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thoroughly examined. No failures during flight and no conditions which could have contributed to the accident were revealed. As stated before, the voice radio installed in the airplane was inoperative during the final approach to San Juan. This radio equipment was so badly damaged during or subsequent to the accident that it was impossible to determine why it did not function.
A thorough inspection failed to disclose evidence of any appreciable amount of corrosion which might have contributed to the weakening of the general structure of the aircraft.
The nature of the damage to the hull and wings indicated that it was the result of the aircraft's being subjected to severe water loads applied first against the lower left portion of the bow and then against the left wing's leading edge, and that in the interval between these two impact loads the left wing tip pontoon was crushed and broken backwards and laterally from the left.
Conduct of the Flight
The dispatching of the flight from Miami, Florida, to San Juan, Puerto Rico, with three intermediate steps was in accordance with proper procedure. The fact that the flight was conducted at an altitude of 8000 feet over most of this leg of the route, rather than at the 9000 feet prescribed in the flight plan, is not pertinent to the accident, although it was forecast that the most advantageous winds would exist at the 9000-foot level. San Pedro de Macoris, the last port of departure, is not equipped for landing at night and according to company procedure, flights are not dispatched from that port later than a time which will allow return and landing at that port during daylight, if mechanical trouble or unfavorable weather is encountered before reaching a point half way to San Juan. The time of departure from San Pedro de Macoris was 4.09 p. m. (EST). This departure time, taking cognizance of the slight difference in times of sunset at San Pedro de Macoris and San Juan, was consistent with the above procedure.
Flight 203 was scheduled to arrive at San Juan before sunset, but because it had left Miami 18 minutes late and had become increasingly so as it progressed because of head winds, it was apparent to the crew during the latter portion of the flight that a night landing would be necessary at San Juan Harbor.
This is consistent with proper procedure since night landings at San Juan Harbor with the type of equipment involved were allowed by the Pan American's Operations Specifications, which are a part of the terms and conditions of the air carrier operating certificate issued to Pan American by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics. The harbor appears to be entirely suitable for night landings so long as the pilot involved is proficient.[1] and Pan American's system of lighting and patrolling the landing area is followed.
Weather conditions were favorable for operation over the portion of the route involved. Investigation of all weather services disclosed that the forecast and other weather advice made available to Captain Lorber, including the conditions of the water surface at all points of landing, were substantially accurate. All weather observational facilities involved functioned in an entirely normal manner throughout the flight.
- ↑ Immediately after the accident the Administrator prohibited night landings at San Juan and other points on this route, pending the conclusion of this investigation and a demonstration by the pilots of their ability to make such landings.
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