Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/432

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4 16 The Sanka1'a School of Vedanta [CH. tact induced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as a unique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the knower and the known. N e are not concerned with physical colloca- tions, for whatever these may be it is knowledge which reveals things-the direct apprehension that should be called the pra- mal)a. Pramal)a in this sense is the same as pramiti or prama, the phenomenon of apprehension. Pramal).a may also indeed mean the collocations so far as they induce the prama. For prama or right knowledge is never produced, it always exists, but it manifests itself differently under different circumstances. The validity of knowledge means the conviction or the specific attitude that is generated in us with reference to the objective world. This validity is manifested with the rise of knowledge, and it does not await the verdict of any later experience in the objective field (sa1!lViidin). Knowledge as nirvikalpa (indeter- minate) means the whole knowledge of the object and not merely a non-sensible hypothetical indeterminate class-notion as Nyaya holds. The savikalpa (determinate) knowledge only re-establishes the knowledge thus formed by relating it with other objects as represented by memoryl. Prabhakara rejected the SaIpkhya conception of a dual element in consciousness as involving a transcendent intelligence (cit) and a material part, the buddhi; but it regarded consciousness as an unique thing which by itself in one flash represented both the knower and the known. The validity of knowledge did not depend upon its faithfulness in reproducing or indicating (pradarsakatva) external objects, but upon the force that all direct apprehension (allubkitti) has of prompting us to action in the external world; knowledge is thus a complete and independent unit in all its self-revealing aspects. But what the knowledge was in itself apart from its self-revealing character Prabhakara did not enquire. Kumarila declared that jfiana (knowledge) was a movement brought about by the activity of the self which resulted in pro- ducing consciousness (jrititatii) of objective things. J fiana itself cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred as the movement necessary for producing the jfiatata or consciousness of things. Movement with Kumarila was not a mere atomic vibration, but was a non-sensuous transcendent operation of which vibration 1 Sarpkhya considered nirvikalpa as the dim knowledge of the first moment of consciousness, which, when it became clear at the next moment, was called savikalpa.