Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/240

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224 The Kapila and the Patanjala Sa1?Zkhya . [CH. came forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretation of their nature. Since no definite explanation of the gut)as is found in any other work before Bhik!?u, it is quite probable that this matter may not have been definitely worked out before. Neither Caraka nor the hfaltiibhiirata explains the nature of the gut)as. But Bhik!?u's interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is known of the manifestations and the workings of the gUt)as in all early documents. I have therefore accepted the interpretation of Bhiku in giving my account of the nature of the gut) as. The Kiirikii speaks of the gUt)as as being of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness (sattva, rajas and tamas). It also describes sattva as being light and illuminating, rajas as of the nature of ener.gy and causing motion, and tamas as heavy and obstructing. Vacaspati merely paraphrases this statement of the Karikii but does not enter into any further explanations. Bhik!?u's interpretation fits in well with all that is known of the gut)as, though it is quite possible that this view might not have been known before, and when the original Sarpkhya doctrine was formulated there was a real vague- ness as to the conception of the gut)as. There are some other points in which Bhiku's interpretation differs from that of Vacaspati. The most important of these may be mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection of the buddhi states with the puru!?a. Vacaspati holds that there is no contact (Sa1!zyoga) of any buddhi state with the purua but that a reflection of the puru!?a is caught in the state of buddhi by virtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and trans- formed into consciousness. Rut this view is open to the objection that it does not explain how the puru!?a can be said to be the experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection in the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an ex- perience (blzoga) on the basis of that image alone without any actual connection of the purua with the buddhi. The answer of Vacaspati Misra is that there is no contact of the two in space and time, but that their proximity (samzidlli) means only a specific kind of fitness (yogyata) by virtue of which the purua, though it remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi, and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribed to a person. Vijftana Bhiku differs from Vacaspati and says that if such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no