Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/464

44 8 The Sankara School of Vedanta [CH. connection with the objects which it illumines, for had it not been so there could be any knowledge at any time irrespective of its connections with the objects. But it is not possible to imagine any kind of connection between consciousness and its objects, for it can neither be contact (sa1!zyoga) nor inherence (samavaya); and apart from these two kinds of connections we know of no other. We say that things are the objects of our consciousness, but what is meant by it is ii'ideed difficult to define. It cannot be that objectivity of consciousness means that a special effect like the jfiataUi of Mlmarpsa is' produced upon the object, for such an effect is not admiib1e or perceivable in any way; nor can objectivity also mean any practical purpose (of being useful to us) associated with the object as Prabhakara thinks, for there are many things which are the objects of our consciousnes but not considered as useful (e.g. the sky). Objectivity also cannot mean that the thing is the object of the thought-movement (jiialla- kiira?/a) involved in knowledge, for this can only be with reference to objects present to the perceiver, and cannot apply to objects of past time about which one may be conscious, for if the thing is not present how can it be made an object of thought-movement? Objectivity further cannot mean that the things project their own forms on the knowledge and are hence called objects, for though this may apply in the case of perception, it cannot be true of inference, where the object of con"sciousness is far away and does not mould consciousness after its own form. Thus in whatever way we may try to conceive manifold things existirig separately and becoming objects of consciousness we fail. We have also seen that it is difficult to conceive of any kind of relation sub- sisting between objects and consciousness, and hence it has to be admitted that the imposition of the world-appearance is after all nothing but illusory. N ow though all things are but illusory impositions on con- sciousness yet for the illumination of specific objects it is admitted even by Vedanta that this can only take place through specific sense-contact and particular mental states (v,rttz") or modes; but if that be so why not rather admit that this can take place even on the assumption of the absolute reality of the manifold external world without? The answer that the Vedanta gives to such a question is this, that the phenomenon of illumination has not to undergo any gradual process, for it is the work of one