ward, and had occupied Zulfikar by the time that the British Ministry had fully grasped the alarming nature of the situation, and had made representations at St Petersburg which led to more guarded conduct on the part of General Komaroff.
What sort of counsel did the Government on its part give to the Commissioner amid the trying circumstances in which he found himself placed? It was reported, on good authority, that instructions were sent to him to organise a defence of the Afghan frontier; and if this was the case, some explanation is necessary with regard to our treatment of the British officers who were present at the action of 18th March, and whose credit seems to have been slightingly dealt with in our controversy with Russia regarding that affair. Then he was told that he must do his best to keep the Afghans from advancing; and when he replied that this was impossible, and asked for further orders, Lord Granville telegraphed back an assurance of "full support." It must strike every one that the recent Afghan blue-books do not tell the whole story of the Government's instructions to the Commission, and that we must wait for Sir Peter Lumsden's return to get at the truth. However, the Governments, both of Great Britain and India, were thoroughly aroused; military preparations were begun in both countries with a degree of ostentation which rarely heralds serious warfare; and it was notorious that the Russian garrisons, which had been increased along the Krasnovodsk-Sarakhs line during October-February 1884-85, were now being swelled to an effective footing by drafts from the Caucasus and from across the Caspian.
On March 13th Mr Gladstone made a statement in the House of Commons that the controversy regarding the settlement of the Afghan frontier had not yet reached such a point on both sides that the matter could be said to be exhausted, and that an agreement had been made, "for diplomatic purposes," that neither party should advance farther. The Premier declined to say whether this agreement was of a temporary or permanent character, but it would last "as long as there was occasion for it," – a Gladstonian utterance that called forth not very comfortable laughter from honourable members. This statement was based upon a series of telegrams, the last being dated 5th March. To make assurance doubly sure, the Cabinet telegraphed to St Petersburg, after Mr Gladstone had made this declaration, to ask whether the communications made really warranted the construction that had been put upon them, thus affording the Russian Government an early intimation of the timidity and irresolution with which it had to deal. Next day this statement was qualified, on the authority of the Czar's Ministers, by information that the Russian advance would not take place, unless for "some extraordinary reason – say disturbances at Penjdeh," – a proviso the saving nature of which soon became obvious. Thus, instead of the "agreement" which Mr Gladstone at first thought he had got hold of, we had only an "arrangement." Orders had, we were assured, been issued from St Petersburg enjoining the Russian commandants on the debatable land to avoid provoking a collision; but, as it subsequently turned out, less than the usual care in matters of such importance was taken at St Petersburg to ensure these instructions reaching their proper destination in time to be of any use.
