Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China/Chapter 3

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4586930Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China2023the United States Department of Defense

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on the PRC's perception of peripheral threats.
Under the direction of the CMC, each Theater Command has operational authority over the PLA conventional forces within the theater.
In August 2022, the PLA carried out large-scale joint military exercises aimed at pressuring Taiwan. The exercises included firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan's main island, over a dozen naval patrols, and hundreds of flights into Taiwan's claimed air defense identification zone (ADIZ).

The PRC continues to make steady improvements to joint operations in the five theater commands, which were established in early 2016. Each theater command receives direction from the CMC, has operational authority over assigned PLA forces within its theater, and is responsible for all conventional combat and non-combat operations within its area of responsibility. Theater commands are responsible for developing theater-specific strategies aimed at preparing to fight and win against an adversary, developing joint operational plans and military capabilities, responding to crises, and safeguarding the sovereignty and stability of its claimed territories. The strategic directions of the theater commands are based on Chinese perceptions of peripheral threats:

Eastern Theater Command – Taiwan, ECS;
Southern Theater Command – SCS; Southeast Asia border security; territorial and maritime disputes;
Western Theater Command – India, Central Asia, "counterterrorism" in Xinjiang and Tibet;
Northern Theater Command – Korean Peninsula, Russia border security;
Central Theater Command – Capital defense; surge support to other theaters.

EASTERN THEATER COMMAND

Key Takeaways

The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the ECS.
The Eastern Theater Command likely would be in charge of a Taiwan Invasion.
The Eastern Theater Command was responsible for executing the PLA’s large-scale joint exercises aimed at pressuring Taiwan in August 2022.

The Eastern Theater Command has responsibility for the ECS and likely executes operational control over military matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands.

During 2022, the Eastern Theater Command maintained focus on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing exercises and drills consisting of long-distance training and mobilization, aerial combat, live-fire training, and the use of modified civilian ferries to help augment transportation.

For Taiwan-related issues, see section on DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT (Pg. 136).

2022 EASTERN THEATER COMMAND LEADERSHIP

Commander of the Eastern Theater Command – General Lin Xiangyang [林向阳]
Previous Position: Commander of the Central Theater Command
DOB: October 1964
Age: 58
Birthplace: Dengjun Village, Haikou Town, Fuqing, Fuzhou, Fujian Province [福建省福州市福清市海口镇登俊村]
Education: Nanchang Army Academy; Studied abroad in Russia; Attended a class at PRC NDU for Young- and Middle-aged Cadres [中青班]

Political Commissar of the Eastern Theater Command – General He Ping [何平]
Previous Position: Director of the Political Department of the Western Theater Command; Deputy Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command
DOB: November 1957
Age: 63
Birthplace: Nanchong, Sichuan Province [四川省南充市]
Education: Unknown

Chief of Staff of the Eastern Theater Command, Deputy Commander of the Eastern Theater Command—Lieutenant General Hong Jiangqiang [洪江强]
Previous position: Commander of the 80th Group Army, Northern Theater Command Army
DOB: 1965
Age: 57
Birthplace: Meishi Village, Gangwei Town, Longhai, Zhangzhou, Fujian Province [福建省漳州市龙海市港尾镇梅市村]
Education: Unknown

PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Group Armies; the Eastern Theater Navy and its naval aviation division and two marine brigades; and two Air Force divisions, two operational PLAAF bases, and one PLARF base. During a contingency, the Eastern Theater Command likely also exercises command over some SSF units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all CCG and maritime militia ships while they are conducting operations related to the ongoing dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands.

PLA Force Laydown in Eastern Theater Command

EAST CHINA SEA (ECS)

Key Takeaways

The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands.
The PRC attempts to legitimize its claims in the ECS through the continuous presence of PRC fishing and Maritime Militia vessels, escorted by CCG cutters and with PLA Navy warships nearby as overwatch.
In 2021, the PRC passed new legislation regarding the rules of engagement for their Coast Guard vessels, which created a legal justification for more aggressive patrols. Throughout 2021 and 2022, the PRC expanded its annual unilateral summer fishing ban in Beijing-claimed waters north of the 12th parallel to include the ECS by an additional month to incrementally enforce its de facto maritime sovereignty claims.

The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the ECS, which Taiwan also claims. Beijing continues to uphold the importance of the 2014 four-point consensus, which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge divergent positions over the ECS but prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any unilateral actions that seek to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.

The PRC uses maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Senkaku Islands, not only to demonstrate its sovereignty claims, but also to improve readiness and responsiveness to potential contingencies. In 2022, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the contiguous zone territorial seas around the Senkaku Islands and stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. For the third year in a row, CCG ships entered Japanese-claimed waters for more than 100 consecutive days, including over 300 days in the contiguous zones around the Islands in 2022. In December 2022, the CCG conducted the longest entrance to date into the Senkaku Islands territorial waters, with four ships remaining in the waters for nearly 73 hours. The previous record for territorial waters entrance duration was 64 hours, set in July 2022. The increased PRC assertiveness around the Senkaku Islands caused Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to express “grave concern” in November to President Xi during the first meeting between Chinese and Japanese leaders since December 2019. The two leaders agreed to reestablish a maritime and aerial hotline between the two countries’ militaries to resume security dialogue, which the two defense ministers later used for the first time in May 2023.

