entirely unable to come to any terms, the French Government again despatched Rayneval to England.

On arriving Rayneval proceeded to demand Dominica for France, and suggested the following arrangement regarding Gibraltar; viz. that France should yield Dominica and Guadaloupe to England, receive Gibraltar in exchange, and then arrange for an equivalent with Spain. Shelburne however rejected both propositions, and intimated to Rayneval that the negotiation could not drag on for ever, and that a definite determination for peace or war must be come to. He was convinced from the language and attitude of the French emissary, that his principals had no real intention of continuing the war for purely Spanish objects; he knew that a separate peace could now, whenever he chose, be concluded with America, and that France would then have to ask herself the question, whether in order to gain Gibraltar for Spain she would choose to encounter the yet formidable though reduced power of England. "Our finances," he said to Rayneval, "are impaired, but not so much so as those of France."^[25]

Hoping to be able to announce both pacifications at the opening of the session, the Ministers resolved to prorogue Parliament from the 26th of November, the day for which it had been summoned, to the 5th of December. Their decision was communicated in a letter from Townshend to the Lord Mayor of London, which stated that the wish of the Ministers was to keep the country as fully informed as the circumstances of the case admitted of what was passing, and thereby to prevent speculation in the funds.^[26] The correspondence of Shelburne and Townshend at this period with Oswald, Strachey, and Fitzherbert, reveals their constant anxiety to prevent the inventions of the numerous stock-jobbers, who kept rapidly passing between London and Paris, and disseminating false news in both cities, from taking effect on the public mind. The speculators, aware of this, revenged themselves by spreading abroad a report that the Prime Minister himself had been taking advantage of his official knowledge to speculate, and the Opposition hacks were not ashamed to lend themselves to the calumny.^[27] One of the most celebrated of Gillray's caricatures represents him with a booted and spurred French courier on his left just arrived from Paris with the news that the Preliminaries were signed, and on his right a group of Jews waiting to receive the payment of the sums supposed to have been lent on the security of Shelburne House, and about to be paid off with the results of successful stock-jobbing. On the wall behind the Minister are hung the portraits or Ignatius Loyola, Malagrida, and Calvin. The same charge had curiously enough been brought against the former owner of Shelburne House, Lord Bute, at the time of the peace of 1763.

The negotiations with America had meanwhile been prospering. Caleb Whitefoord now describes Oswald as busily "employed in drawing up schemes and plans in behalf of the Loyalists and for annoying our enemies."^[28] Strachey had arrived in Paris before the end of October, and almost simultaneously John Adams joined his colleagues. The latter shared the dislike for the French entertained by Jay, considering them essentially false and untrustworthy in character. He told Franklin his opinion, and carried the day in favour of negotiating separately, and communicating as little as possible with Vergennes; but it was only with great reluctance that Franklin yielded. John Adams also conceded without hesitation the justice of the English demand, that the treaty should give to English merchants the right of collecting all debts due to them in the United States previous to the commencement of hostilities. He said "he had no notion of cheating anybody. The question of paying debts and compensating Tories were two." Franklin was not present at the interview when this point was settled, but felt the uselessness of protesting. Strachey and Oswald, the latter of whom acknowledged that he ought to have been firmer, now wrote in hopeful terms to the Ministers in England.^[29]

 

A noble Lord, on an approaching Peace, too busy to attend to the Expenditure of a Million of the Public Money———JSF

Pubd March 12th 1787, by R. Phillips, Southwke London

 

B.

Stanford's Geographical Establ.

London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd

On the 30th of October, and the three following days, formal interviews took place between the negotiators of the two countries. The American Commissioners having practically thrown over the French alliance, had to recede from the extreme demands originally formulated by Franklin.^[30] They agreed to accept the St. Croix instead of the St. John, as the boundary, and that from its source the Eastern boundary should be the line indicated in the Proclamation of 1763, up to the point where that line intersects the Highlands separating the rivers falling into the Atlantic Ocean from those falling into the river St. Lawrence. From that point, which was to constitute the North West angle of Nova Scotia, the boundary was to follow the Highlands to the north-westernmost head of the Connecticut River, thence follow the middle of that river to Lat. 45, then run through the centre of the water communications of the great lakes to the Lake of the Woods,and from that point to the source of the Mississippi, which was then supposed to lie due west. Some deviations in the proposed line were left at the option of the English Government. "I despatch," wrote Strachey to the English Ministers, "the boundary line originally sent to you by Mr. Oswald, and two other lines proposed by the American Commissioners after my arrival at Paris. Either of these you are to choose. They are both better than the original line, as well in respect to Canada as to Nova Scotia."^[31]

It was the loss of the map, with the line marked out as finally agreed upon, which led to the difficulties which were only terminated in 1842 by the Ashburton Treaty. The line drawn upon the map was the only means of affixing an exact meaning to the words used. It ought after the signature of the Final Treaty to have been worked out on the spot by special Commissioners appointed ad hoc. Owing however to the negligence of those who signed the Final Treaty, Boundary Commissioners were never named.^[32]

The American Commissioners next abandoned the claim of drying fish on the coast of Newfoundland, on condition that their fishermen should be given the right on the unsettled parts of the coast of Nova Scotia. The right of fishing in the Gulf of St. Lawrence was at the same time conceded to them.

The future position of the Loyalists alone remained to be dealt with; for the right of the King to the ungranted domain had to be abandoned, as Oswald had foreseen. The struggle on this point proved very sharp, and Oswald wrote in terms of the highest praise of the skill, knowledge, and perseverance of his colleague.^[33] The American Commissioners however would not yield. "With regard to the refugees," wrote Strachey to Townshend, "I see nothing for them except what you have in Canada, and the little piece now added to Nova Scotia, between the original boundary sent to you by Mr. Oswald and that now obtained."^[34]

Before leaving Paris however, Strachey and Oswald addressed formal and separate demands in writing to the American Commissioners on the subject of the Loyalists, to which the latter again refused to listen, except upon condition that England should agree to make retribution to those Americans who had suffered loss by the depredations of the English army. Notwithstanding this refusal, Strachey still believed that Jay and Adams would make some concession on the point rather than break off the treaty; Oswald recognized the obduracy of Franklin, but was not so hopeful as Strachey in regard to his colleagues.^[35]

