Page:Brief for the United States, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).djvu/38

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

32

Or, as stated in People v. Howard, 173 Cal. App. 2d 787, 791, where the information had come from theretofore unknown members of a check-passing group:

[T]he act of the man in slamming and locking the door indicated that the man was fleeing from and attempting to prevent the officer from apprehending him. The information which the officer had received and the conduct of the appellant in the presence of the officer constituted probable cause to arrest appellant. * * *

And see Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103, distinguishing its facts from a case of "fleeing men or men acting furtively".^[1]

The composite of elements here is as persuasive of guilt, we believe, as the circumstances in numerous decisions that have established probable cause upon corroboration of prior information by factors less

↑ Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, cited by petitioners to the effect that slamming a door and running did not justify entry (Pet. Br. 9), is inapposite, upon the facts stated in Miller—there, this Court questioned whether the running was from police, since it was doubted whether the concededly low-voiced enunciation of the word "police" had been heard. There was not, as here, an exhibiting of the official badge, and the officers were not in such uniform as would dispense with the need to show a badge (357 U.S. at 311). United States v. Castle, 138 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C.), also cited by petitioners (Pet. Br. 9), did not involve flight. Gascon v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 2d 356, did not embody prior events, as here, to give significance to the flight. Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 269, similarly lacked a background of prior events, as the prosecution there was still relying on the California non-exclusionary rule as to evidence (see pp. 272–273). People v. O'Neill, 10 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Dist. Ct. of App., Cal.), involved an admission by the officer that he had no information as to the reliability of his informant (p. 116), and the circumstances provided a possible innocent basis for the closing of the door.

[1] Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, cited by petitioners to the effect that slamming a door and running did not justify entry (Pet. Br. 9), is inapposite, upon the facts stated in Miller—there, this Court questioned whether the running was from police, since it was doubted whether the concededly low-voiced enunciation of the word "police" had been heard. There was not, as here, an exhibiting of the official badge, and the officers were not in such uniform as would dispense with the need to show a badge (357 U.S. at 311). United States v. Castle, 138 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C.), also cited by petitioners (Pet. Br. 9), did not involve flight. Gascon v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 2d 356, did not embody prior events, as here, to give significance to the flight. Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 269, similarly lacked a background of prior events, as the prosecution there was still relying on the California non-exclusionary rule as to evidence (see pp. 272–273). People v. O'Neill, 10 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Dist. Ct. of App., Cal.), involved an admission by the officer that he had no information as to the reliability of his informant (p. 116), and the circumstances provided a possible innocent basis for the closing of the door.

[1]