Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/413

IX] Non-perceptio1l 397 bring; these two are then combined into the meaning" bring the cow." But on the former theory the word giim means that it is connected with some kind of action, and the particular sentence only shows what the special kind of action is, as in the above sentence it appears as associated with bringing, but it cannot have any meaning separately by itself. This theory of Kumarila which is also the N yaya theory is called abhihitanvayavada 1. Lastly according to Prabhakara it is only the Veda that can be called sabda-pramarya, and only those sentences of it which contain injunctions (such as, perform this sacrifice in this way with these things). In all other cases the validity of words is only inferred on the ground of the trustworthy character of the speaker. But Kumarila considers the words of all trustworthy persons as sabda-pramarya. The PramaI)a of Non-perception (anupalabdhi). In addition to the above pramaryas Kumarila admits a fifth kind of pramarya, viz. a1lupalabdhi for the perception of the non- existence of a thing. Kumarila argues that the non-existence of a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Some people prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of anumana. They say that wherever there is the existence of a visible object there is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no vision of a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easy to see that such an inference presupposes the perception of want of vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptions are to be accounted for is exactly the point to be solved. How can the perception of want of vision or want of existence begrasped? It is for this that we have to admit a separate mode of pramarya namely anupalabdhi. All things exist in places either in a positive (sadritpa) or in a negative relation (asadriipa), and it is only in the former case 1 See Prahhiikaramimiil!lsii by Dr Ganganatha Jba and S. N. Dasgupta's Study of Patanjali, appendix. It may be noted in this connection that Mimal11sa did not favour the Spho!a doctrine of sound which consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds of letters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was mani- fested (spho!a) but not created by the passing sounds of the syllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project this word-manifestation. See Vacaspati's Tattva- hindu, Slokaviirttika and Prakara'.wpaiicikii. For the doctrine of anvitabhidhana see Salikanatha's Viikyiirthamiitrkavrtti.