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training, and a l-BO-hours C-hé pilot—in-command flight check by a company check pllot — all of which were passed successfully. On July 1, 1963, he was aSSigned as a captain on C—hé aircraft and at the time of the seeident had accumulated 108 hours of C—hé pilotuin-command time on LOGAIR miss10ns.
AAXICO crew personnel are hired by a pilot employment group and aSSigned to fly under contract for AAXICO. They are compensated for mileage flown in accord— ance with MATS mileage figures from psint to pOint speCified in LOGAIR contractsn Mileage is not payable for distances flown while in a holding pattern; awaiting ATC clearance; on route deViations due to weather; deViations to Weather alter— nates; or on flights of less than 30 minutes which begin and terminate at the same station due to malfunctions of the aircraft, or for any other reasons.
Analysis
A careful examination of all the eVidence indicates that the failure of the right engine was caused by the failure of the front master rod bearing. The evidence of the bearing, oil cooler, scavenger screens, scavenger pump, oil pressure regulator valve and pressure pump, together with the captain's statement, and the observations of ground witnesses, all confirm that the engine had been operating for some time at an excessively high oil temperature with a failure in process. The high temperature was due to the failure of front master rod bearing. This condition resulted in a rise in friction and higher than normal oil temperature. The normal oil flow and cooling were not adequate to compensate for the added heat conduction. The engine oil system became contaminated with sludge and metal as the bearing failure progressed with the final overtravel and breakup of the pistons.
It is apparent that the captain initially attempted to lower the cilntet- peratures by descending the aircraft With engine power reduced. These efiorts were unsuccessful and Oil inlet temperature continued to be exceSSive even after power reductions.
Oil inlet temperatures on the right engine began to exceed maximum allowable temperatures when the aircraft was approximately-500 feet above the ground after takeoff. The Board believes a reasonably prudent pilot would have made a deter- mined effort to lower the temperatures and if they did not decrease after these efforts, an immediate return to the psint of takeoff would have been made.
Numerous witnesses observed black smoke coming from the right chain: aSflfgi;n% aircraft progressed eastward. The continued exce551vely high oil inle egggafiioq p and the drop in oil pressure after power reduction, should haVe been an indication to the captain of an abnormally operating engine.
When the aircraft was at approx1matelY 500 feat above the terrain (3,500 m.s.l.) and withln 50 nautical miles of its departure point, the right englne began to backfire and the captain shut it down and feathered the propeller. Normal feathering was reflected in the captain's statements and in the examination of the propeller assembly.
At this point, the captain reversed course and began a 100 to 200-foot-per-minute descent.
According to C-46F performance criteria in Federal Aviation Regulations, Civil Aeronautics manual 42, N 67941, under existing conditions, should have been
