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We have concluded previously in this report that the aircraft involved in the accident had been properly maintained and was in airworthy condition when at took off from Miami, Florida. An examination of the carrier's records shows that it had been given the required periodic checks and a pre—flight inspection prior to its departure from this point. The possibility of damage to the aircraft during the landing at Port au Prince was thoroughly investigated by crew members at the time and no damage was found. The water surface at the time of this landing was not unusual. The waves were much too small to be of any importance and the swell estimated at less than one foot in height was not of sufficient magnitude to produce severe landing loads. Moreover, all three of the flight officers testified that the aircraft, engines and controls functioned normally during the remainder of the flight to San Juan, including the landing and take-off at San Pedro de Macoris.
The fact that the aircraft's radiotelephone was inoperative is not material for at most it is used only as an additional radio facility to the flight while operating in close proximity to a station. The conventional (telegraphic) radio set was still available to Captain Lorber had he desired to obtain landing instructions prior to landing. Since Captain Lorber had knowledge of the wind conditions at the time of his approach to San Juan and could see the landing lights laid out in the harbor, his failure to obtain landing instructions did not contribute to the accident.
The Board having concluded that Pan American's facilities at San Juan are adequate for night water landing it is now faced with the question as to whether the crew on the landing launch at San Juan performed their assigned duties in a satisfactory manner. The evidence intimates that they did.
Mr Jahncke, the Relief Airport Manager in charge of the landing launch, had personally supervised the placing of the landing lights in the harbor. In fact, all members of the crew of the launch were well qualified and performed their assigned duties in a satisfactory manner. The lights were laid out properly with regard to the wind direction, and all were lighted. The area adjacent to these lights which was entirely suitable for the landing, had previously been scrutinized by the crew of the landing launch and found to be clear of obstructions. According to company procedure the launch stood by after placing the lights approximately abeam of the green light and about 300 feet north of it. The engine in the launch was kept running. When it was determined that the airplane was approaching for a down-wind landing, the search—light was turned in the opposite direction so that its beam would not impair the pilot's vision. The white flare was fired from the launch in accordance with regular procedure. Although darkness had not become complete, the crew of the launch should have followed the regular procedure and fired a green flare, signifying "all clear" However, the failure did not contribute to the accident since the pilot was not in any way mislead.
Immediately following the crash the launch proceeded at maximum speed to the scene of the accident and participated in rescuing the passengers and crew. The rescue work was performed commendably. Particularly noteworthy was the work of one Harold Roebuck, a native Puerto Rican who repeatedly dived and swam through the partially submerged cabin freeing passengers and removing them from the wreckage, This action was attended by considerable hazard and physical discomfort as the surface of the water was covered with gasoline from the wreckage.
Next we must determine whether the conduct of the flight by Captain Lorber is in any way subject to criticism. There appears to be no question as to the manner in which he
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