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ford no explanation of the flight to the rear other than guilt. There was only a single agent, standing in daylight at the door of a laundry on a public street, with no weapons, and who had made no attempt to enter. The door was not slammed when the man at the door inquired for laundry; it was slammed when the officer's badge was exhibited.
In these circumstances, the officer surely had cause to believe Toy guilty; unexplained flight from an officer is strong indication of guilt. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 701; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 166, fn. 7; Wrightson v. United States, 236 F. 2d 672, 673 (C.A.D.C.); Jones v. United States, 131 F. 2d 539, 541 (C.A. 10); Levine v. United States, 138 F. 2d 627, 629 (C.A. 2); United States v. Heitner, 149 F. 2d 105, 107 (C.A. 2); People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 108; People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 303; Allen v. McCoy, 135 Cal. App. 500, 507; People v. Dewson, 150 Cal. App. 2d 119, 129; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940), sec. 276. As stated in Green v. United States, 259 F. 2d 180, 182 (C.A.D.C.), certiorari denied, 359 U.S. 917:
The appellant, then, made his own decision [of flight], not because of threatened assault, for he proved none. His effort to escape impelled his attempted illegal course * * * before the very eyes of the officers. The arrest was proper.
1. ↑ front door and "as he started toward his living quarters" the agents, about seven in number, "broke in and pursued him * * *." This was only one of three versions Toy told, another being, "as I tried to close the door," the agent forced the door (R. 38), and the third being that he heard the crash when he "had gone back to [his] bedroom" (R. 47).
