also sought agreements on the terms of U.S. support for Korean troops in Vietnam. Resulting arrangements between the United States and Korea provided substantially the following terms.
- 1. No U.S. or Korean force reductions were to take place in Korea without prior consultation.
- 2. The Korean Military Assistance Program for 1966 was to include an additional $7 million to provide active division equipment for the three Korean Army ready-reserve divisions.
- 3. Korean forces in Korea were to be modernized in firepower, communications, and mobility.
- 4. For Korean forces deployed to Vietnam, the United States was to provide equipment, logistical support, construction, training, transportation, subsistence, overseas allowances, funds for any legitimate noncombat claim brought against Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam, in Vietnam, and restitution of losses of the Korean force not resulting from the force's negligence.
General Westmoreland also agreed to provide the Korean force with facilities and service comparable to those furnished U.S. and other allied forces in Vietnam. Korean forces in Vietnam had custody of the equipment funded by the Military Assistance Program brought into Vietnam and equipment funded by the Military Assistance Service and provided by General Westmoreland. Equipment funded by the Military Assistance Program that was battle damaged or otherwise attrited was replaced and title retained by the Republic of Korea. In an emergency redeployment to Korea, the Koreans would take with them all equipment on hand. In a slower deployment of rotation, equipment would be negotiated, particularly that held by Koreans in Vietnam but not comparable with similar equipment held by Korean forces in Korea and items extraneous to the Military Assistance Program.
Prior to the arrival of the Korean division, considerable study of possible locations for its deployment took place. The first plan was to employ the division in the I Corps Tactical Zone, with major elements at Chu Lai, Tam Ky, and Quang Ngai; Korean troops would join with the III Marine Amphibious Force, and perhaps other Free World units to form an international Free World force. Subsequently, this idea was dropped for several reasons. First of all, support of another full division in that area would be difficult logistically because over-the-beach supply would be necessary. Deployment of the division in the I Corps Tactical Zone would also necessitate offensive operations since the enclaves were already adequately secured by elements of the III Marine Amphibious Force. Offensive operations might, in