SOUTHERN THEATER COMMAND

Key Takeaways

The Southern Theater Command is oriented toward the SCS, Southeast Asia border security, and territorial and maritime disputes.
The Southern Theater Command is responsible for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS and can assume command as needed over all CCG and CMM ships conducting operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.”
In 2022, Southern Theater Command units conducted multiple live-fire drills and amphibious training events near PRC-occupied features in the SCS.

The Southern Theater Command covers mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, including the SCS. This geographic area implies that the Southern Theater Command is responsible for securing the SCS, supporting the Eastern Theater Command in any operation against Taiwan, and assuring the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) vital to China’s global ambitions in the SCS. The Southern Theater Command is responsible for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS by regularly tracking and reacting to U.S. ships operating within the China-claimed “nine-dash line.”

The Southern Theater Command is responsible for training, force disposition, and operations in the SCS. The Southern Theater Command also plays a significant role in the PLA’s bilateral and multilateral exercises with countries in Southeast Asia, such as participating in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise with Thailand in 2022.

The PLA Hong Kong and Macao garrisons are subordinate to the Southern Theater Command. In August 2022, the PLA Hong Kong and Macao garrisons conducted an annual rotation of forces. Since 1997, the PLA has rotated forces by land, air, and sea from Shenzhen at night, nominally as part of the usual annual rotation. Since the 2019 pro-democracy protests, China maintains a rotational deployment of PAP forces in Hong Kong. The PAP and PLA units continued to publicly highlight their anti-riot, counterterrorism, and disaster prevention training.

All of the PLA’s 24 Su-35s purchased from Russia are assigned to the Southern Theater Command Air Force and have flown patrols in the SCS and into the Western Pacific. The Southern Theater Command was also the first command to receive the PLAN’s H-6J maritime strike bombers. In December 2019, the PRC commissioned its first-domestically produced aircraft carrier, Shandong into service at Yulin Naval Base in the Southern Theater Command. In April, the Shandong conducted its first training exercise in the Philippine Sea with J-15 aircraft entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone for the first time, demonstrating the PLA’s increased capabilities further from China’s borders.

2022 Southern Theater Command Leadership

Commander—Wang Xiubin [王秀斌]
Previous position: Chief of Staff, Eastern Theater Command; Deputy Commander, Eastern Theater Command
DOB: March 1964
Age: 58
Birthplace: Rudong County, Nantong, Jiangsu Province [江苏省南通市如东县掘港镇港南村]
Education: National Defense University’s Joint Command and Staff College [联合指挥与参谋学院]; Postgraduate class at Zhejiang University; Taught at Nanjing Artillery Academy

Political Commissar of the Southern Theater Command—Wang Jianwu [王建武]
Rank: General
Previous position: Deputy Director of the CMC Political Work Department
DOB: August 1958
Age: 64
Birthplace: Luoning, Henan Province [河南省洛宁]
Education: Unknown

Chief of Staff of the Southern Theater Command—Liu Yayong [刘亚永]
Rank: Lieutenant General
Previous position: Deputy Chief of Staff of the Northern Theater Command
DOB: April 1958
Age: 64
Birthplace: Duchang, Jiangxi Province [江西省都昌]
Education: Unknown

PLA units located within the Southern Theater Command include 74th and 75th Group Armies, the Southern Theater Navy, three marine brigades, two PLA Air Force bases, and two PLA Rocket Force bases.

PLA Force Laydown in Southern Theater Command

SOUTH CHINA SEA (SCS)

Key Takeaways

The PRC’s outposts on the Spratly Islands are capable of supporting military operations, including advanced weapon systems, and have supported non-combat aircraft. However, no large-scale presence of combat aircraft has been yet observed at airfields on the outposts.
In 2022, the PRC continued to deploy PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships in response to Vietnamese and Malaysian drilling operations within the PRC’s claimed “Nine-Dash-Line,” the Philippines’ construction at Thitu Island, and the Philippines’ resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SCS

In July 2016, pursuant to provisions in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an arbitral tribunal convened at the Philippines’ behest, ruled that the PRC’s claims to “historic rights” in the SCS, depicted by the “nine-dash line,” were not compatible with UNCLOS. Since December 2019, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have explicitly referenced the arbitral ruling in notes verbales to the UN denying the validity of the PRC’s “historic rights” and nine-dash line claims. Beijing, however, categorically rejects the tribunal decision, and the PRC continues to use coercive tactics, including the employment of PLA naval, coast guard, and paramilitary vessels, to enforce its claims. The PRC does so in ways calculated to remain below the threshold of provoking conflict. In 2022, the PRC continued to impose a yearly, unilateral three-month fishing ban that includes the waters inside the EEZ of the Philippines and Vietnam to incrementally enforce its de facto maritime claims.

The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its sovereignty. Throughout 2022, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships to maintain a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.” Separately, the CCG and People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) used nets and ropes to block Philippine supply boats on their way to an atoll in the SCS and issued radio challenges and threats to Philippine ships during routine resupply missions.

In November 2022, a CCG vessel forcibly seized apparent PRC rocket debris that had fallen near Philippine-occupied Thitu Island from the Philippines by cutting the tow line of a Philippine Navy vessel as it was towing debris back to shore. PRC insisted the debris was returned to them after a “friendly negotiation,” despite the Philippines producing video evidence of the incident and issues diplomatic notes of protest.

