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in no such conversation; with the door open, he could have seized Toy. Instead, when Toy terminated the opportunity for further conversation by telling the agent to return for his laundry later, the agent merely disclosed his official capacity, obviously to continue the interview. He showed his badge and stated, "I am a federal narcotics agent." He said nothing about an arrest. This is undisputed in the officer's testimony and that of Toy himself (R. 51-53; 38, 39, 45-47). Contrary statements in the arguments of counsel in the district court are not supported by the record.
There then occurred the action by Toy that forced upon the officer a split-second decision and supported the arrest as immediately necessary and lawful. Toy slammed the door shut and fled toward the rear of the laundry (the officer could see the flight through the glass in the door). If Toy had narcotics on the premises he could conceal or destroy them in an instant. See Mattus v. United States, 11 F. 2d 503, 504 (C.A. 9); United States v. Kancso, 252 F. 2d 220, 222 (C.A. 2). He could also escape. In sum, Toy's action in fleeing, combined with Hom Way's accusation, constituted probable cause for the arrest of Toy at that moment. Toy's slamming of the door was no flight from a supposed robber. Toy made no claim of any such fear.[1] The admitted circumstances af-
- ↑ He testified, instead, that he had closed the door and gone to the rear of the laundry, admittedly taking "big steps" (supra, p. 4), and that the officers had thereafter suddenly crashed through the door. We disagree with petitioners' statement (Pet. Br. 4) that "Toy testified he then" locked the
