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VIII] I nftrence 343 and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhana- jfiana, which is also to be regarded as a pratyaka directly by the mind. This is of course different from the other form of perception called manasa-pratyaka, by which memories of past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept visualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and per- ceive that it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by the eye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visual percept with it. According to Vedanta this acquired perception is only a case of inference. The pratibha-pratyaka however is that which is with reference to the happening of a future even t. Vhen a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective cognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to the self by the mind as "I know this pot." This is effected by the mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cogni- tion which had already been generated in the soul. This second reperception is called anuvyavasaya, and all practical work can proceed as a result of this anuvyavasaya 1. Inference. Inference (amt1Juilla) is the second means of proof (pramat:1a) and the most valuable contribution that Nyaya has made has been on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a thing on the strength of the mark or liIi.ga which is associated with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically called liIi.ga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has been made (the hill in this example) is called paka, and the term " fire" is called sadhya. To make a correct inference it is necessary that the hetu or liIi.ga must be present in the paka, 1 This later N yiiya doctrine that the cognition of self in association with cognition is produced at a later moment must be contrasted with the trzputipratyak!a doctrine of Prabhakara, which holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simul- taneously in knowledge. Vyavasaya (determinate cognition), according to Gailgda, gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am aware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding the former one and is called anu (after) vyavasaya (cognition), .. idamaha1!1 jiinii1lliti vyavasllye lla bhiisatc tad- bodhakelz driyasannikar!iibhiiviit kin tvidal!lvi!ayakaj iiiillatvaviiif!asya jiilillasya vai- H!tyamilt1/lani bhllsate; Ita ca svaprakilie vyavasllyc tiidrSa1!' svasya vaiii!{Ya1.n bhii- situT/larhati, piirvaJ!1 visefazasya tasYlljiitl1ltlt, tasmiididamahaJ!1 janiimiti na vyavasllyal} kintu anzevyavasiiyah." TattvacilltiimalI, p. 795.