Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China/Chapter 4

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4586932Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China2023the United States Department of Defense

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

CCP leaders view the PLA's growing global presence as an essential part of the PRC's international activities to create an international environment conducive to China's national rejuvenation.
The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China's borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC's growing overseas interests and advance its foreign policy goals.

The CCP continues its goal to create international conditions that are conducive to the PRC's development and compatible with its aspirations for the PRC's rejuvenation as a "great modern socialist country." CCP leaders believe that the PRC's global activities, including the PLA's growing global presence, contribute to creating a “favorable” international environment for the PRC's national rejuvenation. Of note, the PRC's perception of its international security environment is evolving in ways that Beijing views as "increasingly complex." The PRC's view of its increasingly complex security environment likely also factors into the PLA's growing global ambitions.

The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China's borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC's growing overseas interests and advance its foreign policy goals. The PRC is focusing on efforts to develop security relationships with key countries along its periphery. In addition to promoting BRI, the PRC is seeking new cooperative security partnerships with foreign nations, including the expansion of the PLA's global military attaché presence and access, expansion of strategic partnerships, and ensuring more reliable, cost-effective, and diverse sources of energy and other strategic resources.

The PRC probably will continue to expand the PLA's global military presence through humanitarian assistance, naval escorts and port calls, peacekeeping operations (PKO), arm sales, influence operations, and bilateral and multilateral military exercises. Through these engagements, Beijing can strengthen and expand its diplomatic relationships to advance its foreign policy goals, to include shaping the international system to align with the PRC's interests, gaining operational experience for the PLA, and attracting foreign interest in hosting PLA bases and dual-use installations abroad.

CHINA’S GLOBAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Key Takeaways

The PRC has increasingly determined that its armed forces should take a more active role in advancing its foreign policy goals.
As the PRC’s overseas interests have grown over the past two decades, the Party’s leaders have increasingly pushed the PLA to think about how it will develop the capabilities to operate beyond China’s borders and its immediate periphery to advance and defend these interests. This has led to the PRC’s greater willingness to use military coercion—and inducements—to advance its global security and development interests.
In 2022, the PLA continued to normalize its presence overseas and build closer ties to foreign militaries. In 2022, Beijing maintained an active peacekeeping force of more than 2,000 personnel stationed abroad, conducted regular anti-piracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia, continued construction of a PLA facility at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, participated in bi- and multilateral military exercises, and restarted in-person military diplomacy suspended by COVID-19.

THE PLA’S EVOLVING MISSIONS AND TASKS

In 2004, one of the “new historic missions” given to the PLA by then-President Hu Jintao was to support China’s overseas interests and diplomacy. The PLAN’s evolving focus—from “offshore defense” to “open seas protection”—reflects the PLAN’s interest in a wider operational reach. The PLAAF’s missions and tasks have similarly evolved towards conducting operations beyond China and its immediate periphery and supporting the PRC’s interests by becoming a “strategic” air force. Additionally, the PLA has embraced its concept of NWMA as an effective way to support and safeguard the PRC’s development, expand the PRC’s global interests, and gain valuable operational experience.

The PLAN, PLAAF, PLAA, and SSF have deployed abroad for counterpiracy, HA/DR, peacekeeping, training exercises, and space support operations. Within the PLA, the PLAN has the most experience operating abroad due to its far seas deployments and counterpiracy missions, the PLAAF likely has the most experience conducting rapid response HA/DR operations abroad, and the PLAA has the most experience conducting peacekeeping operations. The SSF operates tracking, telemetry, and command stations in Namibia, Pakistan, Argentina, and Kenya. The SSF also has a handful of Yuan-wang space support ships to track satellite and ICBM launches.

