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assisted the pilot of Trip 14 by reporting such information to him immediately. It is equally certain that such a trained dispatcher would not have failed to acquaint Captain Whipprecht with Captain Meyers' experience.
Section 61.55 of the Civil Air Regulations, dealing with dispatchers, provides in part as follows:
"61.550 Number required.The air carrier shall provide an adequate number of certificated aircraft dispatchers, necessary for the type of operation involved, for the purpose of dispatching air carrier aircraft."
"61.551 Location.One or more aircraft dispatchers shall be located at such points as may be deemed necessary by the Administrator to insure the safe operation of the air carrier."
It is a primary responsibility of the air carrier to establish its ground organization so as to comply with these regulations. As the result of the facts disclosed in the investigation of this accident, it was the considered judgment of the Board that Eastern had not provided sufficient dispatch centers on Route 6, and the Board on May 8, 1941, recommended to the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics that he conduct an informal investigation of the operating procedures of Eastern. The Board has been advised that Eastern has established an additional dispatch center at Miami to better facilitate flight operations on Route 6.
We have concluded that Eastern's ground personnel failed to properly apprise Captain O'Brien of the weather conditions that he might expect to encounter but it does not necessarily follow that this omission by itself caused the accident. In view of the known frequency with which violently turbulent conditions are associated with thunderstorms, Captain O'Brien should have made the most careful observation of the thunderstorm area into which he was proceeding, since even the inadequate weather information furnished by Eastern's ground personnel predicted "light to occasionally moderate turbulence in scattered thundershowers" along the flight path. While it is impossible to determine whether or not mere visual observation of the cloud mass would have given warning that it possessed unusual characteristics, there is enough possibility that it might have done so to cause unfavorable comment on the lack of evidence of any concern on the pilot's part for the making of the closest possible examination of the characteristics of the storm, and of its apparent lateral extent, before entering it.
We must consider whether Trip 14 encountered turbulence of such extraordinary intensity that it was impossible for the captain, exercising the degree of skill expected of an airline pilot, to maintain control of the airplane. If the turbulence encountered did not approach that degree of severity, then an additional inquiry must be made into the degree of care and skill exercised by O'Brien after be entered the cloud mass.
In determining the degree of turbulence we have the testimony of the four Eastern Air Lines pilots who flew through the storm area on the morning of April 3, a meteorological analysis and the testimony of Captain O'Brien and First Officer Crabtree and of their passengers.
Of the four Eastern Air Lines pilots who flew through the storm, two described the turbulence encountered as "moderate"; another stated that he encountered "severe turbulence";
