37 2 Mzmii1!lSii Philosophy [CH. also been pointed out. Prabhakara's views however could not win many followers in later times, but while living it is said that he was regarded by Kumarila as a very strong rivaP. Hardly any new contribution has been made to the Mlmarpsa philosophy after Kumarila and Prabhakara. The 1I1imiil!lsii. siUras deal mostly with the principles of the interpretation of the Vedic texts in connection with sacrifices, and very little of philosophy can be gleaned out of them. Sabara's contributions are also slight and vague. Varttikakara's views also can only be gathered from the references to them by Kumarila and Prabhakara. What we know of Mlmarpsa philosophy consists of their views and theirs alone. It did not develop any further after them. Works written on the subject in later times were but of a purely expository nature. I do not know of any work on Mlmarpsa written in English except the excellent one by Dr GaIiganatha J ha on the Prabhakara Mlmarpsa to which I have frequently referred. The Parata1)-prama1Jya doctrine of Nyaya and the Svata1)-pramal)ya doctrine of Mimarpsa. The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (svata!t- 'pramii.?zya) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure of the Mlmarpsa philosophy is based. Validity means the certi- tude of truth. The Mlmarpsa philosophy asserts that all know- ledge excepting the action of remembering (smrti) or memory is valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other knowledge for its validity. But Nyaya holds that this self- validity of knowledge is a question which requires an explanation. It is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledge is produced in us, but what is meant by saying that this knowledge is a proof of its own truth? When we perceive anything as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact, and this visual contact cannot certify that the knowledge generated is true, as the visual contact is not in any touch with the knowledge 1 There is a story that Kumarila, not being able to convert Prabhakara, his own pupil, to his views, attcmpted a trick and pretended that he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabhakara whether his burial rites should be performed according to Kumarila's views or Prabhikara's. Prabhakara said that his own views were erroneous, but these were held by him only to rouse up Kumarila's pointed attacks, whereas Kumarila's views were the right ones. Kumarila then rose up and said that Prabhakara was defeated, hut the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was alive. But this has of course no historic value.
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