Such was the position of affairs in the middle of November when Rayneval returned to France and Strachey to England. As the moment approached when the tie between the Colonies and England was about to be formally severed, George III. grew more and more restive. "I am too much agitated," he wrote to Shelburne, "with a fear of sacrificing the interests of my country by hurrying it on too fast, which indeed has been uppermost in my thoughts since the beginning of the war, that I am unable to add anything on that subject, but the most frequent prayers to heaven to guide me so to act, that posterity may not lay the downfall of this once respectable Empire at my door; and that if ruin should attend the measures that may be adopted, I may not long survive them. … I cannot conclude without mentioning how sensibly I feel the dismemberment of America from the Empire, and that I should be miserable indeed if I did not feel that no blame on that account can be laid to my door, and did I not also know that knavery seems to be so much the striking feature of the inhabitants, that it may not in the end be an evil that they will become aliens to this Kingdom."^[36]

With a full appreciation of the difficulties that arose from the attitude of the King, Shelburne met his Cabinet. Richmond and Keppel were very bitter against Oswald, who they declared was only an additional American negotiator, and they proposed to recall him. This Shelburne and Townshend refused to do, as they especially desired that Oswald should be in Paris to negotiate a commercial treaty, as soon as the necessary Acts of Parliament had been passed. The main question however they had to settle was what course they would pursue in regard to the Loyalists. Shelburne had very strong opinions of his own on the question, and the public voice demanded in no unmistakable terms that they should not be abandoned. On the other hand there was the risk that persistence might throw the Americans back into the arms of France. The bolder course recommended itself to the mind of Shelburne, notwithstanding the persuasions of Vaughan, who undertook another journey from Paris to try to induce him to give way. Strachey was instructed to return to Paris, and while accepting the main propositions already put forward, to demand the addition of certain limitations taken from former treaties with France, as to the distance within which the American fishermen were to be allowed to fish off Cape Breton and other islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and to insist once more on an indemnity for the estates of the refugees and the Loyalists, and for the proprietary rights of the Penns and the heirs of Lord Baltimore, and for a recognition of the validity of debts contracted subsequently as well as prior to 1775.^[37] "It is no idea of interest," Shelburne wrote to Oswald, "which actuates us in regard to the refugees; it is a higher principle. This country is not reduced to terms of humiliation, and certainly will not suffer them from America. If Ministers through timidity or indolence could be induced to give way, I am persuaded the nation would rise to do itself justice, and to recover its wounded honour. If the Commissioners reflect a moment with that coolness which ought to accompany their employment, I cannot conceive they will think it the interest of America to leave any root of animosity behind, much less to lodge it with posterity in the heart of the treaty. It is a very inferior consideration, and what you will do me the justice to acknowledge that I never leant to, what affects the Ministers of the day. Our uniform conduct ought to speak for itself, and it must lie with the Americans what return they choose to make.

"If the American Commissioners think that they will gain by the whole coming before Parliament, I do not imagine the refugees will have any objection."^[38]

Strachey returned to Paris in the middle of November. It was known in London that the negotiation was reaching a crisis. "Our ultimatum is gone," Horace Walpole wrote to Mann on the 26th. During Strachey's absence the breach between France and the United States had been sensibly widened, for Vergennes had not only persisted in his views on the fishery and boundary questions, but had stated that in his opinion the demands of the American Commissioners on the subject of the Loyalists were unreasonable, and that France would not continue the war for American objects.^[39] The American Commissioners, on the other hand, said they would not continue war for French and Spanish objects. "You are afraid," said Oswald to Adams, "of being made the tools of the Powers of Europe." "Indeed I am," replied Adams. "What Powers?" asked Oswald. "All of them," bluntly replied Adams.^[40]

While Strachey was still in England various conversations had taken place between Oswald and the Commissioners, and at one of these Oswald suggested, that since Jay and his colleagues would not positively undertake to grant a restitution or compensation to the refugees and Loyalists, they might still add a clause to the treaty "of recommendation to the Congress in their favour in general"; but all to no purpose. On the return of Strachey to Paris, Oswald communicated the idea to him, and they resolved with the consent of Fitzherbert to bring it forward a second time.^[41]

On the 28th November the negotiators met at Oswald's lodgings. Mr. Laurens, who had been exchanged for Lord Cornwallis, had now joined his colleagues, just in time to take a share in the final discussions. The interview began by Strachey "clearly telling the American Commissioners that the restitution of the property of the Loyalists was the grand point upon which a final settlement depended. If the treaty should break off, the whole business must go loose, and take its chance in parliament." The American Commissioners now practically stood alone, and to a certain extent felt the consequences of their isolation. After long discussions they agreed that there should be no further confiscations of property nor prosecutions of Loyalists, and that all pending prosecutions should be discontinued. They further practically accepted the idea which Oswald had put forward a few days previously; and it was agreed that Congress should recommend to the Legislatures of the several States, an amnesty and the restitution of all confiscated property. With regard to the fishery the British Commissioners yielded. On the other hand, the fourth article which was intended for the security of creditors before the war was extended to all creditors.^[42]

There was now nothing further to settle. The only question was whether the British Commissioners could venture to sign without consulting their principals. Franklin was really anxious to conclude; on the other hand, he threatened that if there was any further delay he would reopen the question of the Loyalists, and the British Commissioners knowing that they had everything to lose and nothing to gain by delay, decided to sign at once.

To save the consciences of the American Commissioners, and to give them a technical defence against the inevitable complaints of France, the Articles now signed were declared in the Preamble to be those "to be inserted in and to constitute the Treaty of Peace," but the Treaty it was declared "was not to be concluded until terms of a Peace shall be agreed upon between Great Britain and France."

"A very few hours ago," Oswald wrote to Shelburne on the 29th, "we thought it impossible that any treaty could be made. We have at last however brought matters so near a conclusion that we have agreed upon articles, and are to meet to-morrow for the purpose of signing. In such particulars as the treaty falls short of your Lordship's wish or expectation the imputation must be upon the inflexibility of uncommon circumstances."^[43] Oswald and Whitefoord—they were both Scotchmen—noted as of good augury that it was St. Andrew's day on which the Treaty was signed. "If," wrote Strachey, "this is not as good a peace as was expected I am confident it is the best that could have been made. Now are we to be hanged or applauded for thus rescuing England from the American war?"^[44]

While Oswald and Strachey were negotiating with the American Commissioners, the French and Spanish Ministers were considering the English reply to their proposals. The result of their deliberations was an offer on the part of Spain to cede West Florida to England for Gibraltar; but France still refused to accede to the retention by England of Dominica and of Trincomalee. With these proposals Rayneval returned to England on the 2nd of December, accompanied by M. de Vergennes' son, and was shortly after joined by M. de Heredia, Secretary to the Spanish Embassy in Paris, and by M. Tor on behalf of the States-General.