Increasingly, the PLAN is operating outside of its home waters to places including the Middle East, Europe, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Latin America. The PLAN has also conducted submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean, demonstrating its increasing familiarity in that region and underscoring the PRC’s interest in protecting SLOCs beyond the SCS. In 2015, three PLAN ships from a Gulf of Aden naval escort task force (NETF) evacuated 629 PRC citizens from Yemen to Djibouti and Oman.
Since 2002, the PLAAF has delivered aid after natural disasters throughout Southeast Asia and South Asia and assisted with evacuations from Libya and Yemen. In January 2022, the PLAAF flew relief supplies to Tonga ten days after a volcanic eruption devastated the island nation, offering the PLA to normalize its presence in the region.

PLA OVERSEAS MILITARY PRESENCE

Counterterrorism. Beijing is implementing its global counterterrorism strategy through international outreach that spans across diplomatic and military domains to garner the assistance of partner governments to prevent terrorist attacks in China and against Chinese citizens and economic projects abroad. The PRC routinely lobbies foreign partners to extradite alleged Uyghur extremists, coordinates with host nations to pursue terrorist threats, and seeks public endorsement of its counterterrorism efforts in multilateral forums. Beijing further leverages involvement in regional security forums, joint border patrols, and international exercises to press its neighbors into adopting the PRC’s approach to counterterrorism operations.

Counterpiracy Efforts. In 2008, the PLAN joined anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, its first missions outside the Western Pacific. Since then, China has dispatched more than 40 NETFs to the region to escort Chinese and foreign ships. This naval activity demonstrates the PLAN’s increasing familiarity with the area, hones its ability to operate in far seas, and allows the PLAN to advance military diplomacy efforts by conducting port calls in Africa. In 2022, in addition to deploying its 42nd NETF to the Gulf of Aden, the PLAN convened a China-Africa symposium to discuss cooperating on anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea.

Peacekeeping Operations. China is the largest contributor of peacekeepers among the five UN Security Council permanent members, having deployed about 50,000 personnel over 31 years and pledged an 8,000-strong PKO standby force to the UN’s Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System. Beijing frames these efforts as advancing cooperative global governance, peaceful development, and the principles of the UN Charter, which are key components of its responsible global power narrative. However, the UN peacekeeping missions in Africa have also become a testing ground for China's "far seas operations" as Beijing seeks to extend its reach in tandem with the growth and expansion of its interests. The PRC could use its role in the UN PKOs to collect intelligence on other UN units, and supporting these missions demonstrates the PLA’s ability to operate outside of China’s borders.

In 2022, the PRC provided about 2,200 personnel to eight UN PKO missions in Africa and the Middle East: Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel, Lebanon, Mali, South Sudan, Sudan, and Western Sahara. These personnel consist of groups-infantry, engineering, medical service, and maintenance specialists. The PRC troop contributions have slightly decreased from 2,548 personnel in 2021 to 2,200 in 2022.

MILITARY ATTACHÉ PRESENCE

The PRC’s military attaché presence continues to grow globally, reflecting the PRC’s increasing interests in military modernization and partnerships. Military Attaché offices manage the day-to-day overseas military diplomacy efforts in over 110 offices worldwide. The attachés serve as military advisors to the ambassador, and support Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PLA foreign policy objectives. They also perform a variety of PLA military and security cooperation duties, including counterpart exchanges with host-nation and third-country personnel. Additionally, the attachés conduct clandestine and overt intelligence collection on respective areas of responsibility. Although the general function of an attaché office is the same worldwide, individual attaché offices probably prioritize specific missions or diplomatic priorities based on location, close bilateral relations, or other factors.

The PRC’s military attaché offices vary in size, generally ranging from two to 1-officers. Most offices are made of two to three officers, although officers in countries considered important to China’s strategic interests often employ more attachés. These offices potentially include multiple assistant attaches, service attaches such as naval or air force, and additional support staff.

MILITARY COOPERATION

As the PRC’s regional and international interests grow increasingly complex, the PLA’s international engagements likely will continue to expand. Beijing often relies on senior military visits, bilateral and multilateral exercises and training, peacekeeping, and military assistance to promote the PRC’s foreign policy objectives.

