Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/476

4 60 The Saizkara School of Vedanta [CH. constitution and not on the se]( If it is regarded as a quality of the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has necessarily to be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from what else could it be produced? Thus it is to be admitted that the self, the atman, is the self-luminous entity. Noone doubts any of his knowledge, whether it is he who sees or anybody else. The self is thus the same as vijfiana, the pure consciousness, which is always of itself self-luminous l . Again, though consciousness is continuous in all stages, waking or sleeping, yet aharpkara is absent during deep sleep. I t is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels "I slept happily and did not know anything": yet what happens is this, that during deep sleep the antal)kara1)a and the aharpkara arc altogether submerged in the ajfiana, and there are only the ajfiana and the self; on waking, this aharpkara as a state of antaJ:lkar1)a is again generated, and then it associates the per- ception of the ajftana in the sleep and originates the perception "I did not know anything." This aharpkara which is a mode (vrttz) of the antal)kara1)a is thus constituted by avidya, and is manifested as jfianasakti (power of knowledge) and kriyasakti (power of work). This kriyasakti of the ahaq1kara is illusorily imposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears to be an active agent in knowing and willing. The aharpkara itself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or vf1:ti of the antal)karaI)a, and as such the aharpkara of a past period can now be associated; but even then the vrtti of antaJ:lkaraI)a, ahaq1kara, may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of. the antal)karaI)a. The same antal)kara1)a is called manas in its capacity as doubt, buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of knowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering 2 . When the pure cit shines forth in association with this antal)karaI)a, it is called a jlva. It is clear from the above account that the ajfiana is not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. But it cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support it (iisra)/a); its own nature as the aji'iana or indefinite is perceived directly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating the phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as under- I See Nyiiyalllakarmlda, pp. [30-140, Citj'ukha anu Vivara'.laprameyasal!lgraha, pp. 53-58. 2 See Vediinta-paribhtNii, p. 88, Bombay edition.