Rayneval was the bearer of a private letter from Vergennes to Shelburne, expressing a fervent hope that the propositions now sent over would be found acceptable. "Eh! que n'hasarderais-je pas," said the French Minister, "pour être utile au genre humain"; and all through the letter his own individual wish for peace was apparent, tempered by a desire to satisfy the demands of Spain and the amour-propre of his own countrymen.^[45] "The letter from M. de Vergennes," said the King on reading it, "is in the usual French style, and no judgment can be formed from it"; but he considered the arrival of M. de Vergennes' son a favourable omen for peace.^[46] Shelburne however was disposed to believe in the personal sincerity of the French Minister, and he afterwards was said to have confessed that if the French Court had not so openly betrayed a desire for a pacification, he would not have ventured to have been so firm.^[47]

Violent altercations took place between the members of the English Cabinet when the French and Spanish project came to be considered. Though unanimous in deciding to reject it, they could not agree what to ask in its place. Grafton wished to obtain Porto Rico and Trinidad in exchange for Gibraltar; the King and Shelburne wished to obtain Porto Rico and West Florida; Richmond and Keppel objected to any cession or exchange of the fortress.^[48] So marked did their differences become that Shelburne said to Grafton subsequently to one of their meetings: "I will fairly tell you that as to Lord Keppel I should be happy to see him away from his Board. The Duke of Richmond also must take the part he judges proper; I shall see it with indifference; but though it would be very unpleasant to me, and give me great concern to differ from you, yet I must bear it, for I am resolved to stand by the King."^[49]

On the 3rd of December the Cabinet at length settled, that "if France would agree to the Preliminaries as already drawn up, and that if Spain would besides Minorca restore the Bahamas, and allow a well-regulated establishment in some part of the coast of Honduras, the proposal of exchanging Gibraltar for Guadaloupe might be accepted, and that in consideration of the above cession and of West Florida being kept by Spain, the Island of Trinidad should be ceded to his Majesty."^[50] On the same day however the news arrived of the signature of the Preliminaries with the United States, and the question of the terms to be asked from Spain and France was again reopened by the warlike section of the Cabinet represented by Richmond and Keppel. Thus the only result of the decisions of the Cabinet before the meeting of Parliament was the rejection of the propositions of Rayneval. The latter however remained in England with M. de Vergennes, awaiting the final decision of the Government. They were meanwhile the guests of Shelburne at Bowood, and during their stay made acquaintance with Jeremy Bentham, who characteristically condemned them both as extraordinarily ignorant persons.^[51]

On the 5th of December Parliament met, and only one pacification could be announced. "Finding it indispensable to an entire and cordial reconciliation with the Colonies, I did not hesitate," the King said in his speech, "to go the full length of the powers vested in me, and offered to declare them Free and Independent states, by an article to be inserted in the treaty of peace. Provisional articles are agreed upon, to take effect whenever terms of peace shall be finally settled with the Court of France. In thus admitting their separation from the Crown of these kingdoms, I have sacrificed every consideration of my own, to the wishes and opinions of my people. I make it my humble and earnest prayer to Almighty God, that Great Britain may not feel the evils which might result from so great a dismemberment of the Empire; and that America may be free from those calamities, which have formerly proved in the mother country how essential the Monarchy is to the enjoyment of constitutional liberty. Religion, Language, Interest, Affections, may, and I hope will yet prove a bond of permanent union between the two countries; to this end neither attention nor disposition on my part shall be wanting."

The speech then alluded to the affairs of India, to the necessity of economy, to the execution of the reductions in the Civil List expenses ordered by the Act of the previous session, to the further reforms in the public departments which had been carried out, to the suppression of sinecure places, to the necessity of continuing the policy of reform in the same direction, to the inquiry which had been set on foot into the administration of the landed revenue and the management of the Mint, and then went to say: "I must recommend to you an immediate attention to the great objects of the public receipts and expenditure and above all to the state of the public debt. Notwithstanding the great increase of it during the war, it is to be hoped that such regulations may still be established, such savings made, and future loans so conducted, as to promote the means of its gradual redemption, by a fixed course of payment."^[52]

The condition of parties in Parliament at this period, according to Gibbon, who had received his information from Eden, was "Minister one hundred and forty; Reynard, ninety; Boreas, one hundred and twenty; the rest unknown or uncertain. The last of the three by self or agents talks too much of absence, neutrality, moderation. I still think he will discard the game."^[53]

As yet no union existed between the two sections of the Opposition, although they joined to attack the treaty which they had not yet seen. Their grounds for doing so were however different, if not contradictory. Lord Stormont attacked the concession of independence to America, because, he said, it was irrevocable, while Fox renewed his old attack on Shelburne for having made independence an article of treaty.^[54] Unfortunately for the Ministers, they gave a handle to their adversaries, by themselves adopting a contradictory line of defence in the two Houses of Parliament. Pitt replying to Fox, and saying what was practically true, and also entirely in keeping with the policy of the Government, declared that the recognition of the independence of America, as it stood in the treaty, was irrevocable, and therefore as good as the preliminary recognition demanded by Fox;^[55] Shelburne, tempted possibly by the wish to gain a debating triumph over Stormont, and alarmed at hearing that Franklin was threatening to bring forward fresh articles before the treaty was finally signed, anxious too to satisfy the susceptibilities of the King, reminded the House that the recognition was technically not final till it was enshrined in the Final Treaty, which the United States could not sign without the consent of France.^[56] George III. was furious with Pitt. "By Lord Shelburne's account," he wrote, "it very clearly appears that Mr. Pitt on Friday stated the article of independence as irrevocable, though the treaty should prove abortive. This undoubtedly was a mistake, for the independence is alone granted for peace. I have always thought it best and wisest if a mistake is made openly to avow it, and therefore Mr. Pitt ought, if his words have been understood to bear so strong a meaning, to say so. It is no wonder that so young a man should have made a slip. This would do him honour. I think at all events it is highly material that Lord Shelburne should not by any language in the House of Lords appear to change his conduct, let the blame fall where it may. I do not wish he should appear but in that dignified light which his station in my service requires, and which can only be maintained by his conduct in the whole negotiation of peace having been neat, which would not be the case if Mr. Fox could prove that independence was granted otherwise than as the price of peace; besides Mr. Vaughan's letter shows further demands are to come from Franklin, which must the more make us stiff on this Article."^[57]

