Page:CAB Accident Report, Eastern Air Lines Flight 14.pdf/19

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A.M. by Larry C. Stevens.

The first fragmentary flight progress report concerning Trip 14 was received by Dispatcher Stevens in New York about 9:10 A.M. (a few minutes after the accident had occurred). This message from Eastern's Miami station contained the information that "Trip 10 had asked Trip 14 to hold in the vicinity of Palm Beach until Trip 10 got in the clear". This message also contained the information that Trip 14 was proceeding to Daytona Beach. Stevens further testified that "after 10 o'clock {A.M.)" he "received a message from Miami which was a copy of a report sent to then (Miami) by Captain Meyers as to the weather he had encountered".

As a result of the delay in transmitting communications, the New York dispatch office of Eastern had absolutely no information concerning Trip 14 from the time of the departure from Miami at 7:45 A.M. until about 9:10 A.M. which was after the accident had occurred. The New York dispatcher did not receive any weather reports from Eastern's Florida stations until after 10 o'clock that would cause him to be concerned with the safety of flight operations in the vicinity of Vero Beach. The New York dispatcher did not have the information that Trip 14 had been holding in the vicinity of Stuart and had then continued north, until approximately 25 minutes after the flight had proceeded north. According to the testimony the New York dispatcher did not know that Trip 10 had decided to return to West Palm Beach because of the weather condition until approximately 50 minutes after the decision to return was made. The New York dispatcher, who was stationed approximately 1100 miles from the locale of the bad weather and the scene of the accident, did not receive a report of the weather encountered by Trip 10 at 8:30 A.M. until after 10 o'clock.

The duties of the aircraft dispatcher are not limited to the dispatching of flights from one terminal point to another. He cannot consistently with the proper performance of his functions dispatch an aircraft and leave the remainder of the flight entirely to the pilot. He is responsible for keeping in frequent, regular contact with the flight in order that he can furnish the flight with all weather traffic, and other pertinent information relating to the operation of the trip. It is obvious that Dispatcher Stevens of New York was not in frequent regular contact with Trip 14 or any other trips operating in Florida about that time and that he could not possibly have furnished Trip 14 with the assistance to which Captain O'Brien was entitled. The only one who was actually in possession of sufficient information with respect to the operation of Trip 14 was the transportation agent at West Palm Beach.

Before persons are permitted to perform the functions of an aircraft dispatcher they must have an aircraft dispatcher certificate issued by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, which certificates are issued only after a showing of extensive aeronautical experience and a demonstration of adequate skill through written and practical examination. The purpose of these previsions is completely defeated if an airline fails to provide adequate dispatchers thus requiring them to communicate over such long distances that they cannot secure current information and by requiring them to have so many flights under their control that they cannot pay adequate attention to any of them. If a trained dispatcher had been located in the Florida sector of Route 6, he would have recognized the significance of Captain Meyers' 8:32 A.M. radio message that he was on instruments and encountering heavy turbulence. A qualified dispatcher could have been expected to transmit this message to Trip 14 accurately and would not have been satisfied with Captain Meyers' rather general weather report. He would have requested complete weather information promptly and would have

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