Senior-level military visits and international exchanges remained limited in 2022 due to continuing COVID-19 restrictions in China. Many engagements were still conducted via remote video, such as the 2nd China-Africa Peace and Security Forum Ministerial and a minister-level meeting with Latin American and Caribbean nations. In 2022, former PRC Defense Minister Wei Fenghe resumed attending some multilateral security meetings in person, including the revived Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus in Cambodia. Wei also traveled to traditional partner nations such as Russia and Iran, and met with his Australian counterpart for the first time in two years. Wei likely undertook these visits to influence foreign approaches to shared security concerns, demonstrate solidarity with long-standing partners, and improve bilateral and multilateral defense relations.

The PLA continued to participate in bilateral and multilateral military exercises in 2022, though fewer than in past years, likely in part due to lingering concerns over COVID-19. The PLA carried out what appears to be a standard annual list of military exercises with the Russian military: the Joint Sea naval exercise and a joint naval patrol; two strategic aerial patrols; and PLA participation in Russia’s capstone military exercise, VOSTOK 2022. The PRC and Russia also conducted a trilateral naval exercise with Iran, the third such exercise since 2019. Other bilateral exercises the PLA conducted last year included the fifth FALCON STRIKE air exercise with Thailand, the PEACE TRAIN humanitarian rescue exercise with Laos, and the SEA GUARDIANS naval exercise with Pakistan. The PRC’s lifting of COVID-19 restrictions in late 2022 will likely facilitate the reinvigoration of PLA defense activities abroad as well as the hosting of senior level bilateral and multilateral engagements in China.

Military Education Collaboration. Beijing considers establishing international professional military education (PME) as a way to create transnational networks of alumni, foster a common understanding of military operational doctrine, and strengthen the PRC’s defense and security ties. Over the past decade, the PRC has increased its military exchange programs with a bias toward junior officers. Nearly half of the 70 military academies operated in China admit foreign students but only a few offers senior-level education. The College of Defense Studies of the PLA National Defense University (PLA NDU) provides the highest level of training for foreign officers offered by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. In addition to training foreign senior military officials, PLA NDU conducts international exchanges and academic discussions on defense and security issues. The PLA NDU has accepted students from more than 100 partner nations and has pursued relationships with Latin American and African militaries.

Although third countries have historically perceived Chinese PME as less prestigious than Russian or U.S. PME, the PRC’s growing economic clout and expanded global security presence has bolstered the international reputation of Chinese programs. For example, PLA NDU offers students higher stipends and greater exposure to Chinese technological and scientific innovations (such as military applications of AI) than Russian schools.

The PRC also cultivates transnational alumni and shared doctrinal understanding through short-term course offerings. Since 2002, the PLA NDU sought to increase exchanges with the international military community by sponsoring annual security seminars which aim to foster cooperation, strengthen military exchanges, and attempt to impart a common approach to issues of interest to the community. The PLA NDU has received thousands of students from over 90 countries and maintains regular contacts with military academies in more than 10 countries in addition to over 140 countries’ militaries.

Despite the PRC’s progress to enhance its PME programs, cultural and linguistic barriers limit the effectiveness of Chinese PME. For example, foreign student and host nation student contacts and opportunities for interaction are limited due to the separation between Chinese and foreign language courses. Additionally, despite detailed dives on specific issues, PRC military schools rarely teach students about the root causes of security problems. Military ethics and human rights are off-limits for discussion within the PLA NDU curriculum and students are prohibited from criticizing the PRC’s record in these areas.

In November 2022, the PLA hosted the third International Army Forum on Military Education via video link from Nanjing. Participants from 21 military academies in 10 countries including Pakistan, Greece, Egypt, and Argentina discussed training and career paths for junior army officers. According to an official PLA news site, the annual forum seeks to foster dialogue and cooperation between Chinese military academies and other nations.

PLA OVERSEAS BASING AND ACCESS

Key Takeaways

The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances.
A global PLA military logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve.
Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection.
In June 2022, a PRC official confirmed that the PLA would have access to parts of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base. The PRC probably also has considered other countries as locations for PLA military logistics facilities, including Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.

