Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/332

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3 16 The Nyaya - Vaifeika Philosophy [CH. of the measure of the latter. This explains aluparimarya, hras-a parimarya, mahat parimarya, and djrgla parimarya. The parimarya of akasa, kala, dik and atman which are regarded as all-pervasive, is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parimaryas of the atoms, akasa, kala, dik, manas, and atman are regarded as eternal (nz"tya). All other kinds of parimalas as belonging to non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal. The eighth is prthaktva (mutual difference or separateness of things), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation sucf} as this jug is not this pot. The ninth is sa1!tyoga (connection), that entity of gurya by virtue of which things appear to us as connected. The tenth is vibhiiga (separation), that entity of gurya which destroys the connection or contact of things. The eleventh and twelfth guryas, paratva and aparatva, give rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote and near. The other guryas such as buddhi (knowledge ),sukha (happiness), du(tklw (sorrow), z"cchii (will), d/e.fa (antipathy or hatred) and yabla (effort) can occur only with reference to soul. The characteristic of gurutva (heaviness) is that by virtue of which things fall to the ground. The gl1rya of sneha (oiliness) belongs to water. The gurya of sa1?lskara is of three kinds, (I) vega (velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions, (2) sthiti-sthiiPaka (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) bhii- vallii is that quality of atman by which things are constantly practised or by which things experienced are remembered and recognized 1. Dharma is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoy happiness or to attain salvation 2 . Adhanna is 1 Prasastapiida says that bhiivana is a special characteristic of the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which things seen, heard and felt are remem- bered and recognized. Through unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India), repetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the salpskara hecomes particularly strong. See Nyiiyakandali, p. 267. Kal)iida however is silent on these points. 1 Ie only says that by a special kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the salpskiira, memory (smrti) is produced (IX. 2. 6). 2 Praastariida speaks of dharma (mcrit) as being a quality of the soul. Thereupon Sriclhara points out that this view does not admit that dharma is a power of karma (na karmasiimarth)'alll). Sacrifice etc. cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary