Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/499

x] Percept-ion 4 8 3 , mental modification, as perception in seeing the hill, and as inference in inferring the fire in the hilL In cases of acquired perception, as when on seeing sandal wood I think that it is odoriferous sandal wood, it is pure perception so far as the sandal wood is concerned, it is inference or memory so far as I assert it to be odoriferous. Vedanta does not admit the existence of the relation called samaviiya (inherence) or jtitz" (class notion); and so does not distinguish perception as a class as distinct from the other class called inference, and holds that both perception and inference are but different modes of the transformations of the antal)kara1)a reflecting the cit in the corresponding vrttis. The perception is thus nothing but the cit manifestation in the antal:t- kara1)a vrtti transformed into the form of an object with which it is in contact. Perception in its objective aspect is the identity of the cit underlying the object with the subject, and perception in the subjective aspect is regarded as the identity of the subjective cit with the objective cit. This identity of course means that through the vrtti the same reality subsisting in the object and the subject is realized, whereas in inference the thing to be in- ferred, being away from contact with antal:tkara1)a, has apparently a different reality from that manifested in the states of conscious- ness. Thus perception is regarded as the mental state represent- ing the same identical reality in the object and the subject by antal:tkara1)a contact, and it is held that the knowledge produced by words (e.g. this is the same Devadatta) referring identically to the same thing which is seen (e.g. when I see Devadatta before me another man says this is Devadatta, and the know- ledge produced by "this is Devadatta" though a verbal (Siibda) knowledge is to be regarded as perception, for the antal:tkara1)a vrtti is the same) is to be regarded as perception or pratyaka. The content of these words (this is Devadatta) being the same as the perception, and there being no new relationing knowledge as represented in the proposition "this is Devadatta" involving the unity of two terms "this" and "Devadatta" with a copula, but only the indication of one whole as Devadatta under visual per- ception already experienced, the knowledge proceeding from "this is Devadatta" is regarded as an example of nirvikalpa knowledge. So on the occasion of the rise of Brahma-conscious- ness when the preceptor instructs "thou art Brahman" the knowledge proceeding from the sentence is not savikalpa, for