Now, even supposing that a few hours of daylight could have been saved on the 23d – and we do not know that they could; on the contrary, we gather from the report that they could not – yet, even then, the steamers could not have reached Kartoum till late on the 27th, the day after the fall of the place. The point is therefore of absolutely no importance to the issue. Unless Wilson had left his exhausted force unfortified and exposed to attack, and had embarked in steamers unprepared for the voyage, which Gordon held to be so perilous, he could not have reached Kartoum even on the 26th. It appears not only an absurdity, but a mischievous absurdity, to charge a man who had done so much in such harassing circumstances with not doing more. To our mind he needed no defence, and ought not to have undergone the imputation implied in the demand for explanation.
This report was sent home by Lord Wolseley, with a letter from himself, which we here give entire.
"Cairo, 13th April 1885.
"My Lord, – I have the honour to forward a letter from Colonel Sir C. Wilson, R.E., giving the reasons for the delay in the departure of the steamers from Gubat.
"I do not propose to add any re- marks of my own to this letter. The reasons given by Sir Charles Wilson must speak for themselves. I have, &c., Wolseley, General.
"The Right Hon.
Marquis of Hartington, M.P."
Now this is a letter which may be read in two ways. Had Lord Wolseley made previous mention of Sir G. Wilson's conduct with approval, it might mean that it was obviously and completely satisfactory. But it must be taken in connection not only with careful avoidance of approval, but of what is implied in Lord Wolseley's despatch of the 15th February, and must be read as declining to say a word which might tend to absolve Wilson.
We need hardly say that the whole theory that Gordon's rescue was possible, even by Wolseley's whole force, had it reached the Nile before Wilson's scanty column got there, rests upon nothing but wild assumption. The truth of the matter is, we doubt not, that put forth as his opinion by Lord Granville in the House of Lords on the 18th May. He said: –
"The noble earl said it did not signify what the cause was that took us to the Soudan. I am bound to say it signifies very much. It was, if possible, to save General Gordon. I do not believe it was a question of time – that is purely a matter of opinion. I believe that treachery would have had effect at whatever time the relief expedition might have arrived."
So say we, and we will give a reason for the belief which Lord Granville would naturally abstain from. The Mahdi (as will be found, we believe, in Gordon's diary) knew of our declared intention to abandon the Soudan after the rescue of Gordon. He had means of constantly communicating with the troops in Kartoum. He would therefore argue with them in this cogent fashion: "The English are coming to take away Gordon, and will then quit the Soudan. The defence of the place depends upon Gordon. Without him and without the English, you cannot keep me out. If I capture the place by force, I will kill every man. But if you agree to admit me when I shall desire it, I will spare you and take you into my service." It is no wonder that these poor Egyptians, who owed no fealty to us, or even to Gordon, if he
