Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/174

15 8 Buddh£st P h£losophy [ CII. elusion is termed ropaI)a because the regulation is placed on the opponent. Next: " If D be derived of C. Then B should have been derived of A. But you affirmed B of A. (therefore) That B can be affirmed of A but not of D or Cis wrong." This is the pa!iloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted with the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major in the latter method we get If A is B C is D. But A is B. Therefore C is D. By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is re- established I." The Doctrine of Momentariness. Ratnaklrtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of all existence (sattva), first, by the concomitance discovered by the method of agreement in presence (mzvaya'l'Yiipti), and then by the method of difference by proving that the production of effects could not be justified on the assumption of things being per- manent and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness as the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of producing anything (arthakn"yiikiiritva). The form of the first type of argument by anvayavyapti may be given thus: "Vhat- ever exists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example the jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are dis- cussing are existents and are therefore momentary." It cannot be said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of an existent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certain effects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that these are all identical in the past and the future or that it is producing no effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible, for those which are done now could not be done again in the future; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to 1 See introduction to the translation of .Kathiivatthu (POilltS of COlltroversy) by Mrs Rhys Davids.