Although unable to agree in their criticisms, the Opposition were able to vie with one another in the violence of their language. The King's advisers, said Lord Stormont, were guilty of "the most preposterous conduct" and had shown "the greatest imbecility"; the Provisional Articles, he declared, had been dictated to the American Commissioners by the French Ministers.^[58] Burke called the speech "a farrago of hypocrisies and nonsense," but was indignant when in reply Pitt talked of treating him "with scorn and contempt." Fox, supporting Burke, declared that he detested the speech as much as he despised it, and followed up this observation with a series of sarcasms on the "sunset speech" of Shelburne.^[59] He then proceeded to torture some expressions in the King's speech relative to the patriotic offer of the citizens of London to embody themselves for the national defence in reply to Shelburne's circular which had been issued with Fox's own consent and approbation in the month of May, as an announcement on the part of the Government of an intention to encourage the renewal of private armaments, which Shelburne and Dunning had denounced in 1776 and 1780 as unconstitutional.

Notwithstanding these attacks the attempts made to obtain information and copies of such parts of the Provisional Treaty as related to American independence were easily defeated. "The great advantage of Monarchy in the English Constitution was," Shelburne said, "that it trusted to the Crown the secrets which must necessarily attend all negotiations with foreign powers. He could easily conceive, he said, a case in which the people of this country might speak to the Crown in such language as this, 'Sire, we called in the aid of your illustrious family to save us from Popery and arbitrary power. We have for three ages reaped the benefits of their attention to our interests and welfare, but not thinking that Monarchy is any longer essential to our security, freedom, and happiness, we are determined to do all the business of the Crown ourselves: and therefore, with many thanks for your care and kindness, we make you our bow, and entreat you to relinquish the trust.' He could conceive all this; but while the Crown did remain a part of our Constitution, and those negotiations were trusted to the prerogative, he could have no conception of their calling for the secrets of any negotiation which the King might be carrying on for the purpose of peace. The noble earls thought there was no danger in disclosing the treaty in question. The best answer to this assertion was, that those Peers who did know the subject matter of the treaty, were of opinion that there was danger in its exposure, and they therefore refused it.^[60]

The discussions with Rayneval had meanwhile continued. Two alternative schemes were at length agreed upon by the Cabinet and submitted to the King, who conveyed his decision upon them to Shelburne, in the following letter:—

"Lord Grantham's note is come, stating the two propositions:—

 

"1st. St. Lucia and Guadaloupe for Gibraltar, but that as this will render Martinico useless, France must also give up that island, for which she must expect an equivalent in the East or West Indies.^[61]

"2nd. Gibraltar to remain in our hands, but Spain satisfied by some acquisition.

 

"I should prefer the first proposition, if I could see any equivalent to Martinico in the West Indies, that we could offer France. To give her further footing in the East Indies would be big with mischief; the two Floridas alone occur to me; and let France and Spain by mutual exchanges accommodate themselves. As to the second, I would propose, if Gibraltar is kept, that Spain should have the two Floridas or Minorca, but I should wish if possible to get rid of Gibraltar, and to have as much possession in the West Indies as possible; for it has been my wish ever since peace has been on the carpet to get rid of ideal advantages, for those that by a good administration may prove solid ones to this country.

"Minorca I should not willingly give up, because if Port Mahon was made a free port, it might draw again into our hands the Mediterranean trade. One unpleasant addition to the great difficulties which arise from these propositions, is the enabling the Dukes of Richmond and Grafton, and the Lords Camden and Keppel, as also General Conway, to fight the whole treaties over again, and to form fresh cabals; I also dread that delays may give time for France to receive accounts from the East Indies, which cannot but add to her demands.

"This letter is less explicit than I wish to be, but the difficulties increase so much, whichever way we turn, that I think it necessary to conclude with just adding that I think peace highly necessary to this country, but shall not think it complete, if we retain Gibraltar, but am not ready to chalk out anything more on so sudden and I own unexpected propositions."^[62]

In conformity with the wishes of the King, the two Floridas were offered to Spain. "You will perhaps ask me," wrote Rayneval to Vergennes, "how it is possible to reconcile the character I gave you of Lord Shelburne with his conduct relative to the equivalent for Gibraltar. I have already given you the key to it in my former despatches, but the course pursued by the American plenipotentiaries has contributed in a most essential degree to the present position, and both Lord Grantham and Lord Shelburne have understood their advantage. The unfortunate news of the signature of their treaty unbeknown to us has occasioned the increase of the equivalent demanded for Gibraltar. Had Lord Shelburne refused to ask it, the Cabinet, if appearances are to be trusted, would have decided on the rupture of the negotiations."^[63]

The claim to Dominica, of which the French were in actual possession, the English Cabinet absolutely refused to surrender; they also rejected the demands made by the Dutch Plenipotentiaries, and offered in their place the renewal of the Treaties subsisting with the Republic at the time of the rupture, and a restitution of all the places taken from them in the war except Trincomalee. The determination of the Cabinet on these points was announced in a despatch from Grantham to Fitzherbert;^[64] while Shelburne, feeling that, as the King said, the chances of peace "began to look desperate,"^[65] wrote in the following terms to the English Envoy:—

"The subject of Lord Grantham's courier is too serious for me, to suffer him to go without adding a few words to his despatch. He will have assured you of the matter of fact, that the restoration of Dominique was essentially combined with the Spanish Peace in our propositions. I may tell you in confidence, that it was myself who made the proposition to Council. I can with equal truth assure you that every person present understood it so.

"M. de Rayneval must do me the justice to say, I explained it to him in that light, as soon as I saw him afterwards; and yesterday we proceeded without hesitation upon his intimation that our offer was accepted, to explain ourselves on other matters; which we certainly should not have done, if we had conjectured that so essential a part of our offer was misunderstood. Lord Grantham will explain to you every other particular, likewise all the official reasoning: upon which I can only add, that it is not the reasoning of party, nor of popular prejudice, but the conviction in reference to all our commerce and Navy, that the object in question can never materially affect France, but must decide on all our possessions in those parts.