In March 2022, the Philippines lodged a diplomatic protest after a CCG ship maneuvered within 21 meters of a Filipino vessel near Scarborough Shoal. This was the fourth time in under a year that the CCG had maneuvered dangerously close to Philippine vessels.

In December 2022, the Philippines expressed serious concern over reports that the PRC had reclaimed several unoccupied land features in the SCS, notably at four features in the Spratly Islands. The Philippines noted that new construction contravenes the Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea’s undertaking on self-restraint and the 2016 Arbitral Award, while Beijing denied any actions and emphasized dialogue between the two nations.

Outposts in the Spratly Islands

SCS OUTPOSTS CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING MILITARY OPERATIONS

Since early 2018, the PRC-occupied Spratly Islands outposts have been equipped with advanced anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems and military jamming equipment, representing the most capable land-based weapons systems deployed by any claimant in the disputed SCS areas to date. In mid-2021, the PLA deployed an intelligence-gathering ship and a surveillance aircraft to the Spratly Islands during U.S.-Australia bilateral operations in the region. From early 2018 through 2022, the PRC regularly used its Spratly Islands outposts to support naval and coast guard operations in the SCS. The PRC has added more than 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the Spratlys. China has also added military infrastructure, including 72 aircraft hangars, docks, satellite communication equipment, antenna array, radars, and hardened shelters for missile platforms.

The PRC has stated these projects are mainly to improve marine research, safety of navigation, and the living and working conditions of personnel stationed on the outposts. However, the outposts provide airfields, berthing areas, and resupply facilities that allow the PRC to maintain a more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the area. This improves the PRC’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third parties and widens the range of response options available to Beijing.

WESTERN THEATER COMMAND

Key Takeaways

The Western Theater Command is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions along China’s Central Asia borders.
The Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang.
Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border have dominated the Western Theater Command’s attention, including at least one border clash in December 2022 along the PRC border with India’s Arunachal Pradesh state that injured multiple soldiers.

The Western Theater Command is geographically the largest theater command within the PRC and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and what the PRC refers to as “terrorist threats” in western China. PLA units located within the Western Theater Command include 76th and 77th Group Armies and ground forces subordinate to Xinjiang and Xizang Military Districts; three PLAAF bases, one transportation division, one flying academy, and one PLARF base.

Within China, the Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, in the PRC, “genocide and crimes against humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.” Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained more than one million ethnic Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities. Although PRC government officials justified the camps under the pretense of “combatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism,” information from the international community, including the UN, refute such justifications. Moreover, oppression of Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang is likely used by extremist organizations as a propaganda and recruiting tool, generating new threats to the region.

Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border have dominated the Western Theater Command’s attention. Differing perceptions between India and the PRC regarding border demarcations along the LAC, combined with recent infrastructure construction on both sides, led to multiple clashes, an ongoing standoff, and military buildups along the shared border. In response to a skirmish in June 2020 between PRC and Indian patrols in Galwan Valley, the most violent clash between the two countries in 45 years, the Western Theater Command implemented a large-scale mobilization and deployment of PLA forces along the LAC. Commander-level negotiations meant to reduce tensions continued in December 2022 with the 17th round of talks. The Western Theater Command’s deployments along the LAC will likely continue through 2023.

2022 Western Theater Command Leadership

Commander—General Wang Haijiang [汪海江]
Previous position: Commander, Xinjiang Military District
DOB: July 1963
Age: 59
Birthplace: Anyue County, Ziyang, Sichuan Province
Education: Unknown

Political Commissar—General Li Fengbiao [李凤彪]
Previous position: Commander, Strategic Support Force
DOB: October 1959
Age: 63
Birthplace: Anxin County, Baoding, Hebei Province
Education: Xinyang Army Infantry School; received a Master’s degree in strategic studies from National Defense University

Chief of Staff—Major General Li Zhonglin [李中林]
Previous position: Commander, 71st Group Army, Eastern Theater Command Army
DOB: Unknown
Age: Unknown
Birthplace: Unknown
Education: Unknown

PLA Force Laydown in Western Theater Command

CHINA-INDIA BORDER

Key Takeaways

In 2022, the PLA increased the deployment of forces and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.
Negotiations between India and the PRC made minimal progress as both sides resisted losing perceived advantages on the border.

Beginning in May 2020, PRC and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and clubs wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff triggered the buildup of forces on both sides of the disputed border. Each country demanded the withdrawal of the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China nor India agreed on those conditions. The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure construction, which it perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China of launching aggressive incursions into India’s territory. On 15 June 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley and resulted in the death of approximately 20 Indian soldiers and four PLA soldiers. This incident was the deadliest clash between the two since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Following the 2020 clash, the PLA has maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.

