the inhabitants of which were able in many cases to take refuge in the fortified military stations, the Arabs were unable to inflict any injury on their rulers. The system of inert optimism, of which we have selected instances from our Indian administration, prevails in every other dependency where the influence of our Government and its military departments penetrates, and produces equally dangerous results. We cannot expect a Government to be prudent abroad that is improvident at home; and until it has realised the necessity for preparing for future emergencies in Great Britain, there is not much chance of adequate consideration being extended to the circumstances of its external possessions.
Before entering on a discussion of the best manner in which our national insurance can be effected, it is necessary to show clearly that the measures at present taken for that purpose are insufficient. It is desirable, in the first place, to clearly and thoroughly comprehend that if this country is ever engaged in war with a strong naval and military power, no time will be available for preparation. It will be a word and a blow. When, in 1858, the question of war between France and England was in the balance, in consequence of the excitement caused in both countries by the Orsini conspiracy and the intolerably offensive addresses presented by certain colonels to the Emperor, the plan of action, which the French Government is believed to have contemplated, was to despatch, at the same moment war was decided on, strong squadrons from Brest and Cherbourg to bombard Portsmouth. In that case no time would have been available to complete our preparations. One of the chief objects with which the large military powers of the Continent are always studying and improving their system of mobilisation, is to insure the power of striking their enemy with as little delay as possible. We read of schemes elaborated by the Germans for despatching, within some hours of the declaration of war, such a force of cavalry into the enemy's territory as would prevent the mobilisation of their forces in those portions of the country near the frontier. Russia is said to have strong independent divisions of dragoons echeloned along her western border, ready to be launched into German or Austrian territory at a few hours' notice, in the event of war with either of those countries taking place. It is evident that similar cavalry operations cannot be undertaken against us, and that we cannot prepare for any rapid movement of this precise description against any Continental power. But we must remember that, in preparing for an attack on England, the first business of the enemy must be to mobilise his fleet. This mobilisation it should be our endeavour to prevent; and for this purpose we should have plans of operation ready and a fleet fit to carry them out, and prepared to strike within a few hours of receiving its orders to do so. We ought to have a fleet available for this purpose, which should be maintained solely for this special duty, and which should never be beyond a few days' steaming from our coasts. A vigorous blow struck at once at the enemy's principal naval ports would not only incapacitate him from undertaking the invasion of England, but it should also so establish our naval prestige as, with the assistance of our fleets in distant waters, to insure very little disturbance being caused to our maritime commerce in any part of the world.
