Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/182

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166 Buddhist Phzlosophy ECHo believe in the existence of a power-possessor separate from the power. Brief survey of the evolution of Buddhist Thought. In the earliest period of Buddhism more attention was paid to the four noble truths than to systematic metaphysics. Vhat was sorrow, what was the cause of sorrow, what was the cessation of sorrow and what could lead to it? The doctrine of paficcasa- 'lmtpPiida was offered only to explain how sorrow came in and not with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. The discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, such as whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathagata existed after death or not, were considered as heresies in early Buddhism. Great emphasis was laid on slla, samadhi and pafifia and the doctrine that there was no soul. The Abhidhammas hardly give us any new philosophy which was not contained in the Suttas. They only elaborated the materials of the suttas with enumerations and definitions. Vith the evolution of Mahayana scriptures from some time about 200 B.C. the doctrine of the non- essentialness and voidness of all dlzammas began to be preached. This doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nagarjuna, .Aryyadeva, Kumarajlva and Candraklrtti, is more or less a co- rollary from the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could not say whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathagata existed or did not exist after death, and if there was no permanent soul and all the dhammas were changing, the only legitimate way of thinking about all things appeared to be to think of them as mere void and non-essential appearances. These appearances appear as being mutually related but apart from their appearance they have no other essence, no being or reality. The Tathata doctrine which was preached by Asvaghoa oscillated between the position of this absolute non-essentialness of all dhammas and the Brahminic idea that something existed as the background of all these non-essential dhammas. This he called tathata, but he could not consistently say that any such per- manent entity could exist. The Vijfianavada doctrine which also took its rise at this time appears to me to be a mixture of the Sunyavada doctrine and the Tathata doctrine; but when carefully examined it seems to be nothing but Sunyavada, with an attempt at explaining all the observed phenomena. If everything was