"The matter will therefore stand thus. In the one case, the whole peace may be considered ipso facto as concluded; the magnanimity and justice of H. M. C. Majesty will be acknowledged through the whole of the negotiation; the positions established by the Count de Vergennes at the commencement of the treaty will be adopted; every good consequence will be to be expected, notwithstanding what we must naturally feel from the loss of the grand source of our wealth, industry and power in this peace; good humour, confidence and unanimity, will result; so far, at least, as regards this great business. In the case of Dominique being insisted on, the Spanish Peace will be to be reconsidered, the terms altered, the time and issue made uncertain, the whole made doubtful; and distrust, suspicion, regret, and division arise."^[66]

On the English terms becoming known in France, great differences of opinion at once made themselves felt. The King, acting under the influence of his own benevolent nature, and Vergennes accepting the inevitable, now that he was deserted by his American allies, united to urge Spain and Holland to desist from their unreasonable pretensions. Louis XVI., according to Fitzherbert, was convinced during every stage of the negotiation, how great an obstacle the cession of Gibraltar would prove in the way of a pacification, and it was through his intervention that the King of Spain now made up his mind to accept the Floridas as an equivalent.^[67] The Dutch withdrew from their demand of a preliminary recognition by England of the principles of the Armed Neutrality, and the negotiation was started on the basis of the restitution by England of all her territorial conquests, with the exception of either Trincomalee or Negapatam, and of the decision by the Courts of Admiralty of the legality of all the captures made.^[68]

Hardly however were the difficulties with Spain and Holland removed, before fresh difficulties arose with France, where the war party still insisted that Dominica should be demanded, and in the event of a refusal by England that the war should be continued. After a sharp struggle they carried the day, and an ultimatum in that sense was sent to England.^[69] It found many of the English Ministers in an unbending humour. Richmond and Keppel were openly for continuing the war, and it was only by the strenuous efforts of Shelburne and Grantham, that a majority of the Cabinet was induced to resolve that England should offer to cede Tobago in exchange for Dominica. Fitzherbert was also instructed to insist on the retention of either Negapatam or Demerara and Essequibo in the Dutch negotiation, if he could not get Trincomalee. If France would not accept these terms, he was immediately to leave Paris.^[70] Neither Richmond nor Keppel attended the Cabinet when this decision was finally arrived at, and their resignation was now only a question of days.

The alternative of peace and war was thus clearly placed before the French King and his advisers. The decision for a long time hung in the balance, and only after a fierce discussion were the views of Vergennes and Rayneval, the latter of whom had hurried back to France, preferred to those of De Castries and the war party. Meanwhile the offer of Tobago was accepted by France, and Dominica remained with England.^[71] Trincomalee was however abandoned to the Dutch; while Negapatam was retained. It was further agreed that, as owing to existing Acts of Parliament no definite settlement of the commercial questions pending between the two countries could be come to immediately, Commissioners should be appointed to inquire into the question, with directions to report within a reasonable time.^[72] The fishery question was settled in the manner proposed by Fitzherbert to Vergennes. Rayneval during his second visit to England had proposed a form of declaration to be attached to the Treaty, but Grantham objected to it, as not marking with sufficient clearness that the concession to France was not to be "exclusive" in character,^[73] and he drew up another form of declaration, which Fitzherbert proposed to Vergennes. After a long debate, in the course of which Vergennes insisted most strenuously, but in vain, for the insertion of the word exclusive, the Declaration was made to stand in the shape in which it may be read attached to the Definitive Treaty; the English Government undertaking to see that the French fishermen should not be molested in their occupation.^[74]

All difficulties were now removed, and on the 20th of January 1783 the Preliminary Articles of peace between England and France and England and Spain were signed. A truce was at the same time settled between England and the States-General.^[75] It was high time. The war party in France was still powerful, and kept on pointing to the enormous armaments which professed to be ready to start in the spring to attack the West Indies. Lafayette, "that vain and insolent young man," as Fitzherbert termed him, went about fanning the waning flames of ill-will between the two countries. For some time past he had been attempting to get sent on some kind of mission to the English Court, in order, as he said, to have the satisfaction of braving George III., by appearing before him at Court in an American uniform.^[76] Benjamin Vaughan, who persisted in remaining in Paris, and seemed to imagine he was clothed with some kind of diplomatic character, was causing general suspicion of the intentions of the English Government. Nor had Shelburne's own speech at the opening of Parliament been without disturbing effects, however diplomatically correct. "I know a gentleman," said Oswald writing to Shelburne, "and he is not entirely unknown to your Lordship, of that happy vein, that if he is not employed, will officiously thrust himself into employment; and if he is not invited into the boat, will step in at once, without waiting for an invitation."^[77] Franklin, impelled by his vindictive hatred of the Loyalists, was still threatening to bring forward new clauses before the signature of the Final Treaty.^[78] "Mr. Adams, Mr. Jay, and Mr. Laurens," so Mr. Fitzherbert informed Shelburne, "have little or no communication with Versailles, and not only distrust, but are strongly distrusted by that Court; but the fourth, Dr. Franklin, keeps up (though perhaps in a less degree than formerly) his connection with the French Minister, and on that account and on account of the private animosity and resentment which he still entertains against England, he prevents his colleagues, on whom (though they rather fear than are attached to him) he has great influence, from inserting in their joint letters to the American Congress such representations of matters on their side as would lead the latter to abandon the close and intimate connection which they have formed with the Court of Versailles, and place a due degree of confidence in Great Britain. In regard to the three other Commissioners, I know but little of Messrs. Adams and Laurens, but I must say in justice to Mr. Jay that he has always appeared to me to judge with much candour and consistency of the true interests and policy of his country as considered in relation to the three Powers of Europe, being convinced that the assistance afforded to America by such of them as are leagued against England, had originated not from any motive of good will towards the former country but from enmity to us, and that therefore she was under no obligation to support them at present (her own peace being settled), in the prosecution of their quarrel, any otherwise that is to say than as she is strictly bound by the letter of her treaty with France. Though from the difference of the views and opinions of some of his colleagues, Mr. Jay has not had in his power to enforce these sentiments in the public letter which he has written conjointly with them, on the present occasion of the signature of the Provincial Treaty, to their committents in America, I have great reason to think that he has stated them very strongly in his individual capacity to several of the leading members of the Congress."^[79]

