Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/356

34° The Nyaya- Vaiseika Philosophy [ClIo kriya (action), nama (name), and dravya (substance) to things]. The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are not different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predi- cation of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The same remark applies to action, for motion is not something dif- ferent from that which moves. But name is completely different from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified, and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if it was a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick" are altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now as regards the first three objections it is a question of the dif- ference of the N"yaya ontological position with that of the Bud- dhists, for we know that N yaya and V aiseika believe jati, gUDa and kriya to be different from substance and therefore the pre- dicating of them of substance as different categories related to it at the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as erroneous. As to the fourth objection Vacaspati replies that the memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not asso- ciated until the second stage through the joint action of memory is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in order to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne in mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only asso- ciated with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there cannot be allY objection to the association of the name. But the Buddhists further object that there is no reaSLn why one should identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which was seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual perception. To this Vacaspati says that through the help of memory or past impressions (sa1!lskara) this can be considered as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is ] NYliyamaiijari, pp. 93-100, .. Panra caite kalpa1/{i bhavallti jiitikalpallii, gu'.zakal- panii, kriyiikalPanii, niimakalpa1zii dravyakalpanii eeti, taka kvaddabhede'pi bhedakal- paniit kvaczcca hhuu'pyabhedakalpal1iit kalpallii ucyallte." See Dharmakirtti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4. See also pp. 409-410 of this book.