Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/319

VIII] Nyliya sutras and V aifeika siUras 3°3 further allusion elsewhere. The Vaiseika sutras as we have already seen had argued only against the Mimarpsa, and ultimately agreed with them on most points. The dispute with Mimarpsa in the iVyiiya sutras is the same as in the V aiseika over the question of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the self-validity of knowledge (svatal} prii11lii1Jyaviida) and the akhyati doctrine of illusion of the Mimarpsists, which form the two chief points of discussion between later ltJ1marpsa and later N yaya, are never alluded to in the Nyiiya siUras. The advocacy of Yoga methods (Nyiiya sutras, IV. ii. 38-42 and 46) seems also to be an alien element; these are not found in V aiseika and are not in keeping with the general tendency of the Nyaya siUras, and the Japanese tradition that lVlirok added them later on as Mahamaho- padhyaya Haraprasada Sastri has pointed out 1 is not improbable. The Vaiseika siUras, III. i. 18 and III. ii. I, describe per- ceptional knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the self (atman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived under special conditions of sa1!zskiira (conglomeration etc.). The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non- simultaneity (ayaugapadya) of knowledge and efforts is almost the same with Vaiseika as with Nyaya. The Nyiiya sutras give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring in the questions of sarpskara or udbhiitariipavattva which Vai- seika does. On the question of inference Nyaya gives three classifications as piirvavat, seavat and samanyatodrta, but no definition. The Va£se#ka siUras do not know of these classifica- tions, and give only particular types or instances of inference (V. S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2,4--5). Inference is said to be made when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of infer- ence without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyapti (concomitance of hetu (reason) and siidhya(probandum» which be- came so important in later Nyaya has never been properly formu- lated either in the Nyiiya sittras or in the V aiseika. Vai.fcika szUra, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance between hetu and sadhya (pras£ddhipiirvakatviit apadesasya), 1 fA.S.B. 19 0 5,