Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/334

3 18 The Nyiiya- Vaifelka Philosophy [CH. This jati or sii11liinya thus must be regarded as having a separate independent reality though it is existent in dravya, gurya and karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any indepen- dent reality of samanya, but said that the sameness as cow was really but the negation of all non-cows (apoha). The per- ception of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns on his own head I. The Nyaya-Vaiseika said that negation of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness per- ceived as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained by the aforesaid pegatio n theory_of the J3uddhists. Samanya has thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that object I. This jati is eternal or non-destructible; for even with the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jati, the latter is not destroyed 2. Through v£sea things are perceived as diverse. No single sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms them- selves. The specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it I The Buddhist PaQdiHisoka says that there is no single thing running through different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the siimiinya could be established. For if it did exist then we could have known it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his action of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is fom1ed. If there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish jiiti in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the action of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should require one common factor to hold them together, then these should require another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum. Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent (yadyadlt/,alabdhilakazapriiptam sallnopalabhyate tattadasat). Siimiinya is such, therefore siimiinya is non-existent. No siimiinya can be admitted to exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past experiences of existence and non-existence that this notion is formed and transferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no siimiinya can be pointed out as being externally per- ceptihle-.Siimiil1yadiiaf.Zadikprasiiritii-in Six Buddhist Nyiiya Tracts. The Vediinta also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know jiiti as a separate substance. So it dicards jiiti. See Vediintaparibhiifti, ,Sikhtlmaf.Zi and Alai- prahhii, pp. 69-7 [. See also Srlhara's Kha1;ujallakha1.ujakhtldya, pp. 1079-1086. 2 Similarity (.<iidrlya) is not rcgarded as a separate category, for it is defined as identity in differcnce (tadbhill1latvt? sati tadgtltabhfi)'odharmavattvam).