The PRC is seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. Beijing may assess that a mixture of military logistics models, including preferred access to commercial infrastructure abroad, exclusive PLA logistics facilities with prepositioned supplies co-located with commercial infrastructure, and bases with stationed forces, most closely aligns with the PRC’s overseas military logistics needs. Some of the PRC’s BRI projects could create potential military advantages, such as PLA access to selected foreign ports to pre-position the necessary logistics support to sustain naval deployments in waters as distant as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean to protect its growing interests.

Official PRC sources assert that military logistics facilities, to include its Djibouti base, will be used to provide international public goods like HA/DR, and secure China’s lines of communication, citizens, and assets abroad. Regardless, a global PLA military logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve. Host nations can perform an essential role in regulating the PRC’s military operations, as PRC officials very likely recognize that a stable long-term relationship with the host nation is critical to the success of their military logistics facilities.
PRC military academics assert that bases abroad can enable forward deployment of PLA forces and support military conflict, diplomatic signaling, political change, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and training. They also suggest that a military logistics network could enable intelligence monitoring of the U.S. military.
In August 2017, the PRC officially opened its first PLA base in Djibouti. PLANMC are stationed at the base with wheeled armored vehicles and artillery but are currently limited in their ability to conduct expeditionary operations due to a lack of helicopters at the facility. Notably, we have no evidence that the PRC has used its base to assist in evacuation of Chinese citizens.
In late March 2022, a Type 903A “Fuchi” class supply ship, Luomahu (AOE-964), docked at the 450-meter pier for resupply; this was the first such reported PLA Navy port call to the Djibouti support base, indicating that the pier is now operational. The pier likely is able to accommodate the PLA Navy’s aircraft carriers, other large combatants, and submarines. PLA personnel at the facility have interfered with U.S. flights by lasing pilots and flying drones, and the PRC has sought to restrict Djiboutian sovereign airspace over the base.

Beyond its base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely considering and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection. The PLA’s approach likely includes consideration of many different sites and outreach to many countries, but only some will advance to negotiations for an infrastructure agreement, status of forces or visiting forces agreement, and/or basing agreement. Critical organizations involved in planning and negotiating for military logistics facilities are CMC Joint Staff Department, CMC Logistic Support Department, and service headquarters. The PRC’s overseas military basing will be constrained by the willingness of potential host nations to support a PLA presence. Host nations are likely concerned about risks to sovereignty, regional and international perceptions, and relations with the United States when considering hosting a Chinese military facility. PRC interlocutors likely use all means available to conduct influence operations to gain political favor among elites in host nations, while obfuscating the scale and scope of PRC political and military interests.

In June 2021, Cambodian Defense Minister Tea Bahn stated that the PRC would help to modernize and expand Ream but would not be the only country given access to the facility. The following June, China and Cambodia hosted a ground opening ceremony for the Chinese-built upgrades of the Ream base.

The PRC has likely also considered Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. The PRC has probably already made overtures to Namibia, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands. According to a draft copy of the China-Solomon Islands Security Agreement, the PRC will be permitted to send armed police and military personnel to the Solomon Islands to help maintain order, though the Solomon Island government denied this would lead to a PRC military base. The PLA is most interested in military access along the SLOCs from China to the Strait of Hormuz, Africa, and the Pacific Islands.

China seeks to strengthen its security ties through small-scale, in-country efforts to support domestic security. As of 2022, the PRC provides occasional personnel support at public events for the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. In Africa, the PRC maintains an embedded PLA training cadre for local military forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a military training school in Tanzania. The PRC probably pursues such efforts in regions it assesses can help foster favorable environments for its security goals, but these efforts do not signal definite interest in overseas basing.

INFLUENCE OPERATIONS

Key Takeaways

The creation of the PLA SSF in 2015 reflected the CCP’s understandings of cyber operations as the primary means for psychological manipulation.
The PLA concept of Cognitive Domain Operations (CDO) combines psychological warfare with cyber operations to shape adversary behavior and decision making.
The PLA probably intends to use CDO as an asymmetric capability to deter U.S. or third-party entry into a future conflict, or as an offensive capability to shape perceptions or polarize a society.

