financing those costs or a portion thereof necessary to prevent the aid from being withdrawn. Washington would decide the question of cost sharing, and pressed for standardized overseas allowance and maintenance costs, reflecting equal rates for all Free World forces. In the event donors could not meet operating expenses, the Agency for International Development through allocations to the budget would subsidize them. Donors were also asked to furnish the supplies and equipment their projects curtailed. In determining the nature of the project, countries were to keep in mind certain criteria, namely that the project be clearly defined, be self-contained, and make a direct contribution to pacification or other priority programs.
Because of the accelerating pace of events and continuing political uncertainty in South Vietnam, the U.S. government began to consider contingencies other than using noncombatants from the allies. In a memorandum of 7 February 1965 to the President, McGeorge Bundy, believing the government of Vietnam would collapse by 1966 without more U.S. help and action, recommended increasing military pressure against the north. Also in early February the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested deployment of a Marine expeditionary brigade to Da Nang.
The commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, responding to a message from the Joint Chiefs requesting his views on the security situation and possible troop deployments to the most vulnerable areas, indicated in a 17 February message that the security situation was in fact deteriorating, and supported the Joint Chiefs' recommendation that the Marine brigade be sent to Da Nang.
In February 1965, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs notified General Westmoreland that a major policy decision had been made "at the highest level" to "do everything possible to maximize our military efforts to reverse the present unfavorable situation [in South Vietnam]." The foundation was thus laid for steady increases in U.S. and Free World combat troop deployments; it was determined to press forward to attain U.S. limited objectives despite any difficulties.
The Joint Chiefs then expanded, in a 20 February message, their recommendations to include deployment of a Republic of Korea Army division "for counterinsurgency and base security operations. Estimated strength 21,000," as well as additional U.S. troops–Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps. The message also spelled out two stumbling blocks to the recommended deployment. The first problem was the provision of sufficient logistical support and the second the establishment of joint command
