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able to operate on a single-engine and maintain a 50-foot-per-minute climb within altitudes well above the accident site.
Although the landing strip at Geraldine has a physical length of 2,900 feet, and the landing distance required for N 67941's weight and configuration at the Geraldlne Airport was more than this distance; nevertheless, it is believed that the aircraft could have been landed at Geraldlne Airport and braked to a stop with minimum damage, if any, to the aircraft, and without loss of life.
Once having gotten so low with uneven terrain on all sides, the captain was forced to fly in the directions of lowest elevations. This required constant heading changes and turns, and some of these banks were described by witnesses to be as steep as 45 degrees.
The airspeed continued to decrease as a result of aircraft maneuvering to avoid terrain obstacles. The left engine oil temperature had increased appreciably beyond normal operating limits although the pilot stated the power was normal for the density altitude. The fact that the airspeed dropped below 100 knots is not abnormal considering the aircraft maneuvers and density altitude. The flight with constant banks and turns continued to bleed off airspeed and prevented the aircraft obtaining its normal single-engine rate of climb in time to avoid contacting the terrain. When airspeed dropped below the best METO climb speed of approximately 113 knots, and then reduced further to airspeeds below minimum control speed (Vmc), it was obvious that a landing had to be made.
In tracing the probable flightpath, it is evident that there were other areas where an emergency landing could have been accomplished successfully. It is apparent the captain ignored these opportunities.
The field upon which the aircraft crashed was purported by the pilot to have been selected by him for the emergency landing. However, as airspeed continued to decrease and the operating temperature of the left engine increased, the aircraft was maneuvered into an area which was surrounded on three sides by rising terrain. The tops of the terrain were above his flight altitude, and airspeed was too low to establish a climb. The Board believes the pilot was aware that a crash landing was imminent; and that the area of the crash was selected for him by circumstances over which he had no control at the time.
Therefore, the Board concludes that the accident was the result of an improper assessment by the captain of his engine instrument readings; a lack of knowledge and training in areas of aircraft performance; and a display of poor judgment.
Probable Cause
The Board determines the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the captain to effect a proper and timely assessment of a powerplant malfunction, followed by improper judgment and technique during a single-engine emergency operation.
Recommendatlons
As a result of the Board‘s investigation of this accident, it recommended to the Federal Aviation Agency that the proration formula used in FAA Advisory