The PLA views controlling the information spectrum in the modern battlespace as a critical enabler and means of achieving information dominance early in a conflict. Beginning in the early 2000s, as part of the PRC’s overall influence operations, the PLA began developing the “Three Warfares” concept, which calls for the coordinated use of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. Public opinion warfare creates and disseminates information to guide an adversary’s public opinion and gain support from domestic and foreign audiences. Psychological warfare uses propaganda, deception, and coercion to induce pressure and affect the behavior of the target audience. Legal warfare uses domestic and international laws to shape narratives that advance Chinese interests and undermine those of an adversary. The PLA likely seeks to combine digital influence activities with the “Three Warfares” concept to demoralize adversaries and influence domestic and foreign audiences, creating an environment advantageous to the PRC.

From the PRC’s perspective, all nations—especially the United States—that use digital narratives to undermine the CCP’s authoritarian system in China employ offensive influence operations. Hence, the PRC considers its influence operations that counter this perceived subversion as defensive in order to protect the party and the military.

Another primary goal of the PRC’s influence operations is to maintain domestic stability and protect CCP rule. Domestically, the CCP uses influence activities to protect its image to the public and garner popular support for the military. Internationally, Beijing aims to create an information environment favorable to the PRC and its strategic foreign policy objectives. The PRC conducts influence operations that target media organizations, businesses, academic and cultural institutions, and policy communities of the United States, other countries, and international organizations to achieve outcomes favorable to its strategic and military objectives.

PRC INFLUENCE ACTORS

PRC influence operations are coordinated and executed by a range of affiliated actors, such as the United Front Work Department (UFWD), the MSS, and the SSF. The CCP likely seeks to condition multilateral political establishments and public opinion to accept the PRC’s narrative surrounding its priorities such as the PRC’s “one China principle” on Taiwan unification, BRI, political control over Hong Kong, and territorial and maritime claims in the SCS and ECS. In mid-2022, official messaging from diplomatic personnel, state media outlets, and diplomatic social media accounts surrounding the U.S. Speaker of the House’s visit to Taiwan highlighted how the PRC uses influence operations to shape the information environment surrounding Taiwan policy. In an August 2022 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Communique, Beijing advanced its official narrative that the PRC is a responsible, law-abiding member of the international community and that the U.S. Speaker’s visit unlawfully violated the PRC’s sovereignty and needlessly provoked potential U.S.-China confrontation.

PRC INFLUENCE OPERATIONS

PRC influence operations can range from lobbying and cultivating foreign politicians, injecting Chinese cultural narratives or values into foreign education systems, bringing academic or thank tank researchers’ access to China, and flooding Chinese language media abroad, all of which can be accomplished via diplomacy or coercive means. For example, a hallmark of the PRC’s influence strategy includes appealing to overseas PRC citizens or ethnic Chinese of other countries as indirect proxies to assert the CCP’s objectives through soft power engagements. The PRC often targets Uyghurs and overseas dissidents with harassment or threats to imprison their family members in China. Furthermore, the UFWD collaborated with overseas Chinese communities in the Global South, including Latin America and Caribbean countries in order to shape positive views of China that would better facilitate economic ties. Additionally, the PRC’s “Thousand Talents Program” targets overseas Chinese emigrants to support its foreign technology acquisition strategy, which is critical to China’s scientific and technical modernization.

The PRC has demonstrated its intent to use multilateral forums and organizations to expand its defense influence and security cooperation, while establishing a leadership role in those organizations. The PRC promotes strategic messaging by portraying China as a responsible global actor through international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and through PRC created multilateral regional forums like the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China-Arab States Cooperation, the China Central and Eastern Europe Cooperation Framework, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and through organizations which exclude traditional western partners, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In August 2022, official PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs remarks to the FOCAC advanced a narrative that, unlike other potential foreign partners, Beijing respected the sovereignty of African nations and was committed to supporting sustainable development, food security, public health services, and foreign direct investment across the continent. In May 2022, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted the Forum for Senior Defense Officials from Caribbean and South Pacific Countries, last hosted by Beijing in 2019, as evidence of its strong security cooperation with the Solomon Islands.

