Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/276

260 The KaPila and the Piitaiijala Sii7!zkhya [CH. that it can reflect the intelligence of the purua, and thus render its non-intelligent transformations to appear as if they were in- telligent. Thus all our thoughts and other emotional or volitional operations are really the non-intelligent transformations of the buddhi or citta having a large sattva preponderance; but by virtue of the reflection of the puru!?a in the buddhi, these appear as if they are intelligent. The self (puru!?a) according to Sarpkhya- Yoga is not directly demonstrated by self-consciousness. Its existence is a matter of inference on teleological grounds and grounds of moral responsibility. The self cannot be directly noticed as being separate from the buddhi modifications. Through beginningless ignorance there is a confusion and the changing states of buddhi are regarded as conscious. These buddhi changes are further so associated with the reflection of the purua in the buddhi that they are interpreted as the experiences of the purua. This association of the buddhi with the reflection of the purua in the buddhi has such a special fitness (yogyata) that it is inter- preted as the experience of the puru!?a. This explanation of Vacaspati of the situation is objected to by Vijnana Bhik!?u. Vijnana Bhik!?u says that the association of the buddhi with the image of the purua cannot give us the notion of a real person who undergoes the experiences. It is to be supposed therefore that when the buddhi is intelligized by the reflection of the puru!?a, it is then superimposed upon the purua, and we have the notion of an abiding person who experiences l . Whatever may be the explanation, it seems that the union of the buddhi with the purua is somewhat mystical. As a result of this reflection of cit on buddhi and the superimposition of the buddhi the puru!?a cannot realize that the transformations of the buddhi are not its own. Buddhi resembles puru!?a in transparency, and the puru!?a fails to differentiate itself from the modifications of the buddhi, and as a result of this non-distinction the purua becomes bound down to the buddhi, always failing to recognize the truth that the buddhi and its transformations are wholly alien to it. This non- distinction of purua from buddhi which is itself a mode of buddhi is what is meant by avidyii (non-knowledge) in Sarpkhya, and is the root of all experience and all misery2. 1 Tattvavaifiiradi and Yo..£{aviirttika, I. 4' 2 This indicates the nature of the analysis of illusion with Saf!1khya. It is the non-apprehension of the distinction of two things (e.g. the snake and the rope) that