from MACV on the availability and receipt of storage for bulk petroleum products. Class I supplies were still under study. A maintenance policy had been worked out for the evacuation of equipment for rebuild and overhaul. All transportation problems had been solved and, finally, training plans had been completed and disseminated.
Because of the unpredictable outcome of Korean plans to deploy a division to Vietnam and the urgent need to have another division there, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, informed the Commander in Chief, Pacific, through U.S. Army, Pacific, that if deployment of the Korean division did not take place by 1 November 1965, a U.S. Army division would have to be sent to Vietnam instead. Since planning actions for the movement of a division from either the Pacific command or the continental command would have to be initiated at once, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Admiral Sharp's opinion on the best means of getting a substitute for the Korean division if the need arose.
Admiral Sharp's view was that the two U.S. divisions then in Korea constituted an essential forward deployment force that should not be reduced. Commitment of the 25th Infantry Division to Vietnam—except for the one-brigade task force requested in the event of an emergency—would deplete Pacific command reserve strength at a critical time. Moreover, the 25th Infantry Division was oriented for deployment to Thailand, and if moved to Vietnam should be replaced immediately with another U.S. division. With deployment of the Korean division to Vietnam, the 25th Infantry Division would be available as a substitute for the Korean division in Korea.
On 19 August 1965 the Korean National Assembly finally passed a bill authorizing the dispatch of the Korean division. The division was to deploy in three increments: the first on 29 September 1965; the second on 14 October 1965; and the third on 29 October 1965. Initial equipment shortages were not expected to reduce the combat readiness of the division.
Definitive discussion between U.S. and Korean authorities on the dispatch of troops began immediately. As a result, the first combat units, the Republic of Korea's Capital (Tiger) Infantry Division, less one regimental combat team, and the 2d Marine Corps Brigade (Blue Dragon) and supporting elements, totaling 18,212 men, were sent during the period September through November 1965.
The Korean government then sought reassurance that sending troops to Vietnam would neither impair Korean defense nor adversely affect the level of U.S. military assistance to Korea. It
