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VIII] Philosophy in the Vaifeika siUras 293 neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (ekaprthaktva). The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc. Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the effect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither contact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist independently (yutasiddhyablulvat). In the eighth book it is said that soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the ap- prehension of qualities, action, generality, and particularity perception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the cause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the cause of taste, colour and touch l. In the ninth book negation is described; non-existence (asat) is defined as that to which neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things may become non-existent and that which is existent in one way may be non-existent in another; but there is another kind of non-existence which is different from the above kinds of existence and non-existence 2 . All negation can be directly per- ceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the mind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also made in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the yogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices). In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the middle term is described. I t is said that anything connected with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as con- trary or as inseparably connected, will serve as liti.ga (reason). The main point is the notion (, this is associated with this," or "these two are related as cause and effect," and since this may also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllo- gism from propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (avidyii) is due to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal- observation due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite of this is true knowledge (vidya). In the tenth it is said that pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to doubt and certainty. 1 Upaskiira here explains that it is intended that the senses are produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in the siitras. I In the previous three kinds of non-existence, pragabhtlva (negation before pro- duction), dhvaf!Zsiibhiiva (negation after destruction), and anyonyabhiiva (mutual negation of each other in each other), have been described. The fourth one is siimiin- yabhiiva (general negation).