his foreign sources of supply by the scandalous disclosures of 1873, could no longer raise the five millions sterling a-year of interest for which he had made Egypt liable. The bondholders met and stormed, as bondholders always do at such disagreeable junctures. They passed and recorded the usual resolution to have a thorough investigation of the bankrupt's affairs. A representative of the highest social position and the most trustworthy character was needed to go to Cairo. The then paymaster of her Majesty's Forces, the late Mr Stephen Cave, was invited to undertake the mission, and he carried it out very ably. Most of the figures above quoted are from his exhaustive and edifying report. He gave the bondholders clearly to understand that only the strictest economy and prudence on the part of the Egyptian Government could secure their interest for them out of the normal revenue of the country. The next question was how to get such unknown and uncongenial virtues as economy and prudence introduced at Cairo. It was proposed to form a European Control Department, whose business it should be "to secure the punctual payment of the debt charges." This meant in effect that Ismail Pasha and his Ministers were not to be trusted with such a delicate operation as the management of an insolvent Treasury. If Egypt had been a powerful State, Ismail Pasha would have snapped his fingers in the face of his creditors; but, unhappily for him, he was only a third-rate defaulter, and there were various ways of putting the screw on him. It could be done at Cairo or at Paris, but most effectively at Constantinople. The Sultan was only too glad of an opportunity of reminding him, that brilliant and enterprising as he was, he had a suzerain.
The scheme of a European Control Department thus mooted in 1876 was highly approved at Paris, but it found no favour at the British Foreign Office. Lord Derby, our then Foreign Minister, was the man above all others qualified to forecast the consequences of such a dubious proposal. His superhuman caution saved him from yielding an inch to the new doctrine which was being urged on him of the duty of the Government to protect the private interests of its subjects abroad. He categorically refused to have anything to do with the "International Commission," which was the next proposal. But lest he should be considered too cold-blooded, he made a concession to the distressed bondholders: he "lent" them a British official, Mr Rivers Wilson, to represent them on the Commission, and he authorised our Consul-General at Cairo to grant "such unofficial assistance as he possibly could." Here Lord Derby, from his own point of view, may be fairly thought to have made a mistake. In these matters there is seldom a safe middle course. Unofficial diplomacy is as much a contradiction in terms as unofficial war, and it generally has the same issue. If it is right or prudent for a consul to act at all in a private matter, he should act officially. If it is not right or prudent, his personal interference may be even worse than his official interference. Mr Rivers Wilson went out to Cairo at the beginning of 1876, and made the startling discovery that the debt, including arrears of interest and floating debt, now amounted to 91 millions sterling! The burden of the fellaheen was rolling up remorselessly. Lord Derby, despairing of effectual help, withdrew his unofficial countenance, and Mr Rivers Wilson was recalled. The bondholders had to take a new