The PRC government-affiliated entities use overt and covert messaging vectors, such as the internet and social media platforms, and military cyber capabilities during both peacetime and wartime. The PLA’s goals for social media influence operations include promoting narratives to shape foreign governments’ policies and public opinion in favor of the PRC’s interests and undermining adversary resolve. The PLA views social media through the prism of information dominance, and during a crisis could use digital influence operations to undermine enemy morale and confuse or deceive adversary decision makers. Most Chinese media platforms, including traditional and digital newspaper and television programs, are either state-owned or heavily influenced by Beijing to augment the CCP’s response to geopolitics and often take on a more aggressive messaging tone.

COGNITIVE DOMAIN OPERATIONS (CDO)

The creation of the PLA SSF in 2015 reflected that the CCP understands cyber operations as the primary means for psychological manipulation. As the PLA seeks to expand the reach of its influence operations around the world and seize information dominance on the battlefield, it is researching and developing what it believes to be the next evolution of psychological warfare, which it calls CDO. CDO blends previous Chinese concepts such as public opinion and psychological warfare with modern internet technologies and communication platforms, and is designed to achieve strategic national security goals by affecting a target’s cognition and resulting in a change in the target’s decision making and behavior. The PLA has recognized the importance of incorporating emerging technologies such as AI, big data, brain science, and neuroscience into CDO as PLA perceives that these technologies will lead to profound changes in the ability to subvert human cognition.

The goal of CDO is to achieve what the PLA refers to as “mind dominance, which the PLA defines as the use of information to influence public opinion to affect change in a nation’s social system, likely to create an environment favorable to China and reduce civilian and military resistance to PLA actions. The PLA probably intends to use CDO as an asymmetric capability to deter U.S. or third-party entry into a future conflict, or as an offensive capability to shape perceptions or polarize a society. Authoritative PLA documents describe one aspect of deterrence as the ability to bring about psychological pressure and fear on an opponent and force them to surrender. PLA articles on CDO state that seizing mind dominance in the cognitive domain and subduing the enemy without fighting is the highest realm of warfare.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE

The PRC almost certainly is learning lessons from the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine that are most applicable to the PRC’s strategic interests of strengthening its whole-of-government approach to counter a perceived U.S.-led containment strategy. From the PRC’s perspective, the war provides unique opportunities for PRC leaders to evaluate how countries use diplomatic, informational, military, and economic measures to advance their interests before, during and after a major conflict. As the conflict continues, the PRC’s ultimate takeaways probably will depend on the conflict’s resolution, the PRC’s predispositions and perceptions of Washington’s intent toward the PRC and competing bureaucratic priorities within the PRC system.

Diplomatically, the war in Ukraine probably has reaffirmed to Beijing the importance of persuading Global South countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific to echo China’s narratives on the conflict. The PRC probably views support from the developing countries as crucial to blunting U.S.-led efforts imposing reputational and economic costs on the PRC as well as claiming broad international support for PRC goals. At the same time, Beijing almost certainly continues to be surprised by the scope, scale, duration, and cohesion of the international response to Russia war on Ukraine. The PRC’s dismissal of the independent agency of countries it views as aligned with the United States or the legitimacy of shared values almost certainly has contributed to the PRC’s continued diplomatic struggles, especially in Europe.

The PLA likely is observing how Russia and Ukraine are employing CDO during the current Russia-Ukraine war, and likely will seek to incorporate lessons learned from this conflict into its own doctrine for future conflicts. The PLA’s lessons learned from Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine probably will reinforce a commitment to conducting influence operations to deter adversaries, shape public opinion early on during a conflict, polarize societies, erode the will to fight, and guard against charismatic leaders changing public perceptions. PLA researchers have stated that the victory of the cognitive narrative may yield greater strategic benefits than firepower destruction, force control, and siege, and that effects of CDO can last long after the conflict has concluded.

