Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/164

14 8 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. objective aspect and an internal pratityasamutpada. The external pratttyasamutpada (dependent origination) is represented in the way in which material things (e.g. a jug) came into being by the co-operation of diverse elements-the lump of clay, the potter, the wheel, etc. The internal (adlzyat11lika) pratityasamutpada was represented by avidya, tfDa, karma, the skandhas, and the ayatanas produced out of them 1. Our understanding is composed of two categories called the pravicayabuddlzi and the vikalpalaka1Jagrallabhill£veSaprati(ha- pikiibuddlzi. The pravicayabuddhi is that which always seeks to take things in either of the following four ways, that they are either this or the other (ekatvanyatva); either both or not both (ubhayanubhaya), either are or are not (astinast£), either eternal or non-eternal (Jlitya1litya). But in reality none of these can be affirmed of the phenomena. The second category consists of that habit of the mind by virtue of which it constructs diversities and arranges them (created in their turn by its own constructive activity -parikalpa) in a logical order of diverse relations of subject and predicate, causal and other relations. He who knows the nature of these two categories of the mind knows that there is no external world of matter and that they are all experienced only in the mind. There is no water, but it is the sense construction of smoothness (slleha) that constructs the water as an external sub- stance; it is the sense construction of activity or energy that constructs the external substance of fire; it is the sense construc- tion of movement that constructs the external substance of air. In this way through the false habit of taking the unreal as the real (mitlzyasatyiiblti1livesa) five skandhas appear. If these were to appear all together, we could not speak of any kind of causal relations, and if they appeared in succession there could be no connection between them, as there is nothing to bind them together. In reality there is nothing which is produced or destroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds up things as perceived with all their relations, and ourselves as per- ceivers. It is simply a convention (vyavalziira) to speak of things as known 2 . Whatever we designate by speech is mere speech- construction (vagvikalpa) and unreal. In speech one could not speak of anything without relating things in some kind of causal 1 Lmikiiz,atiirasutra, p. 85. 2 Lmikiivatdrasiitra, p. 87, compare the term" vyavahiirika" as used of the pheno- menal and the conventional world in almost the same sense by Sankara.