Our fleet is, and must remain, the first defence of England; and it is by maintaining it in such superior strength and readiness as will enable it to strike at once and effectively, that the safety of the country can be best secured.
We cannot, however, trust our national existence and prosperity to one line of defence only. Behind the navy we must have regular troops ready to take the field – either abroad or at home – at very short notice, and our auxiliary forces in such a condition as to be available, after a few days' preparation, for active operations in the United Kingdom. Our naval and mercantile ports, both at home and in the colonies, should no longer remain a tempting prey to an enemy's cruisers, but should be protected by strongly armed forts.
The various measures which are necessary to put the United Kingdom and her possessions in a moderately safe and secure position will now be enumerated in the order of their importance, and will be subsequently discussed in detail. They are –
I. The strengthening of the navy.
II. The strengthening and efficient arming of the works defending our naval arsenals and ports, and a proper supply of ammunition.
III. The protection of the mercantile ports of the United Kingdom.
IV. The protection of the principal ports and coaling depots of our colonial possessions.
V. The provision of complete equipment and stores of every description, with proper storehouse accommodation for two army corps on a war footing, and clothing and equipment for the whole of the reserve.
VI. The provision of such equipment and stores (including guns of position) as are necessary to enable the whole of the remaining troops, regular and auxiliary, which can be called out in the United Kingdom, to take the field or be employed in garrison duty.
VII. The construction of an arsenal and a camp of instruction in the north of England.
Any estimate of the various measures mentioned must necessarily be more or less vague; but approximate estimates are requisite in order to allow of considerations being given to the manner in which the funds can be best provided.
I. For some few years past there has been a general feeling throughout the country that, with reference to the growth of foreign navies, the English fleet is not maintained at the preponderating and superior strength which is necessary for the security of the empire. So that, besides being made powerful enough to undertake the extra duty – which, as already pointed out, our fleet should be prepared for – it ought also to be increased to such strength as will enable it to more than hold its own in the defence of our shores and the protection of our commerce in all parts of the world.
The recent disclosures which have been wrung from the Admiralty regarding the deterioration of the Fleet during recent years, and its insufficiency to deal with any serious emergency, have marked out the strengthening of the Navy as the primary and most pressing step to be taken towards national insurance. It cannot be said that the measures which the Admiralty has undertaken, or the expenses which it contemplates incurring, give much assurance of the restoration of England to the first place among naval powers; and it will be well
