ihstory]
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
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to Russia, and Austria, even after the outbreak of war, did not oppose Russian measures. At the beginning of 1877 a secret understanding had been made between the two powers, by which Russia undertook not to annex any territory, and in other ways not to take steps which would be injurious to Austria. The advance of the Russian army on Constantinople, however, was a serious menace to Austrian influence ; Andrassy therefore demanded that the terms of peace should be submitted to a European conference, which he suggested should meet at Vienna. The Peace of San Stefano violated the engagements made by Russia, and Andrassy was therefore compelled to ask for a credit of 60 million gulden and to mobilize a small portion of the army; the money was granted unanimously in the Hungarian Delegation, though the Magyars disliked a policy the object of which appeared to be not the defence of Turkey against Russia, but an agreement with Russia which would give Austria compensation at the expense of Turkey ; in the Austrian Deputation it was voted only by a majority of 39 to 20, for the Germans were alarmed at the report that it would be used for an occupation of part of the Turkish territory. The active share taken by Great Britain, however, relieved Austria from the necessity of having recourse to further measures. By an arrangement made beforehand, Austria was requested at the Con- Bosn,a and gress of Berlin to undertake the occupation and gOVjaa administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina—an honourable but arduous task. The provinces could not be left to the Turks ; Austria could not allow them to fall under Russian influence. The occupation was immediately begun, and 60,000 Austrian troops, under the command of General Philippovitch, crossed the frontier on 29th July. The work was, however, more difficult than had been anticipated; the Mahommedans offered a strenuous resistance; military operations were attended with great difficulty in the mountainous country; 200,000 men were ! required, and they did not succeed in crushing the resist! ance till after some months of obstinate fighting. The losses on either side were very heavy; even after the capture of Serajevo in August, the resistance was continued; and besides those who fell in battle, a considerable number of the insurgents were put to death under military law. The opposition in the Delegations, which met at the end of the year, was so strong that the Government had to be content with a credit to cover the expenses for 1879 of less than half what they had originally asked, and the supplementary estimate of 40,000,000 gulden for 1878 was not voted till the next year. In 1879 the Porte, after long delay, recognized the occupation on the distinct understanding that the sovereignty of the sultan was acknowledged. A civil administration was then established, the provinces not being attached to either half of the empire, but placed under the control of the joint minister of finance. The Government during the first two years was not very successful; the Christian population were disappointed at finding that they still had, as in the old days, to pay rent to the Mahommedan Begs. There were difficulties also between the Roman Catholics and the members of the Greek Church. In 1881 disturbances in Dalmatia spread over the frontier into Herzegovina, and another expedition had to be sent to restore order. When this was done Herr von Kallay was appointed minister, and under his judicious government order and prosperity were established in the provinces. In accordance with another clause of the Treaty of Berlin, Austria was permitted to place troops in the sanjak of Novi-Bazar, a district of great strategic importance, which separated Servia and Montenegro, and See General Le Brun, Souvenirs Militaires, 1866-70. Paris, through which the communication between Bosnia and 1895 ; also, Baron de Worms, op. cit., and tlie article on Beust. Salonica passed. This was done in September 1879, an
For the first four years, while Beust was chancellor, the foreign policy was still influenced by the feelings left by the war of 1866. We do not know how far Foreign there was a real intention to revenge Konigpollcy. gr£1,tz and recover the position lost in Germany. This would be at least a possible policy, and one to which Beust by his previous history would be inclined. There were sharp passages of arms with the Prussian Government regarding the position of the South German states; a close friendship was maintained with France; there were meetings of the emperor and of Napoleon at Salzburg in 1868, and the next year at Paris; the death of Maximilian in Mexico cast a shadow over the friendship, but did not destroy it. The opposition of the Hungarians and financial difficulties probably prevented a warlike policy. In 1870 there were discussions preparatory to a formal alliance with France against the North German Confederation, but nothing was signed.1 The war of 1870 put an end to all ideas of this kind; the German successes were so rapid that Austria was not exposed to the temptation of intervening, a temptation that could hardly have been resisted had the result been doubtful or the struggle prolonged. The absorption of South Germany in the German empire took away the chief cause for friction; and from that time warm friendship, based on the maintenance of the established order, has existed between the two empires. Austria gave up all hope of regaining her position in Germany; Germany disclaimed all intention of acquiring the German provinces of Austria. Beust’s retirement in 1871 put the finishing touch on the new relations. His successor, Count Andrassy, a Hungarian, established a good understanding with Bismarck; and in 1872 the visit of the Emperor Francis Joseph, accompanied by his minister, to Berlin, was the final sign of the reconciliation with his uncle. The Tsar was also present on that occasion, and for the next six years the close friendship between the three empires removed all danger of war. Three years later the full reconciliation with Italy followed, when Francis Joseph consented to visit Victor Emmanuel in the city of Venice. The outbreak of disturbance in the Balkans ended this period of calm. The insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately affected Austria; refugees question™ larSe numbers crossed the frontier and had to be maintained by the Government. The political problem presented was a very difficult one. The sympathy of the Slavonic inhabitants of the empire made it impossible for the Government of Vienna to regard with indifference the sufferings of Christians in Turkey. Active support was impossible, because the Hungarians, among whom the events of 1848 had obliterated the remembrance of the earlier days of Turkish conquest, were full of sympathy for the Turks. It was a cardinal principle of Austrian policy that she could not allow the erection of new Slavonic states on her southern frontier. Moreover, the disturbances were fomented by Russian -agents, and any increase of Russian influence (for which the Pan-Slavonic party was working) was full of danger to Austria. For a time the mediation of Germany preserved the good understanding between the two eastern empires. In 1875 Andrassy drafted a Note, which was accepted by the Powers, requiring Turkey to institute the reforms necessary for the good government of the provinces. Turkey agreed to do this, but the insurgents required a guarantee from the Powers that Turkey would keep her engagements. This could not be given, and the rebellion continued and spread to Bulgaria. The lead then passed
