Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/363

VIII] Invariable U1lcondz"tional Conconlita1zce 347 tance, or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It may be that one might never have observed smoke without an antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but e'en that is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents re- mained the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately followed by the disappearance of smoke (yasmill sati bhavanam yato vinii 1la bhavallanz iti bhfi)'odarsana1!l, Nyiiyamaiijari, p. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation of concomitance (vyiipti) between the ass and the smoke}. But of course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the above observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a real hetu, and there might be some other condition (uPiidhi) associated with the hetu which was the real hetu. Thus we know that fire in green wood (iirdrendhana) produced smoke, but one might doubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that pro- duced smoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it. But there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulged in them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would have to be dispensed with (vyiighiita). Thus such doubts as lead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or unsettle the notion of vyapti or concomitance at which we had arrived by careful observation and consideration 2. The Buddhists and the naiyayikas generally agreed as to the method of forming the notion of concomitance or vyapti (vyiiptigralta), but the former tried to assert that the validity of such a con- comitance always depended on a relation of cause and effect or of identity of essence, whereas N yaya held that neither the relations of cause and effect, nor that of essential identity of genus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was quite a number of other types of inference which could not be brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the tide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things hap- pening other things would happen could certainly exist, even without the supposition of an identity of essence. But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes often have the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to } See Tiitparya!ikii on anumiina and vyaptigraha. 2 Tiitparya!ikilOn vyaptigraha, and Tattvacintiimazi of Gangda on vyaptigraha.