Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/458

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44 2 The Sa1ikara School of Vedanta [CH. world-appearance disappears once for all. No intermediate link is necessary to effect it, no mechanical dissociation of buddhi or manas, but just as by finding out the glittering piece to be a conch- shell the illusory perception of silver is destroyed, so this illusory perception of world-appearance is also destroyed by a true knowledge of the reality, the Brahman. The U paniads held that reality or truth was one, and there was "no many" anywhere, and Sailkara explained it by adding that the" many" was merely an illusion, and hence did not exist in reality and was bound to disappear when the truth was known. The world-appearance is maya (illusion). 'rhis is what Sailkara emphasizes in ex- pounding his constructive system of the U pani!?ad doctrine. The question is sometimes asked, how the maya becomes asso- ciated with Brahman. But Vedanta thinks this question illegiti- mate, for this association did not begin in time either with reference to the cosmos or with reference to individual persons. In fact there is no real association, for the creation of illusion does not affect the unchangeable truth. Maya or illusion is no real entity, it is only false knowledge (avidyii) that makes the appearance, which vanishes when the reality is grasped and found. Maya or avidya has an apparent existence only so long as it lasts, but the moment the truth is known it is dissolved. It is not a real entity in association with which a real world-appear- ance has been brought into permanent existence, for it only has existence so long as we are deluded by it (priititika-sattii). Maya therefore is a category which baffles the ordinary logical division of existence and non-existence and the principle of ex- cluded middle. For the maya can neither be said to be "is" nor "is not" (tattviillyat1.1iibhyiim a1zirvacalliyii). It cannot be said that such a logical category does not exist, for all our dream and illusory cognitions demonstrate it to us. They exist as they are perceived, but they do not exist since they have no other inde- pendent existence than the fact of their perception. If it has any creative function, that function is as illusive as its own nature, for the creation only lasts so long as the error lasts. Brahman, the truth, is not in any way sullied or affected by association with maya, for there can be no association of the real with the empty, the maya, the illusory. It is no real association but a mere appearance.