Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/138

122 Buddh£st Ph£losophv lCH. others around it. The point which must be remembered in con- nection with the conception of matter is this, that the qualities of all the mahabhutas are inherent in the paramal).us. The special characteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth), viscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belonging to fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together to form each of the elements; the difference between the different elements consists only in this, that in each of them its own special characteristics were predominant and active, and other charac- teristics though present remained only in a potential form. The mutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of earth or the solidness inherent in them; the mutual attraction of things is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth. The four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely, (I) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such as activity, moisture, etc.), and (3) function (such as dlzTti or attrac- tion, sa1!lgl'alla or cohesion, pakti or chemical heat, and vyiilzana or clustering and collecting). These combine together naturally by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinction between the Vaibhaika Sarvastivadins and other forms of Bud- dhism is this, that here the five skandhas and matter are re- garded as permanent and eternal; they are said to be momentary only in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly, owing to their constant change of combination. Avidya is not regarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series of pratltyasamutpada; nor is it ignorance of any particular in- dividual, but is rather identical with "moha" or delusion and represents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. A vidya, which through saf!lskara, etc., produces namarupa in the case of a particular individual, is not his avidya in the present existence but the avidya of his past existence bearing fruit in the present life. "The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when it becomes an effect, having changed its state." For example, day becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case the name clay is lost and the name jar arises 1. The Sarvastivadins allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in the case of composite things (sal!/prllyukta Iletu) and in the case of 1 Sogen's quotation from Kumiirajiva's Chinese version of .Aryyadeva's commentary on the 1IIiidh)'alllika Iiislm (chapter xx. Kiirika 9)'