This negligence was all the more culpable that the Russian Government had apparently been informed by telegram of General Komaroff's desire to attack Penjdeh. Under the temporary sedative of this arrangement a lull was produced on both sides; the Russian press for a little laid aside its warlike tone, and employed the interval in urging the mutual advantages of Russia being allowed to rest upon an "ethnographical frontier." But the great question with both parties – was Afghan territory to remain inviolable, and the frontier to be at once carefully delimited on the spot? – was rapidly being lost sight of by the British Government, amid the incessant diplomatic diversions which MM. De Giers and De Staal were keeping up to distract its interest.
That the subject of frontier delimitation was, however, not wholly lost sight of, may be inferred from Mr Gladstone's statement on 24th March, that the Russian answer had not yet been received to a communication made ten days previously which would bring to issue the question whether the frontier was to be settled by inquiry on the spot or by negotiations in London, where M. Lessar was doing his best to plead the Russian cause through the press and at public meetings. Russia did not want to go to Herat, said M. Lessar, just as no less an authority than his Majesty the Czar had assured Lord Dufferin six years before that there was no intention of Russian troops advancing to Merv, – an assurance to which the usual saving clause was hastily supplied by M. de Giers, that "under different circumstances and in view of unforeseen contingencies, the occupation of Merv might become necessary." We may assume that it was not without reluctance that the Gladstone Government found itself being successfully manipulated by the Russian Government on the frontier question, for military preparations on a great scale were ordered in India, and movements for concentrating forces at Quetta and Pishin were pushed on. Not to force the hands of the British Government too much, or to reveal her fixed determination to prevent any inquiry being made on the spot, before she had secured the positions on which her mind was set, Russia amused us with a rumour that General Zelanoy was to commence work with Sir Peter Lumsden as soon as the negotiations with London had resulted in a "preliminary settlement" of the subjects in dispute. But even at this time, towards the end of March, with Herat practically lying within the grasp of Russia if she chose to put forth her hand and seize it, there were unquestionable signs that the Gladstone Government was yielding; and its surrender would unquestionably have come much sooner, but for an untoward incident which aroused a momentary flash of resolution, only to result in more complete humiliation and failure.
When Parliament adjourned for the Easter recess on 31st March, the Government was still unable to afford any information regarding the course of negotiations. All that was known was that Russia was still pressing for "a preliminary understanding" on certain matters – generally understood to be that Penjdeh and Zulfikar should be exempted from the delimitation inquiry – and which Mr Gladstone's Government was combating with some show of determination. And certainly there seemed then to be no lack of resolution outside the circles of negotiation. We were answering Russia's war preparations