In 2022, China continued to develop military infrastructure along the LAC. These improvements include underground storage facilities near Doklam, new roads in all three sectors of the LAC, new villages in disputed areas in neighboring Bhutan, a second bridge over Pangong Lake, a dual-purpose airport near the center sector, and multiple helipads.
In 2022, China deployed one border regiment, supported by two divisions of Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts with four combined arms brigades (CAB) in reserve in the western sector of the LAC. China also deployed as many as three light-to-medium CABs in the eastern sector from other theater commands and an additional three CABs in the central sector of the LAC. Although some elements of a light CAB eventually withdrew, a majority of the deployed forces remain in place along the LAC.
On July 17th, China and India held the 16th round of Corps Commander-level talks focusing on the resolution of border disagreements in the western sector of the LAC. Both sides agreed to withdraw forces from the Gogra-Hotsprings area of the LAC and to maintain dialogue through military and diplomatic channels to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the remaining border issues. Two previous rounds of Corps Commander-level talks in March and January made no progress to resolve the China-India border dispute.
On September 8th, Chinese and Indian forces began to withdraw from the Gogra-Hotsprings area along the western sector of the LAC. This withdrawal was the direct result of the 16th round of Corps Commander-level talks held in July.
On October 14th, representatives from China and India attended a virtual 25th Meeting of Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC). Both sides lauded the recent withdrawal of forces from the border and agreed to take measures to reduce border tension and shift from emergency response to regular management of the border areas. The 24th WMCC was held on 31 May with no significant progress being made to disengage from the western sector of the LAC.
On 9 December, hundreds of Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the eastern sector of the LAC near the Yangtse area of Tawang, India. Both sides previously agreed to not use firearms along the border—instead they use sticks and clubs as weapons—however both Chinese and Indian forces sustained injuries. Media reports described the skirmish as the worst since the 2020 Galwan Valley incident.
On 20 December, China and India held the 17th round of Corps Commander-level talks at the Chushul-Moldo border meeting point in China. This round of talks was not announced—unlike previous talks—and came 10 days after Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the eastern sector of the LAC near the Yangtse area of Tawang, India. No agreements were made during this meeting and both sides pledged to continue dialogue through military and diplomatic channels.

NORTHERN THEATER COMMAND

Key Takeaways

The Northern Theater Command is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian border security.
In September 2022, the Northern Theater Command sent a 2,000 member contingent of army, navy, and air force units to participate in the Russia-hosted multi-national military exercise Vostok-2022.

The Northern Theater Command includes the PRC’s provinces bordering Mongolia, Russia, North Korea, and the Yellow Sea. It is responsible for operations along China’s northern periphery and border security associated with North Korean, Russia, and Mongolia. PLA units located within the Northern Theater Command include the 78th, 79th, and 80th Group Armies; the Northern Theater Navy and its naval aviation division and two marine brigades; and two operational PLAAF bases, one special mission aircraft division, and one flying academy; and one PLARF base.

During a contingency, the Northern Theater Command likely exercises command over some SSF units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater. The North Sea Fleet is responsible primarily for protecting the sea approaches to northern China but could provide mission-critical assets to support other fleets during contingencies located beyond the Northern Theater. In 2022, Northern Theater Command forces conducted various joint and single service training activities including carrier navigation and flight training, and likely conducted UAS training.

2022 Northern Theater Command Leadership

Commander—General Wang Qiang [王强]
Previous position:Commander of the Western Theater Command Air Force; Deputy Commander of the Western Theater Command
DOB: ~1963
Age: ~59
Birthplace: Probable Rong County, Zigong, Sichuan Province [四川省自贡市荣]
Education: Unknown

Political Commissar—Admiral Liu Qingsong [刘青松]
Previous position: Political Commissar of the Northern Theater Command Navy; Deputy Political Commissar of the Northern Theater Command
DOB: ~November 1963
Age: ~58
Birthplace: Zhangqiu District, Jinan, Shandong Province [山东省济南市章丘区]
Education: Unknown

Chief of Staff—Vice Admiral Jiang Guoping
Rank: Admiral
Previous position: Assistant to the Chief, Joint Staff Department, CMC
DOB: ~October 1962
Age: 60
Birthplace: Rushan, Weihai, Shandong Province
Education: Dalian Naval Ship Academy

PLA Force Laydown in Northern Theater Command

CENTRAL THEATER COMMAND

Key Takeaway

The Central Theater Command’s mission is the defense of Beijing while providing support to other theater commands.

The Central Theater Command’s primary responsibility is to defend the capital and CCP leadership while providing a strategic reserve to the other theater commands. It is centrally located, connecting the four remaining theater commands. Major military units under the Central Theater Command military include the PLAA’s 81^st, 82^nd, and 83^rd Group Armies; and the PLAAF’s 13th Transport Division, 34^th VIP Transport Division, 36^th Bomber Division, 15^th Airborne Corps, and the Shijiazhuang Flying Academy. Other assets in the Central Theater Command include PLA Rocket Force and the Wuhan and Datong Bases.

2022 Central Theater Command Leadership

Commander—General Wu Ya'nan [吴亚男]
Previous position: Deputy Chief, Joint Staff Department, CMC
DOB: August 1962
Age: 60
Birthplace: Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province [河北省石家庄市]
Education: Unknown

Political Commissar—General Xu Deqing [徐德清]
Previous position: Political Commissar, Western Theater Command Army; Deputy Political Commissar, Western Theater Command
DOB: July 1963
Age: 59
Birthplace: Chongzhou, Chengdu, Sichuan Province [四川省成都市崇州市]
Education: Unknown

Chief of Staff—Vice Admiral Wang Changjiang [王长江]
Previous position: Deputy Commander of the Northern Theater Command
DOB: February 1959
Age: 63
Birthplace: Luanzhou, Tangshan, Hebei Province [河北省唐山市滦州市]
Education: The PLA Air Force's Fourth Aviation Academy

PLA Force Laydown in Central Theater Command

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Key Takeaways

In 2022, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan.
Throughout 2022, the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, sharply increased flights into Taiwan’s self-declared ADIZ and a series of major military exercises near Taiwan.

