Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/376

3 60 The Nyaya - Vaiseika Ph£losophy [CH. in the horse that of the cow); (4) atyantiibltiiva (a negation which always exists-e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in other places is not destroyed)l. The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for the seeker of Salvation. It is probable that the N yaya philosophy arose in an atmo- sphere of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are tarka, Ilirlaya, viida, jalpa, vitaW!ii, hetvabltiisa, cltala, jiiti and lligraltastltiina. Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern its real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of some supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions; it is not inference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right conclusion. Vhen there is doubt (sa1!lsaya) about the specific nature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nin:laya means the conclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When two opposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as the doctrines that there is or is not an atman, in which each of them tries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses is called a viit/a. J alpa means a dispute in which the disputants give wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective op- ponents. A jalpa is called a vita?ltjii when it is only a destructive criticism which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine without seeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. Hetvabhasas are those which appear as hetus but are really not so. Nyiiya siUras enumerate five fallacies (ltdviibhiisas) of the middle (hetu): savyab/tica1a (erratic), 'i.-'irltddlta (contradictory), prakara?laSama (tautology), siidltyastlma (unproved reason) and kiilatita (inop- portune). Savyabhicara is that where the same reason may prove opposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal because it is intangible like the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because it is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal); viruddha is that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e.g. a jug is eternal, because it is produced); prakaraJ)asama is that 1 The (loctrine of negation, its function and value with reference to diverse logical problcms, have many divcrse aspccts, and it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this.