Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/487

.xl Theory of Perception 47 1 pramal)a is to be defined as the means that leads to such right knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge (pra11la) in Vedanta is the knowledge of an object which has not been found contradicted (abadhitartlla1.11ayaJilallatva). Except when specially expressed otherwise, prama is generally considered as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unac- quired (anadhigata) and uncontradicted knowledge. Objections are sometimes raised that when we are looking at a thing for a few minutes, the perception of the thing in all the successive moments after the first refers to the image of the thing acquired in the previous moments. To this the reply is that the Vedanta considers that so long as a different mental state does not arise, any mental state is not to be considered as momentary but as . remaining ever the same. So long as we continue to perceive one thing there is no reason to suppose that there has been a series of mental states. So there is no question as to the know- ledge of the succeeding moments being referred to the know- ledge of the preceding moments, for so long as any mental state has anyone thing for its object it is to be considered as having remained unchanged all through the series of moments. There is of course this difference between the same percept of a previous and a later moment following in succession, that fresh elements of time are being perceived as prior and later, though the content of the mental state so far as the object is concerned remains unchanged. This time element is perceived by the senses though the content of the mental state may remain undisturbed. When I see the same book for two seconds, my mental state representing the book is not changed every second, and hence there can be no sitch supposition that I am having separate mental states in succession each of which is a repetition of the previous one, for so long as the general content of the mental state remains the same there is no reason for supposing that there has been any change in the mental state. The mental state thus remains the same so long as the content is not changed, but though it remains the same it can note the change in the time elements as extraneolls demonstrating the illusory nature of the world of appearance, and did not work out a logical theory. It may be incidentally mentioned that in the theory of inference as worked out by Dharmariijiidhvarlndra he was largely indebted to the Mimiil!1sa school of thought. In recognizing arthapatti, upamana sabda and anupalabdhi also Dharma- riijiidhvarindra accepted the Jlimiirpsii view. The Vedantins, previous to Dharmarii- jiidhvarindra, had also tacitly followed the Mimii111sii in these matters.