Throughout 2022, the PRC conducted large-scale joint military exercises focused on training to deter further U.S. and allied operations along China’s periphery. Many of these exercises focused on combat realism and have featured night missions, training in extreme weather, and simultaneous multi-domain operations.

The PLA is preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force if perceived as necessary by Beijing, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention, such as the United States and/or other like-minded partners, on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai administration and signal its displeasure at deepening Washington-Taipei ties, the PRC has persistently conducted military operations near Taiwan and military training for a Taiwan contingency. Throughout 2022, the PLA increased provocative actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, significantly increased flights into Taiwan’s self-declared air defense identification zone, and conducted a series of large-scale military exercises around Taiwan.

According to Taiwan Ministry of National Defense (MND) data, the PLA sent a total of 1,737 aircraft in Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2022. This is a 79 percent increase from 972 incursions in 2021.
Throughout 2022, the PLA also diversified the type of aircraft it sent into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Since September 2022, when the Taiwan MND began releasing information on UAV operations in the ADIZ, UAVs have made up around 10 percent of aircraft tracked.

At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping repeated the CCP’s longstanding public position that China seeks peaceful unification with Taiwan but would never renounce the use of force as an option. Additionally, the CCP amended its constitution to reaffirm that it will resolutely oppose and deter Taiwan independence. The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicted it would consider the use of force has evolved over time. These circumstances have included the following:

Formal declaration of Taiwan’s independence
Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence
Internal unrest in Taiwan
Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons
Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-strait dialogue on unification
Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

PlA Aircraft Entering Taiwan ADIZ

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan increased in 2022, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. Following the U.S. Speaker of the House CODEL to Taiwan in August 2022, Beijing released a new Taiwan white paper, which was the third paper issued by Beijing since 1993. The content of the white paper appears consistent with familiar talking points from Beijing, albeit with a more pointed tone. It highlights that unification is foundational to the PRC’s “national rejuvenation,” Beijing’s preference for peaceful reunification under the “one country, two systems” framework, and a refusal to renounce the use of force to compel reunification, if needed. Unlike the previous Taiwan white paper (released in 2000), this iteration explicitly calls out Taiwan’s ruling Democratic People’s Party for “having adopted a separatist stance,” and features heavier criticism on “external interference” by singling out the United States. The paper further asserts that all U.S. “interference” in Taiwan is guided by a strategy to use Taiwan as a “pawn” in an effort to contain China.

The PRC continues to suspend formal communications with Taiwan, which began in 2016, and remains steadfast that Taiwan must accept the PRC’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart such engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to the PRC’s “One China principle,” which was reaffirmed by President Xi in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan.

CONSISTENT U.S. DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT WITH TAIWAN

In response to U.S. defense engagement with Taiwan, Beijing routinely accuses the United States of not abiding by its One China principle. U.S. defense engagements with Taiwan, as one element of the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship, remain consistent with our one China policy—as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. U.S. defense engagement with Taiwan has evolved over time in response to the PRC’s capacity and willingness to use military coercion against Taiwan. This evolution does not contradict publicly-stated U.S. policy, and it is in fact required by U.S. policy.

The 1979 TRA states that the United States “will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” In 1982, President Reagan clarified in an internal memo—which the United States made public in 2019—that the quantity and quality of U.S. defense assistance provided to Taiwan be “conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.” President Reagan further emphasized that this linkage is intended as a “permanent imperative” of foreign policy.

The United States opposes unilateral changes to the cross-Strait status quo by either side; does not support Taiwan independence; and expects cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means. United States defense engagement with Taiwan’s will continue to bolster these positions and be conditioned entirely on the evolving threat posed by the PRC and the interests of the people of Taiwan, as enumerated in U.S. policy.

PLA COERCIVE AND RISKY OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOR

The PLA’s coercive and risky air and maritime activity, particularly in the East and South China Seas, continued throughout 2022 and into 2023. The PLA’s coercive and risky activities includes unsafe, unprofessional, and other behaviors that seek to impinge upon the ability of the United States and other nations to safely conduct operations where international law allows. The goal of the PLA’s behavior is to pressure the United States and other nations to reduce or cease lawful operations near areas Beijing claims territorial sovereignty.

Examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. and Allied aircraft have included lasing (i.e., the use of military-grade lasers against a target), reckless maneuvers (i.e., maritime bow crossings and barrel rolls and acrobatics in close proximity to aircraft), close approaches in the air or at sea, high rates of closure (i.e., rapid approaches), discharging objects i.e., chaff or flares) in front of, or in close proximity to, aircraft; and other actions.

The PLA’s behavior contravenes flight safety protocols and the international maritime rules of the road; increases the risk of a major accident, incident, or crisis, including the potential for loss of life.

Over the last 18 months, the PLA appears to have been engaged in a centralized, concerted campaign to perform these risky behaviors in order to coerce a change in lawful U.S. operational activity, and that of U.S. Allies and partners. Prior to the fall of 2021, the PLA routinely intercepted foreign air and maritime assets operating in the Indo-Pacific, but these earlier interactions rarely involved PLA employment of coercive and risky behavior. Between the fall of 2021 and fall of 2023, the United States has documented over 180 instances of PLA coercive and risky air intercepts against U.S. aircraft in the region—more in the past two years than in the previous decade. Over the same period, the PLA has conducted around 100 instances of coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. Allies and partners, in an effort to deter both the United States and others from conducting lawful operations in the region. The PRC’s messaging regarding its forces’ operational behavior, such as claiming it is “justified to take forceful countermeasures” against activities that Beijing labels “provocative,” suggests centralized coordination, not the behavior of a few isolated PLA officers.