On the economic front, western sanctions against Russia almost certainly have amplified the PRC’s push for defense and technological self-sufficiency and financial resilience. The PRC’s reliance on Western technology and capital investment probably will slow economic decoupling from Washington.

PRC ENERGY STRATEGY

Key Takeaway

The PRC’s interest in ensuring reliable, cost-effective, and diverse hydrocarbon sources to support its economic growth drives its overseas energy investments.

In 2022, the PRC imported approximately 10.2 million barrels per day of crude oil, which met about 70 percent of its needs, and produced the other 30 percent domestically, according to industry reports. The PRC continues to build its crude oil emergency petroleum reserve (EPR) capacity to safeguard against supply disruptions with a goal to have the equivalent of 90 days’ worth of oil imports in storage. The PRC’s EPR storage capacity is approximately 600 million barrels, equal to about 60 days’ worth of oil imports, according to industry data. The PRC met about 41 percent of its natural gas demand with imports in 2022, and industry experts estimate that the PRC’s natural gas imports will increase to about 50 percent by 2035. In 2022, most of China’s oil and natural gas imports came from Africa, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Russia. China’s investments in transport networks for oil and gas could help diversify its supply and reduce dependency on strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca.

The PRC relies on maritime routes that transit the SCS and Strait of Malacca for most of its hydrocarbon deliveries. Approximately 62 percent of the PRC’s oil imports and 17 percent of its total natural gas imports transit the SCS and Strait of Malacca. Despite the PRC’s efforts to diversify energy suppliers, Beijing will most likely continue to rely on oil and natural gas imports from Africa and the Middle East to meet energy demands for at least the next 10 years.

Crude oil pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan to China demonstrate the PRC’s interest in increasing overland fuel supply. In 2022, the PRC imported about 600,000 barrels per day of Russian crude oil via the East Siberia–Pacific Ocean pipeline, which has a total designed capacity of 1.6 million barrels per day. The PRC also imports crude oil from Middle Eastern—primarily Saudi—and African suppliers via a crude oil pipeline across Burma. This 440,000-barrels-per-day pipeline bypasses the Strait of Malacca by transporting crude oil from Kyaukpyu, Burma, to Yunnan Province, China, and reduces shipping time by more than a third. This pipeline, however, still relies on seaborne oil imports through the Indian Ocean, where the PRC has little power projection capability.

In 2022, approximately 30 percent of the PRC’s natural gas imports came from Turkmenistan via a pipeline that runs through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This pipeline can transport 55 billion cubic meters per year; Turkmenistan and China are planning to expand it to 85 billion cubic meters per year. A natural gas pipeline connecting China to Burma can deliver 12 billion cubic meters per year, but only 4 billion cubic meters of gas was shipped in 2022. Russia’s Power of Siberia gas pipeline supplied approximately 15 billion cubic meters to China in 2022. The pipeline is projected to reach an annual capacity of 38 billion cubic meters per year by 2027.

CRITICAL MINERAL EXPLOITATION

China controls the majority of the global critical minerals refining, in addition to the majority of rare earth element (REE) production and refining. Critical minerals such as lithium are key to the green energy transition, while REEs have significant industrial and defense applications. A 2022 Brookings report estimated that the PRC refines 68 percent of nickel, 40 percent of copper, 59 percent of lithium, and 73 percent of cobalt. However, other countries make up the majority of lithium and cobalt mining. While China’s share of the global extraction of REEs has declined from a peak of 95 percent in 2010 to nearly 60 percent in 2019, the world is still significantly reliant on China for over 90 percent of REE processing and refining. The PRC’s control of these supply chains could grant it a competitive advantage in sustainable energy technologies such as lithium-ion battery production and secure critical supply lines for its defense industrial base and production of high-end weapons platforms.

