33° The Nyliya - V a£feika P h£losophy [CH. changes the colour of a fruit is different from that which generates or changes the taste. Even when the colour and taste remain the ame a particular kind of heat may change the smell. When grass eaten by cows is broken up into atoms special kinds of heat-light rays change its old taste, colour, touch and smell into such forms as those that belong to milk 1. In the Nyaya- Vaiseika system all action of matter on matter is thus resolved into motion. Conscious activity (prayat11a) is distinguished from all forms of motion as against the Saf!1khya doctrine which considered everything other than purua (in- telligence) to arise in the course of cosmic evolution and therefore to be subject to vibratory motion. The Origin of Knowledge (PramaI).a). The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We have already seen that Saf!1khya- Yoga explained it by supposing that the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or purua. The J ains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all- intelligence of the self. N yaya- V aiseika regarded all effects as being due to the as- semblage of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably, and immediately preceded these effects. Thatcollocation (Si1magri) which produced knowlege involved certain non-intelligent as well as intelligent elements and through their conjoint action un- contradicted and determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thus called pramar:ta or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge 2 . None of the separate elements composing 1 Govardhana's Nyayabodhini on Tarkasal!,graha, pp. 9, 10. 2 "Avyablliciiri1.zimasandigdhiirtllopalabdllil!1 vidlldllati bodlliibodllasvablliivii siima-
- ri pramii1.wm." N)'ayamaiijari, p. 12. Udyotakara however defined "pramal)a"
as upalabdhihetu (cause of knowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I have followed, but it emphasizes the side of vyapara or movement of the senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with them and knowledge is produced. Thus Vacaspati says: .. siddllamilldriyiidi, asiddhaiica tatsa1tnikarfiidi 7')1iiPiiraya1ZllZttPiidayall karala eva caritiirtha!, karZm!1 tvilldriy{idi tatsa1l1Zikarfiidi vii 1ltlllyatra caritartlwmiti siik{id/lpalabdh{iveva Plltlle vyiipriyate." Tiitparya!ikii, p. 15. Thus it is the action of the senses as pramal)a which is the direct cause of the pro- duction of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken place without the