To all these alarms, suspicions and intrigues, a term was now definitely put, and Oswald and Fitzherbert at once began to turn their attention to the preliminary discussion of the commercial treaties with France and the United States. "You will already," so Shelburne, in alluding to the cession of the back lands of Canada and of Senegal, wrote to Morellet, "have recognized in the treaties of peace, the great principle of free trade, which inspires them from beginning to end. I have no hesitation in saying that in my own opinion, a peace is good in the exact proportion that it recognizes that principle."^[80] It was in this spirit that FitzHerbert and Oswald entered on their new labours. A sudden and unforeseen event soon put a termination to them. But to understand how this happened, it is necessary to return to the troubled waters of English party politics.^[81]

 

NOTE

 

The Maine Boundary.—Only two maps of any real importance exist in England bearing upon the celebrated question of the Maine boundary:

(1) A map by Mitchell of 1753, marked by a clear broad red line; and on that line is written, "Boundary as described by Mr. Oswald." In alluding to this map during the debates of 1843, Sir Robert Peel is reported to have made the mistake of describing it "as following the claim of the United States"; viz. that the North-west angle of Nova Scotia was between the head waters of the Metis and the Restigouche. (Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 67, p. 1249: March 21st, 1843.) The map on the contrary places the north-west angle at the head of the Madawaska Lake, then known as Lake Medousa. What Sir Robert Peel probably did say was, that the map did not support the English claim. The important point to settle in regard to this map is: does it represent the boundary agreed upon by Oswald before or after the first arrival of Mr. Strachey in Paris? This can be at once settled by referring to the other parts of the boundary line, the whole of which is indicated upon this map. It will then be at once seen that the map includes all the alterations of Mr. Strachey, and was consequently made after his arrival.

(2) A map of 1755 by Mitchell in the Record Office, and described in the Catalogue as the map used by Mr. Oswald. This is the map referred to by Lord Palmerston, "as the red-lined map showing the boundary to be such as we claimed it" (Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 67, p. 1194), and the duplicate of which he sarcastically suggested that Mr. Webster had in his possession, but would not produce. This map was found in 1841, by Mr. Lemon, but there is nothing on the map itself, nor does any documentary evidence exist, to support the statement in the Catalogue, which rests upon the ipse dixit of Mr. Lemon. The "red line" is very faint, and the geographers who were consulted on the age of it, were divided in their opinion. The map has not got the rest of the boundary between the two countries indicated upon it. (See Mr. Hobhouse's letter to Mr. Addington, 18th May 1842, and the opinions of Mr. Arrowsmith, Mr. Wylde, and others, at the Record Office.) It may then be asked what was the district described by Strachey in his despatch of November the 8th, as won back by his efforts? Evidently the strip of land between the St. John and the St. Croix: for Oswald had originally proposed the former river as the eastern boundary (see his despatch to Townshend, 7th October 1782), while Strachey obtained the St. Croix. (See his despatch to Townshend, 8th November 1782.)

In the "Observations" of Mr. Featherstonhaugh on the Ashburton Treaty, much stress is laid on a map existing in the French Archives, and having on it a red line drawn in conformity with the English claim. Mr. Featherstonhaugh considered that this was undoubtedly the map mentioned by Franklin in a letter of December 2nd, 1782, and printed in his works, as that on which the treaty line had by him been drawn. The English Government of the day caused an inquiry to be set on foot in Paris on the subject, but the conclusion they arrived at was not in keeping with the views of Mr. Featherstonhaugh. "There is not on this map," says Sir Henry Bulwer, "any writing signifying why it was thus marked, nor do I know of any clue thereto, except the letter of Dr. Franklin, quoted by Mr. Featherstonhaugh, should be considered to furnish such. But I should remark that there is no reference, as would be usually made in such cases by the Record Keepers on Dr. Franklin's letters, referring to the map, and consequently there is no chain of evidence nor anything beyond conjecture or probability connecting the one with the other." (Sir Henry Bulwer to Lord Cowley, May 3rd, 1843, with the certificate of M. Barbié du Bocage, of the French "Archives.")

Had the merits of the case not been obscured by national jealousies, little or no difficulty need ever have arisen in determining the position of the North-west angle of Nova Scotia, as understood in 1782. A real difficulty, however, would have arisen from the projection of the map by Mitchell, which described the country in dispute, being entirely incorrect. While the English and American Commissioners in 1782 were under the impression that a line drawn due north from the source of the river St. Croix would touch the Highlands near the source of the Madawaska, it appeared, when the country was properly surveyed, that such a line would touch them between the headwaters of the Metis and the Restigouche. There would consequently have been a hopeless conflict between the map and the terms of the treaty.

 