CHINA’S TOP CRUDE SUPPLIERS 2022
Country	Volume (1,000 barrels per day)	Percentage of Imported Crude Oil
Saudi Arabia	1,752	17
Russia	1,728	17
Iraq	1,111	11
UAE	858	8
Oman	789	8
Malaysia	715	7
Kuwait	667	7
Angola	603	6
Brazil	497	5
Colombia	173	2
Others	1,289	13
Total	10,182	101*
*Total does not equal 100 because figures have been rounded.

CHINA IN THE POLAR REGIONS

CHINA IN THE ARCTIC

The PRC has increased activities and engagement in the Arctic region since gaining observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013. In January 2018, the PRC published its first Arctic strategy paper that promoted a “Polar Silk Road” and declared China to be a “near-Arctic State,” although it has since stopped using this language to describe itself in public fora. The strategy paper identifies the PRC’s interests as access to natural resources, sea lines of communication, and promoting an image of a “responsible major country” in Arctic affairs. The strategy highlights the PRC’s icebreaker vessels and research stations as integral to implementation.

The PRC maintains civilian research stations in Iceland and Norway and operates three icebreaking research vessels as of early 2023. The first is the Xue Long, which in 2017 became the first official Chinese vessel to traverse Canada’s Northwest Passage. In 2018, Beijing launched its second icebreaking research vessel, the Xue Long 2. The Xue Long 2 can break ice up to 1.5 meters thick, compared to the Xue Long’s maximum of 1.2 meters, and the first polar research vessel that can break ice while moving forwards or backwards. In October 2022, the Xue Long 2 commenced the PRC’s 12^th Arctic expedition, during which researchers did comprehensive observations of the atmosphere, ocean and ecology. During the 12^th Arctic Expedition, the PRC deployed an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) for the first time in the Arctic Ocean. In November 2020, the Xue Long 2 embarked on the PRC’s 37{{sup|th Antarctic expedition, where researchers planned to carry out hydrological, meteorological and environmental studies and monitor new pollutants such as microplastics and drifting garbage in the Antarctic Ocean. In February 2023, the PRC’s third polar icebreaker—the Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di—completed a 3,000-mile round-trip winter sea trial in the Bohai Sea.

The PRC’s expanding Arctic engagement has created new opportunities for engagement between the PRC and Russia. The PRC is interested in increasing the use of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to cut shipping times between Europe and China by a third. The use of the NSR also allows China to diversify shipping routes away from the strategic Strait of Malacca. In September 2022, China and Russia also conducted a combined naval patrol in the Bering Sea. China-Russia cooperation on Arctic issues throughout 2022 likely created momentum enabling spring 2023 agreements to coordinate Arctic maritime law enforcement and establish a joint working body for the development of the NSR.

THE PRC IN THE ANTARCTIC

China currently has four active Antarctic sites that are used for environmental research and support to the Chinese space program: the Great Wall Station, Zhongshan Station, Kunlun Station, and Taishan Station. China is quickly building a formidable presence in Antarctica that almost certainly has a nexus with its civilian space program and future PLA missions. It also endeavors to work more closely with Russia and possibly seeks to revise the Antarctic Treaty in 2048 to afford it greater access to natural resources and support military operations there.

China is constructing bases in Antarctica that includes possible dual-use technology. While the equipment is ostensibly used for legitimate scientific research and is allowable under the Antarctic Treaty, it could also be used for unspecified military purposes. For instance, China is building a fifth station on Inexpressible Island in the Ross Sea to increase its Antarctic footprint that could provide the PLA with better surveillance capabilities. Inexpressible Island will provide telemetry, tracking and communications for scientific polar observation satellite, and its equipment is also well positioned to collect signals intelligence over Australia and New Zealand.

While China is a relative newcomer to Antarctica, it has been de-legitimizing the Consensus-based Antarctic Treaty, preparing for 2048, when central aspects of the treaty will be open to renegotiation. It is likely both China and Russia will work together to seek to renegotiate the Antarctic Treaty to loosen regulations on mining and fishing practices, which both countries need for future consumption.