Some examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky behavior include the following:

In February 2022, a Chinese naval ship directed a laser at an Australian P-8A Poseidon aircraft operating in Australia’s exclusive economic zone, endangering the health of Australian airmen.
While flying a mission between April and May 2022, the Canadian CP-140 patrol aircraft were the subject of harassment by PLAAF fighter jets, which on several occasions, attempted to divert Canadian CP-140s. The PLAAF aircraft did this by conducting close approaches which forced the Canadian patrol craft to alter its flight path to avoid collision.
During a routine May 2022 maritime surveillance flight by an Australian P-8A in the South China Sea, a Chinese J-16 conducted a dangerous intercept maneuver which posed a safety threat to the P-8A and its aircrew. The Australian government issued a press release on this event.
In June 2022, a Chinese J-16 cut across the nose of another Australian P-8A Poseidon that was operating in international airspace over the South China Sea. The Chinese jet released a round of chaff, which was ingested into the Australian aircraft’s engine.
In December 2022, a PLA J-11 fighter came within 20 feet of the nose of a U.S. military aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace over the South China Sea.
In February 2023, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs issued a statement concerning an incident with a Chinese Coast Guard vessel, operating under PLA overwatch, engaged in dangerous maneuvers against a Philippine Coast Guard vessel operating within Manila’s own EEZ, including by deploying a military-grade laser that temporarily blinded Filipino crew members.
In May 2023, the DoD released cockpit video of a PLA J-16 “thumping” a U.S. RC-135 aircraft by forcing the U.S. RC-135 to fly directly behind it in its wake turbulence.
Less than one week later, in June, the DoD released video of the PLA’s unprofessional reaction to the USS CHUNG HOON during a U.S.-Canada bilateral Taiwan Strait Transit.

PLA RESPONSE TO HIGH-PROFILE VISIT TO TAIWAN BY FOREIGN FIGURES

Throughout 2022, the PRC continued to respond to high-level foreign visits to Taiwan with low-level military drills near Taiwan, typically including Taiwan Strait centerline crossings, increased PLA Navy activity around Taiwan, and public statements condemning the visits. In stark contrast, the PLA responded in early August 2022 to the CODEL vist to Taiwan with significantly larger-scale military activities that included several unprecedented actions. The Eastern Theater Command conducted snap military drills that included PLA aviation flying more than 250 fighter aircraft into Taiwan’s self-declared ADIZ and 13 PLA Navy vessels operating around Taiwan. The PLARF fired multiple ballistic missiles into impacts zones in waters around Taiwan, including the first-seen instance of at least four missiles overflying Taiwan. These military drills also afforded the PLA an opportunity to train simulated joint blockade and simulated joint firepower strike operations.

PRC MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST TAIWAN

Although Beijing reaffirms that “peaceful reunification” is its preferred course of action, the PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could increasingly signal its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a range of cyberspace, blockade, and kinetic campaigns designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification or compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table on the PRC’s terms. In any case, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer Xi the following military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of feasibilities associated risk. The PRC’s perception of domestic and international receptivity to military action, the expected impact on its economy of resulting sanctions, political trends in Taiwan, and its level of confidence in the PLA’s capability to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan will determine which military option the PRC chooses during crises. The PLA practiced elements of each of these military options during its August 2022 large-scale military exercise aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ingwen’s transit of the United States.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely would complement its air and maritime blockades with concurrent EW, network attacks, and IO to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by IO to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA SOF could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize its leadership, or undermine the public’s resolve to resist.

Amphibious Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent Taiwan’s shore defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key targets or the entire island.

The PLA continues to test new options to force unification. In October 2022, seven Chinese civilian car ferries, under CMM, participated in amphibious landing drills on Chinese beaches in the Taiwan Strait. In August 2022, in response to the U.S. Speaker of the House CODEL to Taiwan, the PLA conducted joint exercises focusing on establishing air, maritime, and information superiority. The exercise consisted of joint air and maritime activities to the north, southwest, and southeast of Taiwan, focused on establishing air dominance, according to Eastern media reporting.

A large-scale amphibious invasion would be one of the most complicated and difficult military operations for the PLA, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. It would likely strain the PRC’s armed forces and invite a strong international response. These factors, combined with inevitable force attrition, the complexity of urban warfare, and potential for an insurgency, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi and the CCP, even assuming a successful landing and breakout past Taiwan beachhead defenses.

Small Island Seizure. The PLA also is capable of attempting various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the SCS, such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island, such as Matsu or Kinmen, is also within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

CIVILIAN ROLL-ON/ROLL-OFF (RORO) SHIPS AND THEIR POTENTIAL USE IN A TAIWAN INVASION

The lack of significant PLA amphibious ship buildup does not independently reflect a PLA deficiency toward building a military option to take Taiwan by force, but rather, is consistent with the PRC’s exploratory approach to testing multi-dimensional Taiwan seizure concepts.

