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434 The Saizkara School of Vedanta [CH. a particular conclusion. As eXplained by Sankara, most of these siltras except the first four and the first two chapters of the second book are devoted to the textual interpretations of the Upaniad passages. Sankara's method of explaining the abso- lutist Vedanta creed does not consist in proving the Vedanta to be a consistent system of metaphysics, complete in all parts, but in so interpreting the U pani!?ad texts as to show that they all agree in holding the Brahman to be the self and that alone to be the only truth. In Chapter I of Book II Sankara tries to answer some of the objectios that may be made from the Sarpkhya point of view against his absolutist creed and to show that some apparent difficulties of the absolutist doctrine did not present any real difficulty. In Chapter II of Book II he tries to refute the Sarpkhya, Yoga, N yaya- V aiseika, the Buddhist, J aina, Bha- gavata and Saiva systems of thought. These two chapters and his commentaries on the first four siltras contain the main points of his system. The rest of the work is mainly occupied in show- ing that the conclusion of the siltras was always in strict agree- ment with the U paniad doctrines. Reason with Sai1kara never r occupied the premier position; its value was considered only secondary, only so far as it helped one to the right understanding of the revealed scriptures, the U pani!?ads. The ultimate truth can- not be known by reason alone. What one debater shows to be reasonable a more expert debater shows to be false, and what he shows to be right is again proved to be false by another debater. So there is no final certainty to which we can arrive by logic and argument alone. The ultimate truth can thus only be found in the U pani!?ads; reason, discrimination and judgment are all to be used only with a view to the discovery of the real purport of the U pani!?ads. From his own position Sai1kara was not thus bound to vindicate the position of the Vedanta as a thoroughly rational system of metaphysics. For its truth did not depend on its rationality but on the authority of the Upani!?ads. But what was true could not contradict experience. If therefore Sankara's interpretation of the U paniads was true, then it would not con- tradict experience. Sallkara was therefore bound to show that his interpretation was rational and did not contradict experience. If he could show that his interpretation was the only interpreta- tion that was faithful to the U paniads, and that its apparent contradictions with experience could in some way be explained,