possible, therefore, that they could reach Kartoum on the 25th; and the imputation on Wilson conveyed by the passage is, in any case, without foundation. But it is to be noted that here Lord Wolseley is taking absolutely new ground; for, having sent Wilson to communicate with Gordon, he is here implying that his duty was to relieve him.
At this time the Government seems to have become alive to the careful avoidance by Lord Wolseley of all approval of Wilson: not one word of commendation had he given to the victor of Gubat, – a fact which had been noticed early in February in the London press. On the 11th February Lord Hartington telegraphs to Lord Wolseley: "Express warm recognition of Government of brilliant services of Sir Charles Wilson, and satisfaction at gallant rescue of his party." Now it is a remarkable fact that this telegram is omitted from the published parliamentary papers. More than a month later, Wilson seems to have been called on for a statement of the occupation of the interval between his arrival on the Nile and his departure for Kartoum. Accordingly, on the 23d March he wrote the report which, in reply to a question, Lord Hartington, on 15th May, said should be laid on the table, and which is now before us. In it Wilson sets forth the situation of his force on the 21st, when the steamers reached him. It had been much weakened by the heavy losses of the 17th and 19th: it was to be further diminished by the return of the convoy and escort to Gakdul, and it was hampered by the large number of wounded. The men, too, we know from other sources, were quite exhausted with the fighting and want of sleep – horses and camels were knocked up. And besides the presence of the enemy's garrison in Metammeh, there were rumours of hostile forces advancing on both sides. He had, therefore, urgently to provide for the defence of his camp. This anxious condition of affairs continued up to the afternoon of the 22d, when the steamers were repaired and ready. "The only day," says Wilson, "that might have been saved was the 22d, as the reconnaissance showed that the force had nothing to fear from the Berber direction." He means that it might have been saved had he known the real state of the case; but he did not know it, and it was most necessary to ascertain it. There remains the 23d. Of this day he says –
"General Gordon, in a most characteristic letter, addressed to the Chief of the Staff or to the Officer Commanding the British advanced - guard, insisted strongly on our taking actual command of the steamers, and removing from them all Pashas, Beys, and men of Turk, or Egyptian, origin. He wrote in strong terms of the uselessness of these men in action, and begged that, if the boats were not manned by British sailors, they should be sent back to him with none but Soudanese crews and soldiers. It was originally intended that the steamers should be manned by the Naval Brigade, but Lord Charles Beresford was in hospital, unable to walk, and all the other officers of the Brigade, and several of the best petty officers and men, had been killed or wounded. It was therefore impossible to carry out the original plan; and though Lord Charles Beresford, in the most gallant way, offered to accompany me, I felt that I could not deprive the force of the only naval officer with it, especially as the steamers left behind might be called upon at any time to take part in active operations against the enemy. It was therefore necessary to select Soudanese officers, crews, and soldiers from the four ships, and to transfer them to the two steamers going to Kartoum. This was the chief reason for the delay on the 23d."