In 2015, China’s official media reported that all future builds of five categories of civilian vessels had to be built to “national defense requirements” including container ships, RORO ferries, multipurpose vessels, bulk carriers, and break bulk ships.

In 2019, images emerged on Chinese state television that at least one of its RORO ferries had been modified with a ramp to allow amphibious vehicles to disembark at sea suggesting these ferries could be used to deliver first echelon forces without requiring prior seizure of a pier. By demonstrating intent to use commercial ROROs during an amphibious invasion, the PLA is eroding the principle of distinction under the law of armed conflict and obscuring crucial lines between warships and non-warships, civilians and combatants, and civilian objects and military objectives.

In a similar state media disclosure, images emerged in 2021 showing that China had modified a flat deck container vessel to function as a landing platform helicopter (LPH) or as an expeditionary transfer dock (ESD); such modification could serve as a mid-way refueling point for helicopters returning from delivering air assault forces to Taiwan or enable PLA helicopters to transport forward stocks of logistics ashore.

Although China has not officially revealed the size of its civilian fleet or how it plans to use it during an invasion, 2019 information indicated the PLA have at least 63 civilian ROROs suitable for military operations.

Subsequent information from one Chinese province indicates as many as 64 civilian ROROs would be made available to the PLA in wartime and that these platforms would be equipped with weapons as part of the mobilization process.

Some public estimates suggest that China’s use of its dual-capable civilian fleet could provide it greater displacement tonnage than the sum of all of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious assault ships.

In 2022, the PLA significantly stepped up RORO training to support China’s military activities by more than doubling the number of ROROs used to support similar activity in the prior year. Although most of these events consisted of troop movements within or between theaters, several marked a continued maturation towards using ROROs and other civilian shipping to support PLA amphibious force employment against Taiwan. However, these events have not demonstrated the realism or requisitite tactical proficiency to engage in wartime operations. This includes the absence of opposed landing operations in unfavorable weather conditions and sea states. It also includes a lack of RORO training to operate in convoys, conduct rapid disembarkation, and the offload of PLA forces at sea while underway.

Floating Causeway Improvement. During three events between May and July 2022, two Chinese civilian ROROs participated in docking evolutions with a new floating causeway system intended to allow ROROs to disembark forces onto a beach without seizing a port or being modified to discharge amphibious vehicles at sea. The causeway observed in 2022 featured several improvements over the one used in 2021 to include having six uniform self-propelled sections extendable to an additional 200 meters. The causeway system seems to rely on a semi-submersible barge to stabilize the causeway, which may limit its utility for a cross strait invasion. However, PLA naval writings stress the importance of floating causeways, especially those with wave attenuation capabilities, as one solution to dealing with Taiwan ports that might be inaccessible for off-loading operations in wartime.
Large-Volume Lift Exercise. From mid-July to mid-August, the PLA conducted large amphibious lift exercises along China’s Northern and Southern coast, using 12 civilian ships including eight large RORO ferries. The lift capacity, number of vessels stops, and the number of participating ground vehicles suggest this training could have simulated the movement of up to a full group army for the first time. The PLA also conducted a five-day loading/unloading exercise in September 2022 using six ROROs and three cargo ships to simulate the movement of a heavy combined arms brigade in a Taiwan invasion.
Denial and Deception Training. In August 2022, a PLAA air defense brigade exercise attempted to obscure observation of its loading onto a RORO in the Bohai Gulf. A PLA video showed the brigade entering a dock-side building where it hid for an undetermined period of time before loading onto a RORO using a tarp that extended from the building to the ship, likely intended to limit observation of their loading activity.
Austere Port Operations. In mid-August 2022, a single RORO supported the transport of roughly 40 vehicles from a portion of Dongshan Port that had little cargo handling infrastructure, no pier-side RORO ramp, and no tugboat support. This training suggests the PLA seeks the capability to operate from any intact pier, even ones without offloading infrastructure.
RORO Participation in PLAN Amphibious Forces. From August 31st to September 2nd, 2022, the PLA conducted its most complex use of civilian shipping for amphibious assault operation at Dacheng Bay and Honghai Bay in southern China. The exercise featured 10 civilian ships—including RORO ferries and RORO vehicle carriers—operating alongside PLAN amphibious ships, including at least one Type-071 LPD. The operations at Dacheng Bay made use of the new six-segment floating causeway, supported by a San Hong Gong submersible floating barge, which docked with at least one RORO ferry. ROROs in both exercise area off-loaded forces at sea, suggesting stern ramp modifications allowing for at-sea disembarkation are becoming more commonplace within the RORO fleet. One combined-arms amphibious brigade and one combined-armed amphibious battalion were believed to have been delivered as part of this exercise.

PRC Missile Coverage over the Taiwan Strait

THE PLA’S CURRENT POSTURE FOR A TAIWAN CONFLICT

PLAA. The PLAA has increased its posture in the Eastern Theater Command and along the Taiwan Strait, providing the PLAA with enhanced firepower, mobility, and rapid strike capabilities. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.

The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2022. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed that the PLA extensively used sea, air, and ground UAS in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

PLAN. The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and ASW capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war and has increased its posture surrounding Taiwan since August 2022. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the FIC as well as to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of oceangoing LPD and LHA ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its number of tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that analysts believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities, such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLAAF. The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. The PLAAF also has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention. Throughout 2022, Eastern Theater Command-based PLAAF units operated at higher levels than in previous years. Taiwan ADIZ incursions involved greater numbers of aircraft and were more frequent than in 2021, demonstrating the PLAAF’s improved ability to sustain pressure on Taiwan.

