departure, and Mr Goschen now came to their rescue. His firm, as bankers for the two first loans, had presented a formal protest at Cairo against the non-payment of the coupons. It was resolved to follow that up with a special mission to Egypt, of such a character as to impress the Khedive, whose good faith was not implicitly relied on. Mr Goschen agreed to go as the English commissioner, and his French colleague was M. Joubert. They adopted drastic measures. Finding that Ismael Sadyk Pasha, the Minister of Finance, was hostile to them, they had him tried on a charge of conspiracy against the Khedive, and sent off to the White Nile – the Siberia of Egypt. Ismail Pasha then surrendered at discretion, and subscribed to the commissioners' terms – European comptrollers of the revenue, European commissioners of the public debt, a special hypothecation of the dues of Port Alexandria, and an Anglo-French administration of the State railways, – a complete financial control of the country, in short.
This, it will be observed, was a private contract between the ex-Khedive and his foreign creditors. The British Consul-General at Cairo had assisted "unofficially" to carry it through, and, with Lord Derby's sanction, he afterwards gave the Comptrollers his "unofficial" support in their difficult task of enforcing it. But there was no political purpose or completion whatever in the Dual Control as thus originally established. In all its aims and circumstances, it will be seen that it was a financial arrangement. The plain practical facts were that Ismail Pasha, the then virtually absolute ruler of Egypt, was bankrupt, and put himself under trust. Such was the exact situation created by the Goschen-Joubert compact of 1876, out of which arose the original Dual Control. The causes of its failure, and of the political intervention thereby necessitated, three years later, are but too easily traced. The trust-estate was in a much worse state than had been suspected; and the bankrupt, not to put too fine a point on it, required very dexterous handling. The provision made for the service of the foreign debt was ample, but the surplus left for carrying on the government of the country was utterly insufficient. In the first year of the Control (1877) the total revenue was about 9½ millions sterling. Of that the bondholders got over 7 millions, partly as interest and partly as redemption of capital. The Turkish tribute and the interest on the Suez Canal shares, payable to the British Government, absorbed another million, leaving the last million and a few odd thousand pounds for the whole expenses of administration of 400,000 square miles of country, inhabited by 5½ millions of people.
Ismail Pasha, who had all the cuteness of impecuniosity, foresaw clearly enough how the Control would work, and how capital might be made out of it for himself. That it should be unpopular with the natives was inevitable, and a word or a hint from him could always intensify the feeling. The whole machinery of the Government, from the Council of Ministers to the sheik of the smallest village, was cleverly worked so as to bring odium on the foreign interlopers. Twice a-year, when the coupons had to be made up, a greedy army of tax-gatherers was set on to grind money out of the poor fellaheen. They were compelled to pay their taxes six months and sometimes twelve months in advance. If unable, their cattle were seized and driven to market,
