Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/160

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146
SECTION VII.

Merit, even in the greatest Men; and becomes still more requisite in those of inferior Rank and Character. 'Tis an agreeable Representation. Which a French Writer gives of the Situation of his own Mind in this Passage[errata 1]. Virtue I love, says he, without Austerity: Pleasure, without Effeminacy: And Life, without securing its End[1].

Who is not struck with any signal Instance of GREATNESS of MIND or Dignity of Character; with Elevation of Sentiments, Disdain of Slavery, and with that noble Pride and Spirit, which arises from conscious Worth and Virtue? The Sublime, says Longinus, is often nothing but the Echo or Image of Magnanimity; and where this Quality appears in any one, even without uttering a Syllable, it excites our Applause and Admiration; as may be observ'd of the famous Silence of Ajax in the Odyssey, which expresses more noble Disdain and resolute Indignation, than any Language can convey[2].

Were I Alexander, say'd Parmenio, I would accept of these Offers made by Darius. So would I too, reply'd Alexander, were I Parmenio. This Saying is admirable, says Longinus, from a like Principle[3].

  1. J'aime la vertu, sans rudessé;
    J'aime le plaisir, sans molesse;
    J'aime la vie, & n'en crains point la fin.  St. Evremond.

  2. Cap. 9.
  3. Idem.

GO!

Errata

  1. Original: this Particular was amended to this Passage: detail