1. Oswald to Shelburne, October 8th, 1782.
2. See, however, infra, p. 202, note, in regard to Shelburne's views on this subject.
3. The Proclamation, though issued after Shelburne's resignation of the Board of Trade, was in the main a confirmation of his ideas. (See Vol. I. p. 190.)
4. See "Commission of Governor to Gov. Wright, November 1763." Papers relating to the Ashburton Treaty presented to Parliament 1843, 17, 87, 185, 187. Proceedings of the Massachussets Historical Society, 4th series, x. 838. Webster's Works, ii. 144, 149.
5. Oswald to Townshend, October 8th, 1782.
6. Oswald to Townshrnd, October 5th, 8th, nth. Oswald to Shelburne, October 3rd, 1782.
7. The map which accompanied the draft treaty was found among the papers of Mr. Jay. See the Memoir on the North East Boundary, by Mr. Gallatin, New York, 1843, which contains a facsimile of the map. See too Map B.
8. Oswald to Townshend, October 11th, 1782.
9. Called Cape Lahune on the English maps.
10. Fitzherbert to Grantham, October 7th, 1782. French and Spanish Memorials, October 6th, 1782. In the will of Isabella the Catholic, she inculcates on her successors the importance of never divesting themselves of their title to the fortress of Gibraltar. (Prescott, History of Ferdinand and Isabella, iii. 153.)
11. Lord Stanhope, History of England, i. 464; iv. 166 (ed. 1854).
12. On the 13th of September 1782.
13. Autobiography of the Duke of Grafton, 341 et seq.
14. Shelburne to Rayneval, October 21st. Shelburne to Fitzherbert. October 20th. Grantham to Fitzherbert, October 20th, 1782.
15. At the time of the Albany Convention in 1754, as Rayneval reminded Jay, the whole course of the Ohio was generally admitted to be French. (See Life of Jay, ii. 477.) When Vaudreuil surrendered Montreal in 1760, the capitulation included all Canada, which was said at the time to extend to the crest of land dividing the branches of the Erie and the Michigan from those of the Miami, the Wabash, and the Illinois (Bancroft, iv. 361); but the valley of the Ohio was then also considered by the French to be attaché au Canada, even if not actually forming part of it (see Flassan, vi. 432433). The 4th article of the Treaty of Paris ceded Canada to England, "avec toutes les dépendences de la manière et dans la forme la plus absolue." Then came the Proclamation of 1763 restricting Canada within narrow limits (see Vol. I. p. 265-268), which were however again greatly enlarged by the Quebec Act of 1774. In 1754-1755 it is clear that Franklin would not have admitted the French claim to the valley of the Ohio as part of Canada (see Bancroft, iv. 121-126). The Canada Act of 1774 included in what was called the Government of the Province of Quebec, besides Canada, the area of the present States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin (see supra, Vol. I. p. 474). The policy of keeping the United States weak was persevered in by France at a later date, when the States were engaged in framing the Federal Constitution. In a letter from Talleyrand to Lord Lansdowne in 1795, written from Philadelphia, the following passage occurs: "{{lang|fr|Lorsque l'Amérique, affranchie du joug de l'Angleterre, périssait sous le poids de sa propre anarchie, lorsqu'au milieu de son indépendance, il lui manquait la liberté; lorsqu'elle faisait effort pour se la procurer et arriver a sa constitution fédérale, les chefs du pays découvrirent que l'Ambassadeur de France avait des instructions pour traverser cette entreprise. Le même allié qui avait tout sacrifié pour les'séparer de l'Angleterre voulait les tenir désunis entre eux." (Talleyrand to Lord Lansdowne, February 1st, 1795; Pallain, La Mission de Talleyrand à Londres, p. 428.) M. de Ternan is the Minister alluded to. M. Genêt, who succeeded him, pursued a similar course. Talleyrand himself afterwards encouraged the policy of "shutting up the States within the limits which nature has traced for them." See Henry Adams, United States, i. 355.
16. Instructions to Strachey, October 20th. Townshend to Oswald, October 20th. Shelburne to Oswald, October 20th, 1782.
17. Shelburne to Oswald, October 21st, 1782.
18. Shelburne to Fitzherbert, October 21st, 1782.
19. Shelburne to Rayneval, October 21st, 1782.
20. Fitzherbert to Grantham, November 5th, 1782.
21. Fitzherbert to Grantham, October 24th, 1782.
22. Fitzherbert to Shelburne, November 5th, 1782. Fitzherbert to Grantham, October 28th, 1782.
23. See supra, p. 112.
24. Projet de Préliminaires, November 9th, 1782. Fitzherbert to Grantham, October 28th, 1782. Vergennes to Shelburne, November 15th, 1782.
25. Rayneval to Vergennes, September 17th. The King to Shelburne, November 21st, 25th. Shelburne to Rayneval, November 25th, 1782.
26. Parliamentary History, xxiii. 279.
27. Wraxall, Posthumous Memoirs, i. 230.
28. Whitefoord Papers, 194.
29. Diary of John Adams for 1782. Works, iii. 301 et seq. Life of Jay, i. 152. Oswald to Shelburne, October 29th, 1782. Strachey to Townshend, October 29th, 1782.
30. The following extract from a letter written in 1838 by Lord St. Helens (Mr. Fitzherbert) it of interest as entirely confirming the view of the history of the negotiations given above. It was written at the time of the appearance of the Life of Mr. Jay. "I can safely add my testimony to the numerous proofs afforded by these Memoirs, that it was not only chiefly, but solely, through Mr. Jay's means that the negotiations of that period between England and the United States were brought to a successful conclusion." (See the "Address delivered before the New York Historical Society on the Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783," by Mr. John Jay, 207-208.)
31. Strachey to Townshend, November 8th, 1782.
32. The map with the line finally fixed upon is now at the British Museum in the "King's Library." (See further on this subject the note at the end of this chapter.) See Maps B and C. While insisting on a more favourable boundary for Canada than that originally proposed by Mr. Oswald, Shelburne nevertheless deliberately consented to a favourable western boundary for the United States. The refusal of the Congress and the States Legislatures to carry out their obligations in regard to the Loyalists under the Treaty of 1783 necessitated the retention of the western forts by Great Britain for several years as a security, nor was it until 1797 that they were all surrendered. In that year Lord Lansdowne expressed himself on the boundary question in a letter to Major William Jackson as follows: "I cannot express to you the satisfaction I have felt in seeing the forts given up. I may tell you in confidence what may astonish you, as it did me, that up to the very last debate in the House of Lords, the Ministry did not appear to comprehend the policy upon which the boundary line was drawn, and persist in still considering it as a measure of necessity not of choice. However it is indifferent who understands it. The deed is done; and a strong foundation laid for eternal amity between England and America. General Washington's conduct is above all praise. He has left a noble example to sovereigns and nations: present and to come."—March 5th, 1797.
33. Oswald to Shelburne, October 29th, 1782. Oswald to Townshend, October 29th, 1782. Strachey to Townshend, October 29th, 1782. Franklin to Townshend, November 4th, 1782. Oswald to Townshend, November 5th, 6th, 7th, 1782.
34. Strachey to Townshend, November 8th, 1782.
35. Strachey to the American Commissioners, and Oswald to the same with their reply, November 5th, 6th, 1782. Oswald to Townshend, November 8th, 1782. Franklin to Townshend, November 4th, 1782. Strachey to Townshend, November 8th, 1782.
36. The King to Shelburne, September 16th, November 10th, 1782.
37. Instructions to Strachey, November 21st, 1782.
38. Shelburne to Oswald, November 21st, 1782.
39. Fitzherbert to Grantham, November 5th, 1782. Vergennes to Laurens, October 14th, November 23rd, 1782. Oswald to Shelburne, November 15th, 1782. Shelburne to Townshend, November 22nd, 1782. Walpole Correspondence, viii. 309.
40. Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, vi. 483.
41. Oswald to Shelburne, November 15th, 1782. The efforts of Shelburne on the behalf of the American Loyalists were recognized by the alteration of the name of the town, harbour, and county of Port Roseway, Nova Scotia, into that of Shelburne. On the 27th of April 1783, 471 families in eighteen vessels left New York, arriving at Port Roseway on the 4th of May. In August Governor Parr visited the town, and proclaimed the alteration of its title. In the following year "an inundation of refugees," some fifteen thousand in number, passed into the town from the United States, in consequence of the ill usage with which the Loyalists were being treated, notwithstanding the recommendations of the Treaty of Peace.—Haliburton, Account of Nova Scotia, ii. 193-196.
42. Oswald to Shelburne and Townshend, November 29th, 1782.
43. Oswald to Shelburne, November 29th, 30th, 1782. Strachey to Townshend, November 29th, 1782. The Preliminary Treaty was signed by Richard Oswald on behalf of Great Britain, and by John Adams, B. Franklin, John Jay, and Henry Laurens on behalf of the United States; and by Caleb Whitefoord, Secretary to the British Commission; and W. P. Franklin, Secretary to the American Commission.
44. Strachey to Nepean, November 29th, 1782. It is worth observing here that both Oswald and Strachey express the very highest opinion of the value of the assistance given them at this stage of the proceedings by Mr. Fitzherbert. "You would have had no treaty without him." Strachey to Townshend, November 29th, 1782. The Duke of Grafton speaks in similar terms in his Autobiography, 353. Upon what the unfavourable character of this able diplomatist given by Mr. Bancroft (x. 556) is founded does not appear.
45. Vergennes to Shelburne, November 28th, 1782.
46. The King to Shelburne, December 2nd, 1782.
47. Soulavie, Louis XVI., v. 17.
48. Cabinet Minutes of 1782. Autobiography of Grafton, 347-349.
49. Autobiography of Grafton, 350.
50. Cabinet Minutes of 1782.
51. Vergennes to Shelburne, December 1782, January 1783. Bentham, x. 125, 126.
52. Parliamentary History, xxiii. 206.
53. Gibbon to Holroyd, October 14th, 1782.
54. Parliamentary History, xxiii. 215, 233.
55. Parliamentary History, xxiii. 265.
56. Ibid. xxiii. 217.
57. The King to Shelburne, December 8th, 1782.
58. Parliamentary History, xxiii. 215.
59. Ibid. xxiii. 235, 243, 267, 274-276.
60. Parliamentary History, xxiii. 309.
61. It will be remembered that the French had taken Dominica, and the English St. Lucia.
62. The King to Shelburne, December 11th, 1782.
63. Rayneval to Vergennes, December 17th, 1782.
64. Grantham to Fitzherbert, December 18th, 20th, 1782.
65. The King to Shelburne, December 14th, 1783.
66. Shelburne to Fitzherbert, December 20th, 1782.
67. By a secret and supplementary article of the Treaty, it was provided that should Great Britain recover West Florida, in the Treaty to be negotiated with Spain, the northern boundary of West Florida should be a line running due east from the mouth of the Yazoo river to the Chattahoochee, instead of the line drawn due cast from the intersection of a line drawn along the middle of the Mississippi, with the 31st degree of north latitude, to the middle of the river Chattahoochee (also called Apalichicola), which was laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty with the United States. Great Britain did not recover West Florida, but the discovery of the secret article by Spain in 1786, when the boundary between Spain and the United States was being fixed, and Spain claimed that the boundary should start from the Yazoo, very nearly had serious consequences to the solidity of the United States, owing to marked differences of opinion between the New England States and the Southern States as to how far it was worth while to resist the Spanish claims (see Fiske, The Critical Period cf American History, 208-211) even at the risk of war.
68. Fitzherbert to Grantham, December 17th, 18th, 19th, 1782. Grantham to Fitzherbert, December 18th, 1782. Projet de Préliminaires entre la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Généraux. See Flassan, Histoire de la Diplomatie, vii. 349-350.
69. Secret Report laid before the King in Council; Paris, December 24th, 1782.
70. The King to Shelburne, January 4th, 1783. English Ultimatum, January 1783. Rayneval to Vergennes, December 25th, 1782.
71. Tobago had been ceded by France in 1763. The island is near Trinidad, then a French possession, with which it is now administered under the same Governor as a British possession.
72. Fitzherbert to Shelburne, January 15th, 19th, 1783.
73. "I find great pains have been taken to avoid mistating the fishery as exclusive, and the third article is cautiously worded for that purpose. However, it is very desirable that it should be left entirely out, and that the French should be contented with as strong assurances of not being molested as can be given in the King's name." (Grantham to Fitzherbert, November 23rd.)
74. The three forms of Declaration mentioned above are here appended in extenso.

