Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/402

3 86 Mlnziil!lSa Philosophy [CH. that I remember silver is not taken note of at the time of illusion. But it holds that the mere non-distinction is not enough to account for the phenomenon of illusion, for there is a definite positive aspect associated with it, viz. the false identification of silver (seen elsewhere) with the conch-shell before us. The akhyati theory of MlmaITlsa holds that since the special peculiarities of the conch-shell are not noticed, it is erroneous to say that we identify or cognize positively the conch-shell as the silver (perceived elsewhere), for the conch-shell is not cog- nized at all. What happens here is simply this, that only the features common to conch-shell and silver being noticed, the per- ceiver fails to apprehend the difference between these two things, and this gives rise to the cognition of silver. Owing to a certain weakness of the mind the remembrance of silver roused by the common features of the conch-shell and silver is not apprehended, and the fact that it is only a memory of silver seen in some past time that has appeared before him is not perceived; and it is as a result of this non-apprehension of the difference between the silver remembered and the present conch-shell that the illusion takes place. Thus, though the illusory perception partakes of a dual character of remembrance and apprehension, and as such is different from the ordinary valid perception (which is wholly a matter of direct apprehension) of real silver before us, yet as the difference between the remembrance of silver and the sight of the present object is not apprehended, the illusory perception appears at the moment of its production to be as valid as a real valid perception. Both give rise to the same kind of activity on the part of the agent, for in illusory perception the perceiver would be as eager to stoop and pick up the thing as in the case of a real perception. Kumarila agrees with this view as expounded by Prabhakara, and further says that the illusory judgment is as valid to the cognizor at the time that he has the cognition as any real judgment could be. If subsequent experience rejects it, that does not matter, for it is admitted in MlmaITlsa that when later experience finds out the defects of any perception it can invalidate the original perception which was self-valid at the time of its production 1. It is easy to see that the MlmaITlsa had to adopt this view of illusion to maintain the doctrine that all cognition at the moment of its production is valid. The akhyati theory 1 See Prakaralapaiicikii, 's"iistradipikii, and Slokaviirttika, si"ttra 2.