PLARF. The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. As of 2023, the PLARF is increasing its presence along the Taiwan Strait with new missile brigades, possibly indicating an increasing number of deployed missiles.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for the use of EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency. Following the U.S. Speaker of the House’s CODEL in August 2022, Taiwan’s MND claimed that China launched widespread cyber-attacks against Taiwan.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms. The JLSF participates in joint, theater-level exercises, becoming most relevant when units operate far from their home garrisons and beyond their organic logistics capabilities.

TAIWAN’S ABILITY TO DETER THE MAINLAND

Key Takeaways

The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap compared to Taiwan’s military.
Geopolitical events in 2022 accelerated Taiwan’s development of new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare to counter the PRC’s improving capabilities.

Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to generate international support and expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island by placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures.

In 2022, Russia’s war on Ukraine and the PRC’s forceful response to then-U.S. Speaker of the House’s CODEL to Taiwan in August increased the urgency with which Taiwan is pursuing defense reforms. The PRC’s response to the then-U.S. House Speaker’s visit accelerated the PRC’s ongoing military and gray zone activity toward Taiwan. The PRC’s actions likely intended to establish a new status quo and to place greater operational demands on Taiwan’s military. Taiwan’s planned improvements only partially address its defense challenges, and a majority of Taiwan citizens believe that the then-Speaker’s visit and the PLA response were detrimental to Taiwan’s security.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active-duty billets. As of 2021, the MND had accomplished its goal to fill 90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. As Taiwan transitions to an all-volunteer force, the cost savings from manpower reductions provided some margin to improve individual pay and benefits, housing, and incentive pay. However, these savings have been insufficient to cover the full increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the new system. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness obstacles.

Reservists, conscripts, and civil defense volunteers support the volunteer active duty forces. Taiwan’s number of reserve personnel ranges from one to two million, while there are fewer than half a million conscripts. In 2021, Taiwan passed legislation to establish an organization to improve the mobilization of reserves and civilians to support military operations. In 2022, Taiwan implemented this legislation by establishing the All Out Defense Mobilization Agency, which coordinates a whole-of-society approach to support military operations and disaster prevention and response. In December 2022, Taiwan announced that it would extend the duration of mandatory military conscription service from four months to one year and double conscripts’ monthly salary starting in 2024.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget to support defense acquisitions and strengthen its forces against Chinese pressure. In 2020, the Tsai administration announced defense spending to be the highest level since 1990. In October 2022, Taiwan proposed total defense spending of about $19 billion for 2023, a 13.9 percent increase from 2022, which will represent about 2.4 percent of Taiwan’s GDP. In January 2022, Taiwan approved an $8 billion multi-year supplemental defense budget to strengthen Taiwan’s air and sea combat capabilities. Over half of Taiwan’s supplemental defense spending will fund missile corvettes and anti-ship weapons, such as the Hsiung Feng missile system. Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget continues to grow to around $230 billion in 2022, about 12 times larger than Taiwan’s defense budget, with much of China’s defense budget focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force.

Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Specific areas of emphasis in Taiwan’s strategy include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems, domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters and producing the remaining three of a previously planned four transport docks.

The United States maintains a one-China policy that is based on the TRA, the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances; opposes unilateral actions aimed at altering the status quo; and continues to support the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner, scope, and pace acceptable to both sides. Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Since 2009 Taiwan has received about $30 billion in arms sales from the United States. Taiwan currently has arms sales agreements to acquire Stinger missiles, Javelins, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, Harpoon missiles, and F-16 fighter jets.

PRC EFFORTS TO CONFLATE FOREIGN ONE CHINA POLICIES WITH ITS “ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE”

The PRC’s “One China principle,” established in 1949, according to PRC government white papers, predicates diplomatic relations with the PRC on “recognizing” the “government of the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China” and “that Taiwan is part of China.”

Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, countries around the world have enacted respective and unique “One China” policies that govern their relations with the PRC and Taiwan. Some countries have endorsed the PRC’s “One China principle” in their national “One China” policies, while other countries have determined to “acknowledge,” “understand,” or “note” the PRC’s position within their respective, national “One China” policies. These unique “One China” policies, and their attendant joint communiques with the PRC, provide countries around the world with the legal basis upon which each country engages with the PRC and Taiwan.

The U.S. one China policy is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. Under the three Joint Communiques, the U.S. acknowledged the PRC’s position and reaffirmed U.S. interest in a peaceful settlement of the “Taiwan question.” U.S. implementation interpretation of the 1982 Communique related to arms sales to Taiwan is guided by President Ronald Reagan’s August 17th, 1982 internal presidential memo (known as the Six Assurances), where he stated the U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned “absolutely” upon the continued commitment of the PRC to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC cross-Strait differences. The Six Assurances, delivered to Taiwan in 1982, outlined key principles for continued U.S. support for Taiwan.

The PRC has sought to conflate the United States, as well as other foreign nations’ respective “One China” policies, with its own “One China principle.” This effort erroneously portrays broad international support for its claim over Taiwan, attempts to legitimize PRC coercion against Taiwan, and make assertions of “broken legal commitments” by countries who engage with Taiwan in ways that Beijing perceives as threatening to its unification objectives.