    Form of clause proposed by Rayneval, November 15th, 1782:—

    "Les pêcheurs françois jouiront de la pêche qui leur est assignée par l'article précédent, comme its ont eu droit d'en jouir en vertu du Traité d'Utrecht et Sa Majesté Britannique's'engage à empêcher ses sujets, par les ordres les plus positifs, d'interrompre ni de gêner, de quelque façon que ce soit, les pêcheurs francois. Bien entendu qu'il ne sera point permis a ceux-ci d'hiverner sur l'Isle de Terre-Neuve."

    Form of Declaration to be attached to the clause as it now stands in the Treaty, proposed by Lord Grantham, January 1783:—

    "Pour que les Pêcheurs des deux nations ne fassent pas naître des querelles journalières, Sa Majesté prendra les mesures les plus positives pour prévenir les enterprises de ses sujets au préjudice de ceux de la France qui pêcheront sur les côtes qui sont assignées à ceux-ci, et fera retirer les Etablissemens'sédentaires qui's'y seront formés."

    The form of Declaration agreed upon by Mr. Fitzherbert and M. Vergennes, January 18th, 1783, is the same as the above; except that in the place of the words in italics, the following words are inserted: "que ses sujets ne troublent, en aucune manière, par leur concurrence, la pêche des François, pendant l'exercice temporaire qui leur est accordé, sur les côtes de l'Isle de Terre-Neuve."

75. The Preliminary Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and Holland was not signed until September 2nd, 1783.
76. Fitzherbert to Shelburne, December 18th, 1782; January 15th, 19th, 1783.
77. Oswald to Shelburne, January 8th, 1783; Vaughan to Shelburne, December 26th, 29th, 1782.
78. Fitzherbert to Shelburne, February 9th, 1783.
79. See Mr. Jay's letter to Mr. Livingston from Paris, November 17th, 1781, printed in his Life, ii. 456.
80. Shelburne to Morellet, March 13th, 1783.
81. Since the publication of the first edition of this work, a complete review of the negotiations in Paris has been published by Mr. John Jay, the lineal descendant of Mr. Jay, the American Commissioner, in An Address delivered before the New York Historical Society, November 27th, 1883. It entirely supports the view of the part taken by the several negotiators and their respective responsibilities set out above. The text of the Preliminary Treaties will be found in the Appendix I. B, C, D).